How did the two military alliances form? What role did they play in shaping the outbreak of the Great War

Louis vuitton outlet, World War I is in fact largely a late war, but it is also because of the late and become particularly tragic. Because it was due to the conflict between Russia and Austria, who were struggling with economic development in the 2 links ----- within Europe at the time, and France and Germany, who were in a relatively good state of development for a long time. There was also the factor that Britain was doing everything it could to maintain its military and economic power as a world leader.

France in the Franco-Prussian War after the defeat, due to the German military Junker Group's tough stance, Bismarck failed to maintain a consistent restraint and balance, France is always looking forward to Germany to take revenge, but if it is a one-on-one duel between France and Germany, France will inevitably end up in a more miserable, so the outbreak of World War I before the outbreak of France's diplomacy has always been in the search for allies to deal with Germany, and Germany has always been wary of France's resurgence. wary of a French resurgence and tried to isolate it as much as possible.

German diplomacy: from playing with eight balls to playing with only one

In the Second German Reich, which was both besieged by the Great Powers and impacting on the encircling Great Powers, Bismarck's continental policy was to isolate France while at the same time preventing the emergence of a grand alliance against Germany. To this end he exhaustively wove his diplomatic system of continental alliance

states. (Relations between Russia and Prussia had been good since the 1830s, when they **** together to suppress the Polish national uprising.) In this system, Germany maintained traditional friendly relations with Russia, and a close alliance with Austria-Hungary, not only to prevent Austria-Hungary from running away to the French camp, but also to enjoy a veto power over Austro-Hungary's foreign policy. In order to prevent the intensification of conflicts between Russia and Austria over the Balkan issue, Bismarck had to bind the two countries through the "German-Russian-Austrian Triple Alliance" in 1873, the "German-Austrian Secret Military Treaty" and the "Russo-German Reinsurance Pact" in 1879, and the "Russo-German Reinsurance Pact". Bismarck was bound by the "German-Russian-Austrian Triple Alliance" of 1873, the "German-Austrian Secret Military Treaty" of 1879 and the "Russian-German Reinsurance Treaty". In order to divert France's attention from Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck deliberately pushed France to actively pursue overseas colonization activities, so as to increase the competition between Britain and France.

When Kaiser Wilhelm II came to the throne, he responded to the interests of the manufacturing group in the western part of the reunified empire, which had been clamoring for Germany to pursue a "daylight world policy" and build a strong ocean-going navy, and Bismarck's prudent and self-restrained foreign policy

was abandoned. Successor Chancellor Bülow apparently recognized the lack of Bismarck's "ability to play with eight balls in the air at the same time":

Wilhelm II and the German chancellors, among others, attempted to establish a formal alliance with Britain in order to lessen resistance to overseas expansion, regardless of the realities of British

nationality and British diplomatic tradition. The British have a tradition of diplomacy that is in line with Britain's diplomatic tradition. What is worse, when Britain refused Germany's request for an alliance, the German authorities resorted to forceful intimidation. Because Britain itself has always been reluctant to conclude alliances against future uncertainties before the diplomatic situation in Europe is clear, and because Germany's aggressive attitude aroused Britain's extreme vigilance - a country capable of absolutely protecting the British Empire is a country capable of absolutely destroying it - Germany's promise of friendship had no diplomatic significance. have diplomatic significance. Instead, William II and others had a clear desire to replace Britain as the world's hegemon after repeated rejections of alliance requests. Bismarck's diplomatic skills were capable of playing eight balls at once, his successor was left with the ability to play the British Empire as a single ball - and of course ended up playing it badly.

French diplomacy: bent on revenge against Germany

After the defeat, France, with a small group of adventurers, military officers, and missionaries working more or less independently of the government, successfully carried out a series of colonial activities. Through the constant input of raw materials and market development in the colonies, and through the export of huge amounts of capital to win over allies and obtain a large amount of interest income, France strengthened its comprehensive national power, and was able to continue its power in Europe. The comprehensive national power, and was able to continue to occupy the status of a great power in the continent of Europe.

But after all, the French for three hundred years (beginning with Louis XIV, who came to power in the mid-17th century) have dreamed of acquiring natural frontiers and establishing hegemony on the European continent (the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine, behind the control of the politics of Belgium and Switzerland is representative of this). France wanted revenge against Germany from the top down, harmonized its colonial conflicts with its arch-enemy Britain, became an ally with monarchical Russia, secured Italy's neutrality at great expense, turned against and lost money to its traditional allies Turkey and Austria, but was simply unwilling and unable to reach a settlement with Germany.

Austro-Hungary: Dead Bones in a Mound, Feasting on Dead Bodies

France was looking for an ally against Germany, and there were only two inland in Europe, the first being Austria-Hungary, and the second being Russia. While the Franco-Austrian union had many advantages (the two countries were never geographically threatened by each other, while both suffered aggression from the Berlin side in the mid-to-late 19th century), both countries had to face a new problem in the form of the unification of Italy, the addition of another rival to France in the competition for overseas colonization, and the territorial disputes between Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Franco-Austrian alliance against Germany had to consider that there was another balancing factor behind it; would Italy be a threat to both France and Austria with German support or not? Judging from the long history of friendship between Germany and Italy, this was entirely possible. Secondly, it is doubtful that French aid would have been as effective and timely as it was when Austria was facing the threat of Germany, Russia and Italy at the same time.

Austrian diplomacy, deprived of its master of even-handed diplomacy, Metternich, has always made mistakes at critical moments. Austria ultimately chose the simplest option, which was to completely defect to Germany. Having lost its dominant position in Germany and the Italian territories, Austria was bent on expanding towards the Balkans in the hope of gaining more land and population from the "sick man of Western Asia", the Turkish Empire. Austria-Hungary followed the trend of the times, pursuing naked power politics and power diplomacy, but failed to see that its own power base and national strength were the weakest ----- The slow economic development, a small number of Germanic peoples and Hungarians ruled over the many Slavic peoples who were all internally conflicted, and such a country could not withstand a little turbulence. Russia and Serbia have long been eyeing this dying empire.

Tsarist Russia: not for local wars, but for total war

In 1890, Germany refused to extend the "Russo-German Reinsurance Pact", which was tantamount to removing a pivot from Germany's external relations. The reason why peace could be maintained among Germany, Russia and Austria for a long period of time was the diplomatic checks and balances caused by Germany's ambiguous relationship with Austria-Hungary as a military alliance and with Russia as a secret pact. Although Russia was a little worried and jealous of the rapid rise of Prussia, there was no fundamental conflict of interest between the two countries. On the contrary, Russia and Austria-Hungary were at loggerheads because of the "Pan-Slavism" ideology, and Russia strongly resented Austria's military actions in the Balkans. German foreign policy makers after Bismarck rashly adopted a one-sided policy toward Austria, forcing Russia to approach France, and the conflict between Germany and France was irreconcilable. Thus, while Russia and Germany had no major geopolitical, economic or colonial conflicts, they were both pitted against each other by their own allies.

From the geopolitical point of view, France and Russia, since the two countries no longer in direct conflict in Europe, there is no contradiction in terms of colonial competition, so in the face of Germany's aggressive momentum on the continent, France and Russia close to be unstoppable. The outbreak of economic war between Russia and Germany after 1879 led to the blockage of Russia's agricultural exports and the deterioration of its financial situation. At this time, the huge amount of capital from France continued to invest, gave the Russian economy a chance to recover, so that the Franco-Russian alliance was water under the bridge, in 1891, the conclusion of the diplomatic agreement between France and Russia, in 1893, the Franco-Russian military agreement formally came into force. This meant that the object of alliance and hostility between the great powers had been fixed, and the coordinated diplomacy of the European powers came to a dead end.

There was also the fact that France was not at all supportive of Russia's interests in the Balkans, and Russia eventually lost all patience with the diplomatic and military community, which simply did not intend to expend its energy on small, manageable diplomatic conflicts, but only intended to prepare for a full-scale war that would drag in all allies and rivals large and small, and would be the "Last Judgement. "

This

This shift eventually led to a peculiar diplomatic pattern in which Austrian diplomacy was held by Serbia, German diplomacy by Austria, Russian diplomacy by Germany, French diplomacy by Russia, British diplomacy by France, and ultimately, the great powers of Europe were collectively at the mercy of the Balkan situation, confirming Bismarck's prophecy that the European powers "will one day fight a European war over a few Balkan fools."

Britain: Shrinking the front, all out against Germany

Traditionally the Anglo-French conflict had been greater than the Anglo-German and Franco-German conflicts, and after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 there was a clear escalation of this Anglo-French conflict. The two sides therefore broke out in the naval race, outside of Europe, the colonial conflict between Britain and France before the First World War is not uncommon. The Anglo-Russian conflict was also a conflict that led Britain to foster the Far Eastern despotic empire of Japan to counter Russia's interests in Asia. To counter the Franco-Russian alliance, Britain also concluded the Mediterranean Sea Agreement with Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1882, thus indirectly drawing relations with the Triple Alliance led by Germany. However, the conflict between Britain and France and Russia had been kept within a limited scope by some very rational policies.

But the great expansion of German power, especially the establishment of its "High Seas Fleet" and the expansion of its power in the Turkish Empire, forced Britain to seriously consider the intentions of German expansion. The British believed that Britain's world hegemony, which was based on her superior geopolitical position and the joint domination of the European powers, could not be maintained for a long time after the balance of power within the European powers had been lost. Germany's excessive power in Central and Western Europe, in fact, undermined this balance of power and made it impossible for the British decision-makers to carry out their policy of "glorious isolation" with confidence. If Germany does not "self-restrain and undermine its own strength", Britain will build an anti-German coalition to eliminate this threat once and for all.

Based on this viewpoint, Britain had essentially decided to fight Germany to the death to preserve the existence of the British Empire. The show of defending Belgium's neutrality was nothing more than a case of right and wrong.

Was the outbreak of the Great War accidental or inevitable?

The Vienna system was founded on the orthodox principles of conservative tradition, self-restraint and internal and external balance, which became what we call in our country "historical reaction", and kept Europe largely peaceful for many years. As technological advances, transportation, and the expansion of markets

increased the depth of state control and the power of repression, conservative states were able to take matters into their own hands diplomatically and tear each other down once they no longer needed each other's support to deal with revolutionary movements of all shapes and sizes, at home and abroad. Although the First World War was caused by the Franco-German conflict, the decisive factor was the split between the three monarchies of Russia, Prussia and Austria, and the change in Britain's attitude was the last straw that broke the camel's back of European parity.

The nineteenth century was also a century of stirring nationalist currents. Before the outbreak of the First World War, Russia was promoting Pan-Slavism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while Germany was pursuing Pan-Germanism in a tit-for-tat manner. Austria-Hungary, a multinational empire, was shaken by the tide of Pan-Slavism on the one hand, and counted on Germany to give it a hand by standing on the side of Pan-Germanism on the other. France, for the sake of national honor and unity, could not forget the recapture of the Alsace-Lorraine region, and Germany, for the same reason, would never give it up. Russia was jealous of German hegemony on the Continent, and Germany feared Russia's enormous potential. Germany coveted Britain's world hegemony and envied Britain's High Seas Fleet, while Britain saw Germany's imitation of Britain's High Seas Fleet as unmistakable evidence of the overthrow of the British Empire. Each nation suffered from narcissism, an unlimited release of its own natural rights, and was unafraid to speculate with the utmost malice about the intentions of others.

The nineteenth century was also an era of democracy, where public sentiment and newspaper editorials were the guiding principles of government policy. In France, public opinion demanded the recovery of lost territories and revenge against Germany; in Britain, it said, "Whoever avoids civil war must become an imperialist. Both Britain and France were so-called representative democracies and took it for granted that they would respond to public opinion. Although Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary were not democracies, these autocracies were more sensitive to public opinion. Because the prestige of the monarchs and the continuity of the dynasties in these autocratic countries depended entirely on the strong foreign expansion to maintain, due to the lack of appropriate institutional channels to vent, public opinion will focus on foreign policy, and will not look at the international relations from a strategic height at all, and will always regard the diplomatic struggle as a sports game, regard the normal diplomatic compromises as a great shame, and cheer on the dangerous military conflicts, always think that the international crisis has reached its peak, and always think that the international crisis has reached its climax. The international community has always thought that the culmination of an international crisis is a glittering trophy and countless glories. This sentiment has infected the decision-makers of the great Powers, who believe that the occasional outbreak of war and the shedding of a little blood "will strengthen the constitution of the nation". Their only mistake was that they simply did not anticipate that under industrialized conditions, wars between nations would no longer be on a manageable scale, and that it would be either total victory or total annihilation.

Realistic power politics goes in reverse

European politicians were initially wary of the outbreak of the Great War, and while the two opposing alliances, the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, had both entered into a phase of military coordination, each country was still exercising self-restraint and restraining its allies. Austria-Hungary was reluctant to help Germany attack France, Germany restrained Austria-Hungary from a showdown with Russia, Great Britain warned Russia to be moderate in standing up for the Balkan alliance headed by Serbia, Russia told France that Russia was not going to fight for Alsace-Lorraine, and France told Russia that France was not going to get involved in the Balkan conflict, and as for Italy it had long intended to remain neutral and watch from both sides.

But the Great War broke out anyway, a tragedy of power politics and realist foreign policy. Since the London Conference of 1912, which resolved the Monaco crisis, suddenly every nation was afraid of losing an ally, regardless of the consequences of the ally's capricious behavior for itself. The reason for this change was that the kind of secret aristocratic foreign

intercourse of the Richelieu, Metternich and Bismarck type was a thing of the past. With the popularization of the news media, any diplomatic event would be quickly known to the public, and the public's attitude would be quickly fed back to the foreign policy makers through the media. The continuous pressure for the public to participate in diplomatic decision-making caused the short-sightedness and blindness of the foreign policy makers of various countries.

By the influence of this mood, countries, especially Germany's military planning and diplomatic policy began to disconnect, at the beginning of the total war, indulging in overall war planning, preoccupation with the "pre-emptive", the master of diplomacy, Richelieu, "action must be in line with the purpose of the" political motto Richelieu, the master of diplomacy, "actions must be in harmony with the purpose" of the political aphorism thrown into the air, not to mention the military plan with foreign policy, leaving room for political negotiations. Of course, in that kind of bloc-opposed diplomatic pattern, the foreign policies of the major powers themselves are no better. Eventually, in the July Crisis caused by the assassination of Archduke and Mrs. Ferdinand, the heirs to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by Serbian nationalists, the military deployment of the major powers, especially Germany, was faster than the speed of diplomatic coordination. The German military bypassed its own diplomatic department to the Austro-Hungarian military issued unlimited blank checks in favor of Austria-Hungary to go to war, when Kaiser Wilhelm II was informed that if Germany breaks the neutrality of the Belgian news, the United Kingdom will be declared war, intended to pull back, but the war machine of the German military has already been started and can not be emergency braking.

The tragic First World War broke out, and from then on modern European civilization went into decline, and Europe began to lose its domination of the world. But the tragedy has not come to an end, Hegel once said, mankind from history to get the lesson is, mankind is not from history to get what lesson. After the First World War, the European nation-states were apparently lenient with themselves and strict with others, so they intensified their efforts, each showing their own skills, and after more than twenty years, they collectively threw themselves into an even more disastrous holocaust - the Second World War.

I caution all readers that in today's world, the United States' "pre-emptive" military strategy, the NATO countries following the United States' military actions around the world, Russia's use of military force against Georgia, and the suicide bombings and desperate resistance of the people of most Asian and African countries in the world. Attracting everyone's attention, but we do not have any envy and imitation of them, to be a "people love, harmless white rabbit", in fact, is the most Chinese people should do.