I would like to know the specifics of the anti-monopoly law.

Article 1: This Law is enacted for the purpose of protecting market competition, preventing and curbing monopolistic behavior, improving the efficiency of economic operation, safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of operators and consumers and the interests of the public ****, and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy.

Article 2: This Law shall apply to monopolistic behavior in economic activities within the territory of the People's Republic of China*** and the State of China; this Law shall apply to monopolistic behavior outside the territory of the People's Republic of China*** and the State of China, if such behavior has an exclusionary or restrictive effect on competition in the domestic market.

For the monopolistic behaviors stipulated in this Law, the relevant laws and administrative regulations shall provide otherwise in accordance with their provisions.

Article 3: The monopolistic acts stipulated in this Law include:

(1) the conclusion of a monopolistic agreement by an operator;

(2) the abuse of a dominant position in a market by an operator;

(3) the concentration of operators which has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.

Monopoly agreement referred to in item (a) of the preceding paragraph means an agreement, decision or other concerted action that excludes or restricts competition;

Article 4: Operators referred to in this Law are natural persons, legal persons and other organizations engaged in the production or operation of commodities or the provision of services within the relevant market.

The relevant market referred to in this Law refers to the scope or area where operators compete over a certain period of time in respect of relevant goods or services (hereinafter referred to as goods).

Article 5: The State Council shall establish the Anti-Monopoly Committee. The Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council shall be responsible for leading, organizing and coordinating anti-monopoly work.

The agencies prescribed by the State Council with responsibilities for anti-monopoly enforcement (hereinafter collectively referred to as the State Council's anti-monopoly enforcement agencies) are responsible for anti-monopoly enforcement in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

The antimonopoly enforcement agency of the State Council may, in accordance with the needs of its work, authorize the corresponding agency of the people's government of a province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the Central Government to be responsible for the relevant antimonopoly enforcement work in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

Article 6: Administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations with the function of managing public **** affairs (hereinafter referred to as public **** organizations) shall not abuse their administrative power to exclude or restrict competition.

The State shall, in accordance with the law, strengthen and improve the regulation and supervision of the operation of administrative rights and, through deepening reforms and transforming government functions, prevent and eliminate the abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition.

Chapter II Monopoly Agreements

Article 7: It is prohibited for operators in a competitive relationship to enter into the following monopoly agreements:

(1) fixing, maintaining or changing the prices of commodities;

(2) restricting the quantities of commodities to be produced or the quantities of commodities to be sold;

(3) dividing up the market for the sale of sales or the purchase of raw materials;

(4) restricting the purchase of new products; and

(5) restricting the purchase of raw materials. p>(iv) restricting the purchase of new technology or equipment or restricting the development of new technology or products;

(v) jointly boycotting a transaction;

(vi) other monopoly agreements determined by the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency.

Article 8 It is prohibited for an operator to limit the price of goods resold to a third party or set other trading conditions in trading activities to exclude or restrict competition.

Article 9: Competitive operators collude in bidding and tendering processes to exclude or restrict competition.

Article 10: Where an operator can prove that the agreement reached is for one of the following purposes and will not seriously restrict competition in the relevant market and enable consumers to share in the benefits arising therefrom, the provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of this Law shall not be applicable:

(1) for the purpose of improving technology, researching and developing new products;

(2) for the purpose of improving the quality of products, lowering costs, enhancing efficiency, standardizing product specifications, and harmonizing product specifications.

(iii) for the purpose of providing small and medium-sized operators with operational efficiency and enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium-sized operators;

(iv) for the purpose of realizing the interests of the social public*** such as saving energy, protecting the environment, and providing disaster relief and assistance;

(v) for the purpose of safeguarding the justified interests in foreign trade and economic cooperation;

(vi) In times of economic downturn, to alleviate the serious decline in sales or apparent overproduction.

Article 11: Monopoly agreements prohibited by this Chapter shall be void ab initio.

Chapter III Abuse of Dominant Market Position

Article 12 It is prohibited for operators to abuse their dominant market position to exclude or restrict competition.

The dominant market position referred to in this Law means that an operator or several operators as a whole have a market position in the relevant market that enables them to control the price, quantity or other trading conditions of commodities, or to impede or influence the ability of other operators to enter the relevant market.

Article 13: To determine that an operator has a dominant market position, the following factors shall be relied upon:

(1) the operator's market share in the relevant market, as well as the state of competition in the relevant market;

(2) the operator's ability to control the market for sales or the market for the purchase of raw materials;

(3) the operator's financial strength and technical conditions;

(iv) the dependence of other operators on the operator in transactions and the extent of such dependence;

(v) the ease or difficulty of entry of other operators into the relevant market;

(vi) other factors relevant to the operator's dominant market position.

Article 14 Where one of the following circumstances exists, it may be presumed that an operator has a dominant market position:

(1) An operator's market share in the relevant market reaches more than one and a half;

(2) Two operators as a whole reach a market share of more than two-thirds of the market;

(3) Three operators as a whole reach a market share of more than three-quarters of the market;

(4) The market share in the relevant market is more than three times of the market;

(5) Other factors related to the operator's dominant market position. (iii) three operators as a whole with a market share of 3/4 or more in the relevant market.

Where the circumstances set forth in the third paragraph of the preceding subparagraph (b) are present, and the market share of one of the operators is less than 1/10, it shall not be presumed that the operator has a dominant position in the market.

Article 15 Abuse of a dominant position of market power by an operator includes:

(1) selling goods at an unfairly high price or purchasing goods at an unfairly low price;

(2) selling goods at a price lower than their cost without a justifiable reason;

(3) refusing to enter into a transaction with the counterparty without a justifiable reason;

(d) Forcing a counterparty to enter into a transaction with him or limiting the counterparty to enter into a transaction only with him or only with the operator designated by him without a justifiable reason;

(e) selling goods against the will of the counterparty or attaching other unreasonable conditions to the transaction;

(f) without a justifiable reason, the counterparty on the same terms of the transaction price and other conditions of the transaction. (f) without justifiable reasons, to the same conditions of the transaction counterparty in the transaction price and other trading conditions of differential treatment;

(vii) Anti-trust law enforcement agencies to determine the abuse of dominant position in the market of other behaviors.

Chapter IV Concentration of Operators

Article 16 Concentration of Operators refers to the following cases:

(1) Merger of operators;

(2) Acquisition by an operator of a sufficient number of voting shares or assets of other operators;

(3) Acquisition by an operator through contracts or other means of the right of controlling other operators, or the ability to exert decisive influence on other operators. operator to exert a decisive influence on the other operators.

The specific criteria for a sufficient number of voting shares or assets as stipulated in item (b) of the preceding paragraph shall be prescribed by the anti-monopoly enforcement agency of the State Council in conjunction with the relevant departments of the State Council.

Article 17 If the sales of all the operators participating in the concentration exceed RMB 12 billion in the previous year on a global scale, and the sales of one of the operators participating in the concentration exceed RMB 800 million in the previous year within the territory of the People's Republic of China*** and the State of China, the operators participating in the concentration shall make a declaration in advance to the State Council's anti-monopoly law enforcement agency; and if the declaration has not been made to the State Council's anti-monopoly law enforcement agency, the operators shall not be concentrated.

In calculating the sales volume under the preceding paragraph, the operators with whom the operator has a controlling or subordinate relationship shall be included in the calculation.

The State Council may separately prescribe the declaration criteria for the concentration of operators in banking, insurance and other special industries or fields.

The anti-monopoly enforcement agency of the State Council may, in accordance with the level of economic development and the state of competition in the market, make adjustments to the declaration standards for operator concentration as stipulated in Paragraph 1 of this Article, and report them to the State Council for approval before they come into force.

Article 18 An operator's concentration may not be declared to the antimonopoly enforcement agency under the State Council if one of the following circumstances exists;

(1) an operator participating in the concentration owns more than 50% of the voting shares or assets of each of the other operators;

(2) more than 50% of the voting shares or assets of each operator participating in the concentration are owned by the same operator who is not participating in the concentration;

(3) the operator who is not participating in the concentration owns more than 50% of the voting shares or assets of the other operators. (ii) Where more than 50% of the voting shares or assets of each operator participating in the concentration are owned by the same operator not participating in the concentration.

Article 19 An operator who declares a concentration to the antimonopoly enforcement agency under the State Council shall submit the following documents and information:

(1) a declaration;

(2) an explanation of the impact of the concentration on the competitive situation of the relative markets;

(3) an agreement on the concentration;

(4) a financial and accounting report for the previous fiscal year of the operator participating in the concentration, audited by a certified public accountant;

(5) the financial and accounting reports for the previous fiscal year of the operator participating in the concentration; and fiscal year audited by a certified public accountant;

(v) other documents and information prescribed by the anti-monopoly enforcement agency of the State Council.

The declaration shall set forth the name, domicile, business scope, global sales of the operator participating in the concentration for the previous year, its market share in the relevant market, as well as the amount of transactions to be concentrated, the date on which the concentration is scheduled to be implemented, and other matters.

Article 20 Where the documents and information submitted by an operator are incomplete, the operator shall submit the documents and information within the period prescribed by the antimonopoly enforcement agency under the State Council. If the operator fails to submit the documents and information after the deadline, it shall be regarded as not having made the declaration.

Article 21 The antimonopoly enforcement agency under the State Council shall, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the documents and information submitted by the operator in conformity with the deficiencies of Article 19 of this Law, carry out a preliminary examination of the declared concentration of operators, make a decision on whether to carry out a further examination, and notify the operator in writing. The State Council anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies to make a decision before the operator shall not implement the concentration.

The State Council anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies to make a decision not to implement further review or overdue decision, the operator may implement the concentration.

Article 22 Where the antimonopoly enforcement agency of the State Council decides to implement further examination, it shall complete the examination within 90 days from the date of the decision, make a decision on whether or not to prohibit the concentration of the operator, and notify the operator in writing; where a decision is made to prohibit the concentration of the operator, it shall state the reasons therefor. During the period of review, the operator shall not implement the concentration.

One of the following circumstances, the State Council antimonopoly enforcement ɑ?goo? Long female court risk-taking? Taking risks to reflect the de翱罟娑ǖ纳蟛槭毕蓿? mapping さ氖毕拮畛げ怀?0 days;

(a) the operator agreed to extend the time limit for review;

(b) the operator to submit inaccurate documents, information, the need for further verification;

(c) the operator declared a significant change in the relevant circumstances.

The anti-monopoly enforcement agency of the State Council shall not prohibit the concentration of operators if it fails to make a decision after the deadline.

Article 23 In reviewing the concentration of operators, the following factors shall be taken into consideration:

(1) the market share of the operators participating in the concentration in the relevant market and their control over the market;

(2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market;

(3) the possibility of the concentration of operators to exclude or restrict competition within the relevant market;

(4) the effect of the concentration on market entry; and (iv) the impact of the concentration of operators on market entry and technological progress;

(v) the impact of the concentration of operators on consumers and other relevant operators;

(vi) the impact of the concentration of operators on the development of the national economy and the interests of the social public ****;

(vii) any other factors that should be taken into account as determined by the anti-monopoly enforcement agency of the State Council.

Article 24 Where an operator's concentration has or is likely to have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, the antimonopoly enforcement agency under the State Council shall make a decision to prohibit the operator's concentration. However, if the operator can prove that the concentration of operators can improve the conditions of competition and the competition situation, and the favorable factors for competition are obviously greater than the unfavorable factors, or the concentration of operators is in line with the requirements of the public **** interest, the State Council anti-monopoly authorities may make a decision on the concentration of operators is not prohibited.

If the antimonopoly enforcement agency of the State Council does not prohibit the concentration of operators, it may decide to attach restrictive conditions to the concentration of operators.

Article 25 The antimonopoly enforcement agency under the State Council shall make a timely public announcement of the decision to prohibit the concentration of operators or the decision to attach restrictive conditions to the concentration of operators.

Chapter V. Abuse of Administrative Power to Exclude or Restrict Competition

Article 26 Administrative organs and public ****organizations shall not abuse their administrative power to restrict, in any way, or in disguised form, the units and individuals to only operate, purchase, or use the commodities provided by the formulated operators.

Article 27 Administrative organs and public ****organizations shall not abuse their administrative power by committing the following acts, which impede the free circulation of commodities between regions and full competition:

(1) Setting discriminatory charges for commodities from outside the region, applying discriminatory charges, or stipulating discriminatory prices;

(2) Adopting technical requirements, inspection standards for commodities from outside the region that are different from those for commodities of the same kind locally, or setting discriminatory prices for commodities from outside the region. (b) the adoption of technical requirements and inspection standards for foreign goods that are different from those for similar local goods, or the adoption of discriminatory technical measures such as duplicate inspection and duplicate certification of foreign goods to restrict the entry of foreign goods into the local market;

(c) the adoption of approval and licensing of foreign goods to restrict the entry of foreign goods into the local market;

(d) the setting up of checkpoints or other means of impeding the entry of foreign goods or the local goods transported out.

Article 28 Administrative organs and public ****organizations shall not abuse their administrative power to exclude or restrict foreign operators from participating in local bidding and tendering activities by setting discriminatory qualification requirements, evaluation standards, or by failing to release information in accordance with the law.

Article 29 Administrative organs and public ****organizations shall not abuse their administrative power to exclude or restrict foreign operators from investing in or setting up branches locally by adopting unequal treatment with local operators.

Article 30 Administrative organs and public ****organizations shall not abuse their administrative power to compel local operators to engage in monopolistic acts as provided for in this Law.

Article 31 Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative power to formulate regulations containing contents that exclude or restrict competition.

Chapter VI Anti-Monopoly Organs

Article 32 The Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council shall be composed of the heads of the relevant departments and agencies of the State Council and a number of experts. The manner of proceeding of the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council and the Chinese rules shall be prescribed by the State Council.

Article 33 The Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council shall perform the following duties:

(1) to study and formulate relevant competition policies;

(2) to organize investigations and assessments of the overall competition situation in the market, and to issue assessment reports;

(3) to supervise and coordinate the anti-monopoly work of the State Council's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies, the State Council's relevant departments and regulatory agencies;

(iv) coordinating the handling of major anti-monopoly cases;

(v) other duties prescribed by the State Council.

Article 34 The antimonopoly enforcement agency under the State Council shall perform the following duties:

(1) to formulate and issue relevant antimonopoly guidelines and specific measures;

(2) to investigate and assess the state of competition in the market;

(3) to investigate and deal with suspected monopolistic acts;

(4) to stop monopolistic acts;

(5) to receive, (v) Receiving and examining declarations of concentration of operators;

(vi) Other duties prescribed by the State Council.

Article 35 Any unit or individual suspected of monopoly behavior, have the right to report to the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies. The antimonopoly enforcement agency shall maintain the confidentiality of the reporter.

If the report is in written form and provides relevant facts and evidence, the antimonopoly enforcement agency shall conduct the necessary investigation.

Article 36 The antimonopoly enforcement agency may take the following measures in investigating suspected monopolistic acts:

(1) Entering the business premises of the operator under investigation or other relevant places for inspection;

(2) Interviewing the operator, interested parties or other relevant units and individuals under investigation, and requesting them to explain the relevant circumstances;

(3) Inspecting, copying or requesting the operator under investigation to explain the relevant circumstances;

(4) Reviewing, copying or requesting the operator under investigation to report the relevant facts and evidences; and ) to inspect, copy or require the operator under investigation, interested parties or other relevant units and individuals to provide relevant documents, agreements, accounting books, business correspondence, electronic data and other documents and information;

(d) to seal up and seize the relevant evidence;

(e) to inquire into and freeze the operator's bank account.

The adoption of the measures provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be reported in writing to the main head of the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency and approved.

Article 37 Antimonopoly Law Enforcement Agency to investigate suspected monopoly behavior, law enforcement officers shall not be less than two people, and shall show law enforcement documents.

Law enforcement officers to conduct inquiries and investigations, shall make a transcript, and signed by the person being questioned or investigated.

Article 38 Anti-trust enforcement agencies and their staff to perform their duties in accordance with the law know the commercial secrets of the duty of confidentiality.

Article 39: The investigated operator, interested party or other relevant units and individuals shall cooperate with the antimonopoly enforcement agency in performing its duties in accordance with law, and shall not refuse, or obstruct the investigation of the antimonopoly enforcement agency.

Article 40: The operator under investigation, interested parties shall have the right to state their opinions and put forward their defense. Antimonopoly enforcement agencies shall verify the facts, reasons and evidence put forward by the investigated operators and interested parties.

Article 41 The Antimonopoly Law Enforcement Agency on suspected monopoly investigation and verification, that constitute monopoly behavior, shall be dealt with in accordance with the law, and may be announced to the public.

Article 42: Where the antimonopoly enforcement agency investigates a suspected monopolistic act, and the operator under investigation admits it and undertakes to take specific measures to eliminate the consequences of the monopolistic act within a certain period of time, the antimonopoly enforcement agency may decide to suspend the investigation. The decision to suspend the investigation shall contain the specific content of the commitment of the operator under investigation.

Antimonopoly enforcement agencies decided to suspend the investigation, the operator shall fulfill the commitments to monitor the situation. Operators to fulfill the commitments, the antimonopoly enforcement agency may decide to terminate the investigation, and may decide to reduce or waive the penalty.

In one of the following cases, the antimonopoly enforcement agency shall resume the investigation:

(a) the operator has not fulfilled the commitments;

(b) the facts on which the decision to suspend the investigation is based on significant changes;

(c) the decision to suspend the investigation is based on the incomplete or untrue information provided by the operator.

Article 43 Where an operator or an interested party is dissatisfied with a decision made by an antimonopoly enforcement agency, he may apply for an administrative reconsideration in accordance with law; and where he is dissatisfied with the administrative reconsideration, he may institute an administrative litigation in accordance with law.

Article 44 For the monopoly behavior stipulated in this Law, the relevant laws and administrative regulations shall be investigated and dealt with by the relevant departments or regulatory agencies, in accordance with their provisions. The relevant departments or regulatory bodies shall notify the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council of the results of the investigation.

The relevant departments or regulatory agencies of the monopoly behavior under this Law has not been investigated and dealt with, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies can investigate and deal with. The anti-monopoly enforcement agency to investigate and deal with, shall seek the views of the relevant departments or regulatory bodies.

Chapter VII Legal Liability

Article 45 Where an operator reaches and implements a monopoly agreement in violation of the provisions of this Law, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall order the cessation of the illegal act, impose a fine of not less than 1% and not more than 10% of the sales of the previous year, and confiscate the illegal income; where the monopoly agreement has not yet been implemented, a fine of 2 million yuan may be imposed.

If an operator takes the initiative to report to the antimonopoly enforcement agency the relevant circumstances of reaching a monopoly agreement and provides important evidence, the antimonopoly enforcement agency may, at its discretion, mitigate or waive the penalties on the modified operator.

Article 46 If an operator abuses its dominant market position and excludes or restricts competition in violation of this Law, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall order the cessation of the illegal behavior, impose a fine of 1% to 10% of the previous year's sales, and confiscate the illegal income.

Article 47 Where an operator implements a concentration in violation of the provisions of this Law, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency of the State Council shall impose a fine of not less than 1 million yuan and not more than 5 million yuan, and may order the cessation of the implementation of the concentration or order the disposal of shares and assets within a certain period of time and transfer of business has taken other measures to restore the operator to the state before the concentration.

Article 48 For the fines provided for in Article 45, 46 body oh a, Article 47 of this Law, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies to determine the amount of specific fines, shall take into account the nature of the violation, the degree and duration of the time and other factors.

Article 49 operators to implement monopoly behavior, causing losses to others, shall bear civil liability; constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for civil liability.

Article 50 Where administrative organs and public **** organizations abuse their administrative rights and commit acts of exclusion or restriction of competition, they shall be ordered by a higher organ to make corrections; if the circumstances are serious, the same or a higher organ shall take disciplinary action against the persons in charge directly responsible for the act and other persons directly responsible in accordance with the law. Laws and administrative regulations on the administrative organs and public **** organization abuse of administrative power to implement the exclusion or restriction of competition behavior, in accordance with its provisions.

Article 51 Violation of the provisions of this Law, by one of the following acts, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies shall order rectification, and may impose a fine of not more than 20,000 yuan on an individual, or not more than 500,000 yuan on a unit; if the circumstances are serious, the individual shall be subject to a fine of not less than 20,000 yuan and not more than 200,000 yuan, or not more than 500,000 yuan and not more than 50 million yuan on the unit; constitutes a violation of public security administration behavior, by the The public security organs shall impose public security management penalties in accordance with the law; if a crime is constituted, criminal liability shall be investigated in accordance with the law:

(a) refusing or obstructing an investigation;

(b) refusing to provide the relevant materials or information or providing false materials or information;

(c) concealing, destroying or transferring evidence.

Article 52 The staff of the Anti-trust Law Enforcement Agency, in the process of law enforcement, abuse of power, dereliction of duty, favoritism and malpractice, or leakage of commercial secrets of the operators known in the process of law enforcement, constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility; not yet constitutes a crime, shall be given punishment according to law.

Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions

Fifty-third This Law shall apply to acts of exclusion or restriction of competition committed by trade associations and other organizations.

Article 54 This Law shall not apply to the exercise of intellectual property rights by an operator in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations concerning intellectual property rights; however, this Law shall apply to the abuse of intellectual property rights by an operator to exclude or restrict competition.

Fifty-five Agricultural producers and their professional economic organizations shall not be subject to this Law in respect of cooperative, joint or other concerted acts implemented in the production, processing, sale, transportation and storage of agricultural products and other business activities that do not seriously restrict competition.

Article 56 This Law shall come into force on the day of January.

Specific cases, you analyze it yourself, so much content, it is not enough to say that