How the EU handled the Ukraine crisis, and what it was actually for What did France, Germany and Poland do and think?

A year ago, gathered in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev on the European Square, the protesters cheered the victory at the same time, but also as if to open the terrible Pandora's Box, the war, the destruction of the country, the economic collapse of the Ukrainian people lingering nightmare. A year later, the smoke has not yet cleared, peace is out of reach. As the Ukrainian crisis "parties", the European Union is still difficult to get rid of the embarrassing situation.

European values are no match for Russia's hard power

Reviewing the past year, the evolution of the Ukrainian crisis can be described as ups and downs, treacherous clouds. From the Crimea to the U.S. and Russia to the U.S. and Europe, from the strange crash of the Malaysia Airlines to the U.S. and Europe to launch sanctions against Russia, from the full-scale war to the French and German mediation of a ceasefire agreement, behind the Ukrainian issue is a new round of fierce game after the Cold War U.S. and Russia's two major strategic rivals, and the European Union in the cracks of the difficult to seek their own sense of existence and values.

The European Union has ruled out the option of resolving the crisis by force from the outset, but finds it difficult to accept that the basic principles and values it espouses have been "undermined," and has therefore opted for a dual-track policy of "engagement plus sanctions" against Russia from the standpoint of realism. At the same time, the political and economic support for the new Ukrainian government led by Petro Poroshenko. Over the past year, the EU, Germany, France and other member states, on the one hand, launched an intensive "diplomatic offensive" against Russia, and on the other hand, with the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine, gradually increased sanctions against Russia. However, whether it is a bitter persuasion, or "aggressive" pressure, seems to have failed to play a role in saving the day. An EU official in charge of Russian affairs in a seminar at the end of last year, frankly, sanctions from the economic point of view to Russia has indeed brought a small amount of pressure, but from the political point of view has not yet played a role. Eugene Loomer, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, a leading think tank, said recently that sanctions could not change the Kremlin's position on Ukraine.

In fact, EU member states are not ironclad in their response to the Ukrainian crisis. Some Eastern European countries, mainly Poland and the three Baltic States, have called for a tough stance against Russia, while Hungary, Bulgaria and other traditionally pro-Russian countries, as well as southern European member states with strong trade ties with Russia, have advocated seeking dialog. Greece's new government sent its economy minister to visit Russia shortly after taking office, while Cyprus announced not long ago that it would lease a military base to Russia, and the core countries led by Germany insisted on a two-handed strategy. As a result, the two rounds of sanctions adopted unanimously by the EU summit were also the result of compromise, leaving a lot of room for maneuver in terms of specifics. In other words, the EU does not want to push Russia into a corner, not to mention that sanctions and counter-sanctions also harm the EU itself.

The analysts generally believe that from September 2014 to February 2015 between the signing of the two Minsk cease-fire agreement, the Ukrainian civil forces have successfully expanded their sphere of influence and opened up a strategic corridor connecting the two self-governing **** and the country, the EU can not do anything about it, and has been a fait accompli of the Crimea issue is not mentioned. Jan Tesau, director of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace's Institute for European Studies, recently wrote that European values have lost out to Russia's hard power in Ukraine.

Germany-France combination gradually become the core of the EU's security affairs

While any major decision of the EU needs the unanimous consent of the Council, it is still necessary to rely on the core powers at the critical moment when it comes to security issues. This has been further demonstrated and reinforced by the crisis in Ukraine.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel met with Russian President Vladimir Putin more than 40 times in 2014, according to European media, including a six-hour-long solo meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Brisbane. French President Francois Hollande also met with Putin several times, and had the intention to take a detour to Moscow to hold a summit meeting.In September 2014, the "Normandy Mechanism" composed of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk agreements for the first time, although the ceasefire only lasted two days, but undoubtedly laid the foundation for the subsequent negotiations. On the eve of the first anniversary of the Ukrainian crisis, a full-scale civil war is on the verge of a critical moment, Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande composed of a "peace combination" after many consecutive days of shuttle diplomacy and good offices, and finally contributed to the parties to reach a cease-fire, to avoid the situation getting out of control.

It is worth noting that in this crisis concerning the collective security of Europe, the only thing missing is the figure of Britain. As one of the EU's "troika", Britain has always occupied an important position in European diplomacy and security, but in the "Normandy Quartet" talks, did not leave Britain a place. Chalmers, director of research at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, said that although the United Kingdom is still an important player on the world political stage, but its influence in European security affairs is fading, especially on the issue of Ukraine, in stark contrast to Germany. Sims, a professor of the history of international relations at the University of Cambridge, pointed out that Cameron's unexpected "absence" from the negotiations on resolving the Ukrainian crisis can be seen as another sign of Britain's declining strength. Prime Minister David Cameron announced on the 24th that the UK will send a 75-member military advisory mission to Ukraine next month to help the Ukrainian army improve its tactical intelligence, logistical support and medical care capabilities. Britain will also conduct an army training program to assist Ukraine in strengthening its military. Although Cameron emphasized that British soldiers will not go to the conflict zone, the United Kingdom will not provide Ukraine with weapons of mass destruction for the time being, but in Kiev "change of day" one year anniversary of the British troops into Ukraine for the first time, seems to have more symbolic significance.

European geopolitical map further solidified

While the Ukrainian crisis is far from over, with the signing of a new version of the Minsk cease-fire agreement and the withdrawal of troops from both sides of the conflict, the situation in eastern Ukraine has been temporarily eased, and the question of the post-Ukrainian crisis era of the geopolitical landscape of Europe is becoming a hotspot of concern for all parties.

When the Ukrainian crisis broke out, some people warned of a new Cold War, and some scholars believed that the geopolitical map of Europe would be redrawn, while Tesau, director of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace's Institute for European Studies, disagreed. According to Teschau, the so-called old order of European geopolitics refers to the post-Cold War expansion of the European Union and NATO to the east, while Russia has indicated that it can not accept its neighbors "to the West", thus forming a mutual acquiescence between the West and Russia's "sphere of influence". When the "changed" Ukraine was ready to join the EU, Russia made a decisive move, and the EU and NATO could not respond with force.

Bruno Leddy, a senior researcher at the Brussels branch of the German Marshall Fund, said NATO's Wales summit decided to implement a rapid response program including the formation of a "Tip of the Spear" and to strengthen the military presence in Eastern European countries, which are all aimed at the threat from Russia, but all the military deployments are These initiatives are all aimed at the threat from Russia, but all military deployments are strictly limited to NATO allies, with Ukraine excluded. As Teschau said, Ukraine is not part of the European security architecture, which is based on NATO's Article 5 "collective defense," and therefore the EU and NATO have no obligation to provide military support to Ukraine.

Tesau pointed out that, more importantly, the EU countries have become accustomed to relying on the United States to provide a security umbrella, and the majority of European countries are not yet ready to take responsibility for their own security from the conceptual and operational point of view. The U.S., on the other hand, has shifted its strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region and is too preoccupied with the Middle East chaos and terrorism to invest too much energy in Europe. As the Ukraine crisis enters a new phase, the U.S. and Russia will continue to play, but both sides avoid touching the bottom line of the opponent, in this sense, the geopolitical map of Europe will be further solidified.

Reference:

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