Who can elaborate on Russia's current military thinking and strategy?

A summary of Russia's current military strategy

1. The main features of Russia's "containment" strategy. In essence, Russia's "realistic containment" strategy is an active defense strategy based on nuclear deterrence, taking conventional forces as practical means, and flexibly combining mobile combat troops (mobile troops) with fixed deployment combat troops (cover troops). Its core idea is: in terms of strategic guidance, it highlights the deterrent role of strategic nuclear forces and the actual combat role of conventional mobile forces, curbs and counterattacks aggression from any direction, so as to safeguard and defend Russia's status as a great power and traditional interests; In operational theory, it emphasizes the combination of attack and defense and mobile operations. Once the deterrence fails and an armed conflict occurs, the front-line troops will be used to cover the battle, and the fast mobile troops deployed in deep areas will be quickly dispatched to reinforce the front-line troops to fight, change the power balance, and take various flexible and active combat actions to strive for a quick victory. With the gradual escalation of the war, strategic reserves should be used when necessary to achieve the final victory of the war. In military construction, while maintaining a standing strategic nuclear force, we should focus on building conventional mobile forces and establish a modern army with moderate scale, well-equipped, strong mobility and flexible command, which can reliably safeguard Russia's status as a big country and its traditional interests; In terms of strategic policy, the main purpose is to prevent and respond to local wars and regional armed conflicts, implement the strategic deployment of "preemptive strike", and strive to establish a combat system with both offensive and defensive capabilities that can cope with various armed conflicts and wars. This strategy has the following characteristics:

(1) Active Russia's "realistic containment" strategy, in essence, is an active defense strategy. It is not only different from the "active attack" strategy pursued by the former Soviet Union, but also emphasizes that attack is the basic type of military action and defense is in an auxiliary and secondary position. It is also different from the "pure defense strategy" that pursued in the post-Soviet period, which regards defense as the basic type of military action. Instead, we should adhere to strategic defense, pay equal attention to attack and defense in campaigns and tactical actions, combine attack and defense, use them flexibly, and redefine the dialectical unity relationship between defense and attack in future wars with a more pragmatic attitude. The Russian army believes that "the political defense policy of military doctrine refers to the state's opposition to war as a means to achieve political goals, and it is not prepared to attack any country first, and the combat method is a military action method adopted after the outbreak of war. These are two factors that work in completely different situations, so they are not necessarily the same. After the war broke out, neither of the warring sides would tie their hands and feet to fight in any way. While resisting aggression, the defensive side will also take very resolute actions to launch a fire assault on the entire deployment depth of the enemy, and actively defend against the enemy, including first attacking the territory of the aggressor country and the most important military target, and also attacking the territory of the enemy country, so that the enemy cannot recover its strength and re-invade. " "What kind of combat mode should be adopted in the battles and battles of future wars should be decided according to the actual situation, and the combat mode and means that are most in line with the established situation and can best grasp the initiative and attack the aggressors should be chosen, instead of sticking to a fixed combat type." "The armed forces must be prepared to carry out various types of military operations. Whether it is defense or attack, what is needed in war, Lu Haijun must train in a targeted manner." The above shows that Russia's "realistic containment" strategy has formally abandoned the defense theories of "no first use of nuclear weapons", "no first use of force" and "no crossing the border" in the post-Soviet period, and has a more flexible animal and plant nature.

(2) Nuclear deterrence The main military means adopted in Russia's "realistic containment" strategy are strategic nuclear forces and conventional mobile forces. The former is mainly used for deterrence and the latter is mainly used for actual combat. Giving up the political commitment of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and highlighting the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons are important features of Russia's "realistic containment" strategy, and it is also an active strategic application in which Russian nuclear forces turn to strategic defense in an all-round way and strive for initiative in passivity. 1994165438+14 October, Grachev pointed out at the meeting of senior Russian commanders: "Today, strategic nuclear forces are still the main guarantee of security and the main factor to prevent possible aggression. When he met with NATO representatives in Brussels, he said more clearly: "Today, strategic nuclear forces are still the main guarantee of security and the main factor to prevent possible aggression. When he met with NATO representatives in Brussels, he said more clearly: "Russia no longer regards nuclear weapons as a means of military action, but as a deterrent." Russia's new military doctrine also clearly stipulates: "The policy goal of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by containing aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies." At present, Russia's nuclear deterrent thought has been basically consistent with America's nuclear deterrent strategy. The difference is that Russia attaches importance to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons at this stage, and regards nuclear weapons as the main means to contain wars against Russia and CIS countries to a greater extent. During the period of 1994, the famous Russian military theorist General Galeev stressed in an interview with the editorial department of Red Star that in order to implement the idea of nuclear deterrence, we should not only study the theory of institutional nuclear deterrence at present, but also change the whole nuclear planning system and the military training policy, with the emphasis on conventional warfare under the condition of nuclear deterrence.

(3) Economy The so-called "economy" refers to reducing the size of the standing army as much as possible in peacetime, ensuring reserve forces, and striving for reasonable security efficiency at a small economic cost on the premise of ensuring national military security. This is the basic focus of Russia's "realistic containment" strategy. Russia believes that with the disintegration of the cold war system, it is neither necessary nor possible to engage in an arms race and spend huge sums of money to support a huge armed force. At present, the scope of Russia's military action has changed from responding to world-scale wars to responding to domestic crises and conflicts in surrounding areas. Therefore, it is less necessary for Russia to maintain a large-scale standing army. In addition, due to Russia's financial difficulties, the full rate of the army has declined, and it is difficult for Russia to maintain a large-scale standing army. Podkolzin, commander of Russian airborne troops, clearly pointed out when answering ITAR reporter's question about why Russia should build a mobile force with airborne troops as the core: "A country with a vast territory like Russia should have an army of 5-6 million people, but we can't allow ourselves to be so extravagant. Therefore, the establishment of airborne troops should become the backbone of mobile troops. " Based on the above understanding, Russia has made clear the way to reduce its troops since it set up its own armed forces. This method of force reduction is embodied in the strategy of "realistic containment": the standing army is limited to being able to cope with the current threatening regional conflicts, and only the cover troops and mobile troops are retained. If something can't be handled for this reason, it will be handled by mobilizing equipment. To this end, while reducing the size of the standing army, Russia tried to strengthen the reserve force to guard against the development of the situation. 1In February 1993, Russia passed the Law on Military Duty and Service in the Russian Federation, and in June of the same year, it passed the Regulations on Military Training for Reserve Citizens in the Russian Federation. In order to ensure the reserve force, Russia is revising relevant laws.

(4) Alliance strategy is an important part of Russia's military strategy, and it is also a consistent practice for Russia to divide hostile camps, avoid fighting on two fronts, establish buffer industries and strive for breathing time. In the history of Russian military strategy development, there have been many examples of wars. During the period of tsarist Russia, Ivan IV made enemies in the east, south and west in the "Livonia War" for the Baltic Sea, and adopted the strategic policy of first east and then west, and finally avoided the two-front battle. Before launching the war, Catherine II always carried out all-round diplomatic activities, established alliances, divided and isolated the enemy. Russia's most successful action in implementing the alliance strategy and establishing a buffer zone was to establish a military alliance group-Warsaw Treaty Organization in Europe after World War II. At present, Russia's "realistic containment" strategy also attaches great importance to military intelligence and the establishment of buffer zones.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unified military system, unified defense zones and unified military strategic space have been in a state of disintegration, and the defense capabilities of CIS countries, including Russia, have obviously declined, and their security cannot be effectively guaranteed. Therefore, the Russian army believes that "Russia's security is inseparable from the security of all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States" and that "the defense of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States can only be effectively guaranteed through collective defense and unified command". In order to ensure Russia's own security and stability, "it is not necessary to have a strong cordon like Nicholas I, but it needs a strong good-neighborly relationship, but this relationship cannot be based on economic or military weakness. Kolesnikov, former chief of general staff of Russia, also stressed that the CIS countries should not only be buffer state between Russia and other countries, but should become Russia's military alliance. At present, the main way for Russia to implement the alliance strategy and establish a buffer zone is to take the CIS countries as its traditional sphere of influence. On the one hand, it generally signs military cooperation agreements with sovereign countries and actively seeks to establish a collective security system led by Russia; On the other hand, Russia comprehensively uses political, economic, military and diplomatic means to strengthen military cooperation with key countries, seek long-term garrison and establish military bases. At present, in Central Asia, Russia and Tajikistan and other four Central Asian countries have signed an agreement to form a joint defense force, with Russian troops as the main force to defend the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan and control the situation in Tajikistan; Agreements were signed with Turkmenistan to defend the borders between Turkey and Kuwait and between Turkey and Iraq, further strengthening the collective security system in Central Asia. In the Caucasus, with its strong military strength, Russia dominated the situation in Georgia and Azerbaijan, forced Albania to return to the Commonwealth of Independent States, forced Georgia to become a new member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and established its military presence in Georgia through treaties. In Moldova, Russia sent peacekeeping troops to the Transdniestrian coast, which basically controlled the turbulent situation in the region. The ultimate goal of Russian alliance strategy is to establish a collective security system of military alliance with Russia as its ally and similar to NATO.

To sum up, Russia's "realistic containment" strategy is an active defense strategy re-established by Russia according to the new geopolitical situation and the characteristics of modern warfare after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Influenced by traditional views, it is novel; It not only permeates the historical experience, but also embodies the realistic requirements. It integrates enthusiasm, nuclear deterrence, economy and alliance, and is more flexible and pragmatic than the military strategy of the former Soviet Union.

Second, the background and causes of Russia's "realistic containment" strategy. Russia's "realistic containment" strategy was formulated on the basis of the disintegration of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the takeover of the former Soviet Union by Russia after the end of the Cold War. It has a specific domestic and international background and political, economic, military and scientific reasons.

(1) Obeying the needs of national strategy Military strategy is an important part of national strategy, and military strategy must obey and serve national strategy. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, due to the domestic economic situation, Russia had to withdraw from the stage of global hegemony of the United States and the Soviet Union and reformulate its national strategy. The key point here is that Russia is no longer the basis of the economic strength of the former Soviet Union. According to the statistics of western countries, the GNP of the former Soviet Union from 65438 to 0975 accounted for about 67% of the GNP of the United States. From 65438 to 0987, its gross national product accounted for about 64% of the United States gross national product; 1992 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's GNP only accounted for 34% of that of the United States. By 1995, it had further dropped to 17%. Therefore, as early as the beginning of 1992, when Yeltsin met with former US President George W. Bush, he publicly admitted that Russia was already an "abnormal big country" and thought that Russia "should abandon the foreign policy of the former superpower, the idea of world savior, the strategy of competing with the United States and the proposition of pursuing equality with the United States" from the new reality. Of course, from today, it is obvious that Yeltsin's remarks have his political and diplomatic considerations. But he also basically expressed the core idea of Russia's national strategy, that is, during the extremely difficult transition period of Russia's domestic politics, economy and military affairs, Russia temporarily gave up its global strategy of competing with the United States for the world and focused on domestic economic construction and social changes in order to make a comeback in the future. It is for this reason that Russia's "realistic containment" strategy abandons the traditional aggressiveness and all-round expansion of the former Soviet Union, and sets the goal of its military strategy as maintaining its status as a big country and ensuring national sovereignty, territorial integrity and border security.

(2) As a result of 40 years' reflection on the Cold War, Russia's "realistic containment" strategy is essentially a containment defense strategy. Its core idea is to contain aggression and prevent war through the practice of nuclear deterrence and conventional forces, thus ensuring the realization of its national strategy. Therefore, in a sense, Russia's "realistic containment" strategy is a kind of war strategy. Its original intention is not to fight for war, but to prevent war. This is completely different from the traditional thinking of the former Soviet Union that "peace requires war" and "only war can achieve peace". Then, after 40 years of "cold war", why have Russian military thoughts and policies changed so much? This is inseparable from the lessons of the 40-year "cold war" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, why did the Soviet Union go from superpower to collapse? There are many reasons for this situation, but one of the most important reasons is that the arms burden of the former Soviet Union has been too heavy for a long time. According to Russian statistics, for a long time after the war, most of the electronics industry in the Soviet Union, including 1/3 for machinery manufacturing and metal processing, 1/5 for metallurgical industry and 1/6 for chemical products and energy, was used for national defense. In addition, because the Soviet Union has been actively expanding outward by military force for a long time, the Soviet Union has shouldered a heavy economic burden internationally. According to western statistics, for a long time after the war, the Soviet Union spent $3.5 billion on Vietnam War, $6 billion on Cuba and Nicaragua, and more than $3 billion on Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. In these six countries alone, the Soviet Union consumes more than $35 million every day. Russians say that the Soviet war in Afghanistan, like a straw, crushed the camel's back. Therefore, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian authorities drew two conclusions when summing up the historical lessons of the "Cold War": First, modern wars cannot be fought easily; Second, excessive development of armaments will have serious consequences for the national economy. It is based on these lessons that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian government was unable to further reduce military spending, military production and military personnel in order to get rid of domestic economic difficulties. As Russian Foreign Minister primakov said, it is more necessary than ever to rationally arrange the national production expenditure and defense military expenditure, and at the same time, it is expected to vigorously accelerate Russia's economic development.

(3) Adapting to the changes in Russia's security environment is an important basis for Russia to formulate its military strategy. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, great changes have taken place in Russia's security environment.

1. The geopolitical environment has deteriorated seriously. This is more prominent in the European region of Russia. Due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia first went to a strategic cover area with a depth of more than 2,000 kilometers. In the main strategic direction of western Russia, Russia's strategic border has retreated eastward from the original East-West German border by more than 1500 kilometers, and directly retreated to the strategic hinterland of the former Soviet Union-at the gates of Smolensk, and Russia's strategic center of gravity has been completely exposed. In the strategic direction of southwest and northwest, not only Russia's two important maritime directions in Europe, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, were blocked at the same time, but also its western wings, the South Caucasus and the Baltic countries, lost their important support in the main strategic direction in the west. This shows that Russia's heart is vulnerable to foreign invasion. 1in April 1996, why did Russia spare no expense to forgive all the economic debts owed by Belarus and reunify with Belarus? Of course, both sides have their own considerations, but Russia is more concerned with geopolitics. The so-called geopolitics, in short, refers to analyzing the relationship and influence between countries from the perspective of geographical environment in international politics. In Russian history, Eastern Europe was the base for western powers to invade Russia. From the invasion of Teutonic knights in the Middle Ages, to Napoleon's war against Russia in recent years, and the two invasions of the German Empire, Moscow was directly taken from here. 18 12 years, after Napoleon's army captured Smolensk, it occupied Moscow in less than a month and a half. Historians believe that after World War II, after the German army captured Smolensk in July 194 1, if Hitler did not temporarily change his battle plan and transfer his main force to Leningrad and Kiev to continue attacking Moscow, then Moscow would probably be captured, and the history of the Soviet-German war would be rewritten. You know, it's only over 400 kilometers from Smolensk to Moscow. It can be seen from this that Belarus is too important to Russia in geopolitics.

2. The national defense strategic system of the former Soviet Union suffered structural damage. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, not only the former Soviet army was divided up by the host country, but the most important thing was that the unified strategic early warning system, unified strategic air defense system, unified theater command system and unified national defense industry system operated by the former Soviet Union for many years were separated and destroyed in structure. The Russian Federation has not yet established an independent national defense strategy system. Therefore, Russians have always had a sense of crisis in military security.

The war in the former Soviet Union directly threatened Russia's security. The Military Strategy Research Center of the Russian General Staff recently released a report that there were more than 200 territorial disputes in the former Soviet Union, more than 20 armed conflicts and more than 70 territorial and ethnic disputes since 1992. Professor Zolota Lev, a famous Russian military historian, once predicted that in the former Soviet Union, there may be 80 ~ 85 armed conflicts in the foreseeable future, and in these conflicts, 500,000 soldiers will die in the battlefield, and more than 8 million residents may become victims of war.

In a word, the security environment facing Russia is more complicated and severe than that of the former Soviet Union. Russian Foreign Minister primakov clearly pointed out that the security environment facing Russia forced me to "reconsider all national defense concepts, reorganize the armed forces, adjust military deployment, and modify operational plans." (4) Conforming to the trend of military revolution, the formation of Russia's "realistic containment" strategy is also closely related to the rising military revolution today. In fact, as early as the early 1980s, the Russians foresaw the coming of this military revolution. Olgakov, then chief of staff of the Soviet Union, clearly pointed out: "The emergence of advanced non-nuclear technology is causing a new military revolution." The Gulf War made Russians more convinced that "the era of military revolution has arrived". The Russian army believes that the Gulf War has some characteristics of the post-nuclear war, especially the wide application of information technology and precision-guided weapons in the military field today, which has made a qualitative leap in military thinking completely different from the nuclear age, including the concept of war, the theory of building the army and the operational thinking. Therefore, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian army, while attaching importance to the development of high-tech weapons, continued to explore major changes in military theory brought about by the military technological revolution in combination with the Gulf War. Western military experts pointed out that the practice of today's military revolution and the Gulf War provided a realistic basis for the Russian army to change its traditional military theory from one side. This is also an important reason for the formation of Russia's "realistic containment" strategy.

To sum up, Russia's "realistic containment" strategy has the following points: first, get rid of Russia's diplomatic predicament as soon as possible and improve Russia's security environment; Second, on the premise of ensuring national military security, try to reduce the size of the standing army in peacetime, reduce the economic burden of the country, and focus on ensuring Russia's domestic economic construction; Third, strive to be in an invincible position in the military high-tech competition in the 2 1 century, and improve and enhance the comprehensive national strength.

Third, the development trend of Russia's "realistic containment" strategy, the adjustment of a country's military strategy, from theoretical proposal to full implementation, objectively needs a long period. This is because the upgrading of weapons and equipment, the transition of military system, the reorganization of military structure and the adjustment of strategic deployment all take time to ensure. It took 10 years for the United States to adjust its military strategy after the war, from "massive retaliation strategy" to "flexible response strategy". At present, the adjustment of Russian military strategy itself contains a series of complex problems in the fundamental reorganization of the state and the army. Russia will not only continue to reduce its troops by more than 500,000, but also completely change a set of army-building principles, military doctrines, command systems, military structure and strategic deployment formed by the former Soviet Union in the past 70 years. Its military reform is difficult and involves a wide range. It takes some time to solve these problems. The historical experience of Russian military reform shows that it usually takes decades to carry out this kind of reform. Therefore, Russia's "realistic containment" strategy faces many constraints, and its full implementation will be at least until the beginning of the next century.

First, it is influenced by the Russian political situation. The adjustment of military strategy and a series of corresponding military reforms objectively need a relatively stable domestic political environment. At present, Russia is in a historical transition period of political turmoil, ethnic division and economic crisis, and this situation will not be fundamentally reversed in the short term. Therefore, Russia cannot make great progress in military strategic adjustment and military reform in recent years. It is worth noting that Russia's "realistic containment" strategy has not been formed for a long time and needs to be continuously improved. In particular, there are still serious differences in the number of military personnel, command system and internal functions of the Russian army. The attitude of the Russian army is an important factor that can not be ignored in promoting the adjustment and change of military strategy. Therefore, if these problems are not effectively solved, the adjustment of Russian military strategy will not proceed smoothly.

Second, it is restricted by Russia's domestic financial situation. Military reform needs a solid economic foundation as a guarantee, and both the merger of services and arms and the formation and modernization of mobile forces need sufficient funds. But as far as Russia's current economic situation is concerned, first of all, although the reform plan has been introduced, the reform will be carried out under the condition of tight military expenditure, and the national leadership has not yet made a final budget and evaluation on the amount of funds needed for the reform, and the source of this fund is unknown. Secondly, the reform of the aftermath also needs a lot of money. 1997 alone, Russia plans to lay off 200,000 people, of which 50,000 officers will be laid off, just to provide social security and job placement for the laid-off people. 5 trillion rubles, this is not a small amount for the Russian army, which is already very tight in funds. Although Russia has set up a financial and economic security committee for military reform headed by Chubais, Russian authorities believe that it needs more than half of the current federal tax revenue to pay off the debts owed to the army. The funds needed for military reform are several times higher than its debt repayment, which is beyond its federal budget. Therefore, the funding problem is bound to become a major obstacle on the road of Russian military reform.

Third, it is restricted by external factors such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the United States and NATO. According to western reports, CIS countries are wary of Russia's attempts to rebuild its status as a great power and restore its traditional sphere of influence. Ukraine accused Russia of keeping the practice of using nuclear weapons first is immoral; Georgia announced that it reserves the right to withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States, can send Russian troops home at any time, and also demands sovereignty over the Black Sea Fleet; Although the five Central Asian countries have increased their dependence on Russia in security, they are deeply wary of the revival of Greater Russianism and the stationing of Russian troops. They once strictly stipulated that the military action of informal dinners in Central Asia must be approved by the host government. This vigilance will lead to the limited depth and intensity of CIS military cooperation. At the same time, the constant "hardening" of Russian military strategy has aroused the vigilance of western countries. The west will soon not tolerate Russia's monopoly on the military affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At present, the western countries' strategic intention of accepting Eastern European countries to join NATO and then pushing eastward is very obvious. Therefore, the intention and actions of western countries to weaken Russia's military strength and intervene in CIS military affairs are important factors restricting Russia's military strategy.

To sum up, Russia's military strategic adjustment faces many constraints, the process of military reform will not be smooth sailing, and the full implementation of the "realistic containment" strategy will at least be at the beginning of the next century.