What are the problems in enterprise group management?

1. The leadership system of enterprise groups needs to be improved.

The leadership system of enterprise group is the general name of the leadership principle, leadership system and leadership authority division of enterprise group. 1987 12 16 the notice on several opinions on the formation and development of enterprise groups issued by the former state commission for restructuring the economy and the state economic commission pointed out: "in principle, the leadership system of enterprise groups is determined by the member units themselves through consultation according to the actual situation. Some group companies can implement the manager responsibility system under the leadership of the board of directors, and can also implement other leadership systems such as the manager responsibility system. No matter which system, we must establish corresponding democratic management and supervision institutions. " However, at present, the internal corporate structure of many enterprise groups is not perfect, such as the board of directors appoints the chairman and vice chairman, but there are no directors under them; Even in a group with a sound board of directors and board of supervisors, its directors and supervisors are basically composed of insiders, so it is difficult to really play an important role in decision-making and supervision. These symptoms have seriously hindered the healthy development of enterprise groups.

In order to further improve and perfect the leadership system of China's enterprise groups, we should pay attention to three issues in deepening the reform: (1) A sound organization should truly embody the principle of democratic management. For enterprise groups, democratic management is embodied in two levels: the first level is the democratic management level of member enterprises. Through the establishment of management institutions such as "managers' meeting", "Council" and "board of directors", the equal legal person status of member enterprises and their rights, responsibilities and interests to participate in management are fully reflected. The second level is the democratic management level of workers' representatives, which fully reflects the position and role of workers' collectives in democratic management enterprise groups. (2) Establish a property right restraint mechanism. Because the enterprise group involves the portfolio of assets between multiple enterprises, a complex property right relationship has been formed among the members of the group. To establish a property right restraint mechanism, it is first necessary to determine the property right boundary through some form of asset organization. At present, the parent-subsidiary system of the pilot enterprise group directly abandons the original large and scattered group organization, and firmly establishes the holding and shareholding relationship between the parent company and its subsidiaries through investment establishment, acquisition and merger, internal divestiture and authorized operation, so as to enhance the cohesion and stability of the enterprise group. Secondly, choose the appropriate enterprise group leadership system to ensure the effectiveness of property rights constraints. The general manager responsibility system under the leadership of the board of directors is a relatively standardized leadership system. (3) Strengthen the overall construction of enterprise group leadership system around enhancing the cohesion and group consciousness of enterprise groups. In addition to implementing the general manager responsibility system under the leadership of the board of directors, we should also consider the irreplaceable role played by party organizations, trade unions and even the Communist Youth League organizations in the group construction and aggregation.

2. The investment and financing management system is not suitable.

At present, the actual situation of enterprise groups in China is: enterprises are heavily in debt, with little self-owned funds, and investment projects are large-scale capital-intensive projects. For example, the debt ratio of National Heavy Duty Truck Group and Second Automobile Group reached 85%, and that of China Eastern Airlines Group reached 89%. In the process of investment and financing, most enterprises report that there are many barriers, complicated procedures, long time-consuming and unsuitable. This is due to the characteristics of the current investment and financing management system, that is, on the basis of administrative divisions, funds are highly dispersed and credit is divided into thousands of administrative districts, thus forming today's "ten groups and nine empty" situation. Although many large enterprise groups have been approved to set up finance companies at present, which enlivens the investment and financing relationship of enterprise groups to a certain extent, due to the limited financing scope and time of finance companies, the problems of fund shortage and financing difficulties of enterprise groups cannot be fundamentally solved.

In this regard, we should start with the reform of macroeconomic management system, focus on developing strategic enterprise groups, promote the reform of management system in investment and financing related fields, and further implement the autonomy of enterprises in various business development. Taking the pilot enterprise group as an example, in order to adapt to the development of enterprise groups and reform the investment management system, after the development plan of enterprise groups is approved by the state, the specific construction projects will be implemented by enterprises themselves, and they will be fully responsible for project demonstration, fund raising, tender selection, construction implementation and debt repayment. National key projects in competitive industries can rely on pilot enterprise groups to invest, thus improving investment efficiency and the development and growth of the group. At the same time, it is necessary to reform the financing management system, and the amount of loan funds required for the pilot enterprise groups to implement the development plan should be issued to the designated banks when the plan is approved. After the credit review and approval, the finance company of the enterprise group can be reorganized into a trust and investment company, and its financing period in the capital market can be appropriately extended. The state manages the foreign debt balance of the pilot enterprise groups, and within this scope, the pilot enterprise groups can independently borrow and repay international commercial loans. Only by accelerating the reform of investment and financing management system of enterprise groups can we give enterprise groups wings to take off.

3. Segmentation has seriously hindered the cross-regional and cross-industry development of enterprise groups.

It is also a trend for enterprise groups to break the boundaries of regions, departments and industries and seek development in many fields. However, due to the administrative division of departments and regions in China, the cross-regional and cross-industry expansion of some large enterprise groups has stopped. For example, Baosteel's investment in Tianjin "Great Seamless" was blocked in Tianjin, investment in Hangang was blocked in Hebei, and the acquisition of Jinbei Automobile Group was blocked in the machinery department. Departmental resistance is to protect the interests within the system from being divided up, and regional resistance is to worry that local enterprises will be controlled by foreign enterprises. Under the current tax-sharing system, enterprise income tax is paid according to different subordinate relations, which also causes contradictions between the central and local governments.

It is suggested that the relevant state departments can reach a consensus on this issue and create good external conditions for the development of enterprise groups. For example, Shanghai Silk Import and Export Co., Ltd. and Shanghai Jinda International Silk Co., Ltd. received the full support of the Shanghai Municipal Government and the two departments of industry and trade, thus forming a Shanghai Silk Group with considerable strength, making full use of the advantages of foreign trade enterprises in information, customers and marketing experience, as well as the advantages of industrial enterprises in production equipment, processing technology and products. For cross-industry investment activities carried out by pilot enterprise groups outside the leading industrial planning, the projects below the quota shall be decided by the parent company of the group, and the projects above the quota shall be directly reported to the State Planning Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission for approval. In the case that some major economic relations have not been straightened out, the competent departments of the pilot enterprise groups should, in the name of the central government, demand and urge government departments at all levels to proceed from the overall situation of national development, actively coordinate various contradictions arising from the joint merger of the pilot enterprise groups, properly handle the interest relations such as income tax payment, and help enterprises overcome the difficulties and obstacles they face in development.

4. Administrative intervention in enterprise restructuring.

The formation of enterprise groups should be the product of marketization, not the result of administrative intervention. The establishment of parent-subsidiary system with property rights as the link is the basis of internal organization and management of enterprise groups. However, due to the general shortage of self-owned funds of enterprise groups in China, the ability to set up or acquire subsidiaries through investment is insufficient, and authorized operation has become the most convenient way to set up or expand enterprise groups. However, authorized operation should also follow the principle of equality and voluntariness. Group merger and acquisition should be based on enterprise groups, and no department has the right to force the group to accept other enterprises as members of the group. Otherwise, the members of the enterprise group will not run in, but will lose the so-called "1+ 1 > 2" effect. For example, the National Heavy Duty Truck Group, which carried out the pilot operation of authorized operation, once had the case that the largest compact enterprise refused to participate in enterprise registration and asked to leave the enterprise group. Grasping the degree of government functions is the key to the benign development of enterprise groups. In the process of the development of enterprise groups, the government should participate but not do everything, and must firmly establish the concept that enterprises are the main body of market development.

Because the enterprise groups formed by administrative means are unstable and not lasting, establishing joint-stock enterprise groups is an important way to improve, enhance and further develop China's enterprise groups. There are many advantages in establishing an enterprise group through the joint-stock system: (1) It is conducive to providing a solid pillar of property rights relations and a strong financial link for the healthy development of enterprise groups. (2) It is beneficial to deal with the interest relationship between the group and the local government and break the limitation of compartmentalization. (3) It is helpful to establish a group leadership system that can break through the shackles of administrative subordination and effectively solve the problem of separation of responsibilities between government and enterprises. (4) It is conducive to promoting the combination of industrial funds and financial funds and strengthening the function of group investment centers.

5. Enterprise groups lack effective incentive and restraint mechanisms.

The core enterprises of China's enterprise groups are mostly state-owned enterprises, and there is little room for choice of incentive methods. Under the existing enterprise system, the incentive methods of core enterprises to operators are mainly wages and bonuses, while wages lack incentives and bonuses only have short-term effects. With the deepening of enterprise reform, it is required to comprehensively use incentive mechanisms such as wages, bonuses, stocks and options. The property rights of state-owned assets are unclear. Under the existing state-owned assets management system, state-owned assets managers lack sufficient management motivation, and their preferences are irrational and unpredictable. In addition, the market restraint mechanism of enterprise groups is not perfect enough. As state-owned enterprises, the social status and power of core enterprises are supported by the government. The slow development of the capital market makes it impossible for state-owned shares to be listed and circulated, which gives state-owned enterprises a "protective umbrella" and is not afraid of being acquired. Under the current state-owned assets management system, even if the product market is fully competitive, if the capital owner is not sensitive to the market, then the constraint of the capital owner on the operator through the product market does not exist.

Therefore, we must put the reform of the core enterprises of enterprise groups in the first place. The contradiction of China's current economic management system lies in the fact that the enterprise system is not straightened out, and it is impossible to restrain the behavior of enterprises by economic means, but only by administrative means. Under such a system, we must first achieve a breakthrough in the reform of the group's core enterprises, otherwise it will always be a chaotic situation. The reform should include two aspects: first, establish a restraint mechanism, including improving the corporate governance mechanism of the parent company of the group and forming a standardized decision-making mechanism; The second is to make the core enterprises of the group have the ability of self-development, including reducing the excessive asset-liability ratio of enterprises and reducing the burden of redundant staff within enterprises and society.