Kant's life and his main ideas

In 1784, three years after the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781, first edition), Kant published in the then Berliner Monatsschrift, vol. 4, no. 12, the essay "Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?". and in the same volume, No. 9, the magazine had already published a similar article by a Jewish philosopher, Mercy Mendelssohn, "On "What is meant by Enlightenment"? According to a small note that Kant later added to his own article, which he would have withheld if he had read it at the time, "This article now consists only in testing to what extent chance can bring about agreement between two minds" [1].

Two hundred years later, when we come back to read the essays of the two philosophers in answer to the same question, we will, of course, notice, as Michel Foucault did, how Jewish philosophical thought, in the context of German society, was integrated into the general trend of German philosophical thought [2], but we will also feel that the two philosophers were not in the same position with regard to the question of the maturity of the Enlightenment [3]. But there is also a sense that these two philosophers differ in their orientation towards the question of the maturity of "enlightenment".

Mendelssohn's essay, by contrast, seems to be clearer and more intelligible in its lines than Kant's, which may be why the editors of the monthly magazine at the time preferred Mendelssohn's response.

Mendelssohn's essay begins with "Enlightenment-Aufklaerung", "Culture-Kultur", "upbringing-Bildung", arguing that "Enlightenment" focuses on "theory" and "culture" on "practice". Mendelssohn distinguishes between "Enlightenment" and "Bildung", arguing that "Enlightenment" focuses on "Theory", "Culture" on "Practice", and "Upbringing" on the synthesis of the two. Mendelssohn's distinction between "theory" and "practice" may indeed be indicative of the broader philosophical context in which Jewish thought has deepened from ancient Greek philosophy to contemporary German philosophy, and on which Kant's philosophy is built. Kant's philosophy was founded on this philosophical idea of the separation and combination of "theory" and "practice", and since then, Fichte, Schelling, and even Hegel have all been within the framework of such an idea. It is perhaps at this basic point that Kant felt that Mendelssohn had something in common with his own philosophy; however, as we shall see, at the end of the essay, Mendelssohn raises an aspect not covered in Kant's "Enlightenment" essays, and Mendelssohn makes it clear that this conception comes from the teachings of the Jewish writers, namely, that the more noble a thing is, the more it will become, the more it will be a part of it. That is, the more perfect any noble thing becomes, the uglier it becomes when it is corrupted [3], and that a broken flower is uglier than a decaying tree, and that it is also a "corpse", and that the "corpse of a beast" is not as abominable as the "corpse of a man" [4]. This issue, indeed, as Mendelssohn himself said, need to be discussed separately.

And we feel that Kant's conception of "Enlightenment" is not an isolated opinion on a single issue, but is closely inseparable from his conception of philosophy as a whole. A very short essay, closely linked to his entire "critical philosophy", would be too concise and general to be readable, perhaps even by the editors of the Berliner Monatsschrift at the time.

I. What is "enlightenment" and what is "maturity"?

Because it is a question and answer, the first sentence of Kant's thesis is: "Enlightenment is the breaking away of people from the state of immaturity which they have imposed on themselves." So what is a "state of immaturity"? The second sentence immediately after that is, "The state of immaturity is the inability to use one's reason without the guidance of others." [5]

The Enlightenment, as a trend or movement of thought, had "reason" written on its banner. It was a new historical period in Europe after the Renaissance and the Reformation.

The Renaissance gave legitimacy to the sensual desires of man. It also meant that the medieval church exercised its authority in the name of "reason," as Thomas Aquinas's philosophy illustrates, and the 18th-century Enlightenment's "rationalism" demonstrated the authority of "reason" through Luther's Reformation, which rejected the authority of external dogma. The "rationalism" of the 18th century Enlightenment, in the spirit of Luther's Reformation against the authority of external dogma, showed a new face of "reason". "Reason broke with external authority to form its own internal authority, i.e., "reason" and "freedom" are one and the same.

Freedom is "itself". Everything comes out of the Self and returns to the Self.

The spirit of Enlightenment is the spirit of Reason, the spirit of Self, the spirit of Freedom. The spirit of "enlightenment" is the spirit of "reason", the spirit of "self", the spirit of "freedom", the spirit of "autonomy", the spirit of "freedom" from "external" domination, the spirit of "autonomy" of "one's own" mastery. The so-called "outside" is the "other", which includes the "person-other" and the "thing-objective world". The so-called "outside" is the "other", which includes the "person-other" and the "thing-objective world" dominating the "self"; the "freedom" from all constraints is also the basic meaning of "freedom". Freedom" is also the basic meaning of "freedom". Therefore, when Kant talks about "Enlightenment", he emphasizes the use of one's own understanding, a function of reason, to perceive the world, rather than relying solely on the guidance of the "other". "The spirit of Enlightenment is the spirit of independence and autonomy from the guidance of the Other.

In this way, Kant has combined his own conception of enlightenment with the traditional slogan of enlightenment, "Dare to know -sapere aude".

In this way, Kant connects his idea of enlightenment with the traditional slogan of enlightenment, "sapere aude". To "dare to know" means to dare to use one's own "reason" to "know" things independently, without relying on or needing those external "guardians-guides". guardian-guide-vormuender". Kant vividly reveals that the lazy man who lives his life by relying on the guidance of others, does not need to bother his own head when he already has a ready-made recipe. Therefore, according to Kant, laziness (Faulheit) and cowardice (Feigheit) are the enemies of "enlightenment" and "maturity".

The reason why "enlightenment" requires "courage-audere" is that it is not easy to "mature" one's reason. The reason why "enlightenment" requires "courage-audere" is that to "mature" one's reasoning-reason is not a smooth process, but involves a certain amount of "risk". People take "risks" in order to "grow and mature". It is often safest to follow the rules under the guidance of the "guide-guardian", but to act independently on one's own, one has to pay the price, to face the double "punishment" of the objective facts and the guide-guardian! The price to be paid for acting independently is the double "punishment" of the objective facts and the guide-guardian. And so it is often the case that only a few people have the courage to allow themselves to "mature", while the majority prefer to remain in the "swaddling clothes" of their guardians, enjoying the "gift" of well-being.

Man is born "free", but once our ancestors have "entrusted" this "freedom" to us, we have to "entrust" it to them. Once our ancestors have "entrusted" this "freedom" to us, we have to pay a considerable price to redeem this treasure that belongs to us. Redeeming this treasure requires not only material power - a certain level of social development - but also spiritual power. People have to have the courage to overcome "laziness-cowardice".

Since this is a kind of "redemption," it is a matter for both the "guardian" and the "ward," and the "guardian" has an enlightened mind, and the "guardian" has an enlightened mind, and the "ward" has an enlightened mind. The "guardians" include the enlightened and insightful ones, who recognize the progress of the times, feel the pace, and thus gradually "return" to the people their own rights and interests. So there are also that philosopher, to the monarchs of Europe appealed to "reclaim" this "freedom", after Kant Fichte had done this work [6]. The reason why the monarchs allowed to return the "freedom" to the people, not only because of their enlightenment and insight, but the social development to a certain stage, return to the people is an important means to promote social development. Without the creative work of all the people, society will not be able to move forward, and will not be able to create greater material wealth, and this kind of wealth, of course, the monarchs are also the most favorite - this idea, but also Kant's short essay has expressed.

It is this condition of "freedom" that Kant emphasizes in the elaboration of his conception of "enlightenment". Kant says, "This Enlightenment requires nothing but freedom, and indeed the most harmless of all things that can be called freedom, that is, the freedom to use one's reason openly in all things." [7] Kant promises that public enlightenment and maturity are not only possible, but almost "inevitable (unausbleiblich)," [8] as long as this freedom is allowed.

"Freedom" is the most central concept in Kant's philosophy, but, of course, the idea of "freedom" did not begin with Kant, whose work was a deep philosophical analysis of the concept of "freedom". Kant's work was a deep philosophical analysis of the concept of "freedom" that brought it to the level of the foundations of philosophy.

"Freedom" is the essential property of reason, the way of being of reason.

Reason was once understood to be identical with necessity. "Rationality is "rule", "logic", "law" and "authority". authority." The Middle Ages took great pains to give theology a greater "necessity" and to rationalize theological questions, while the Renaissance turned to "sensibility" in order to break through the authority of theology. However, since Descartes revealed the "doubtfulness" of sensory experience, the problem of "reason" emerged again from the foundation of philosophy; however, at this time, "reason", in order to separate itself from the doubtfulness of sensibility, was not the same as "reason". However, at this time, in order to draw a line with the doubtfulness of sensibility, it emphasizes the significance of "getting rid of" and "liberating" - from the bondage of "sensible experience". The sense of "freedom" is emphasized in the sense of "escape" and "liberation" from the bondage of "sensual experience" and "freedom". There is a natural connection between "reason" and "freedom". In this way of thinking, the philosophical categories of "necessity", "chance", "possibility", etc., are understood in a new way. "Freedom" is not "indulgence" and "freedom", not "return to nature", but rather It is the "creative" function of "reason".

In his essay on Enlightenment, Kant further distinguishes between two kinds of use of "freedom" and "reason," one of which is "public" and the other " public" and "private". Kant says: "There must always be freedom to use one's reason publicly (der oeffentliche Gebrauch seiner Vernunft), and it alone can bring about the enlightenment of mankind. The private use (der Privatgebrauch) of one's own reason tends to be very narrowly restricted, though not in such a way as to particularly prevent the progress of enlightenment." [9] Here, what is meant by "public" and "private (human)" is specified by Kant. Kant follows with, "And by the public use of reason I understand the kind of use that anyone can make as a scholar (als Gelehrter) in the presence of a full audience (ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt). The application of one's own reason that one can make in the public post (anvertrauten buergerlichen Posten) or office (Amte) to which one is appointed, I will call private application." [10]

Here Kant has his own usage in applying the words "public" and "private (under)", because usually "private-private " carries the meaning of "personal-private", which is precisely the opposite of "public (social) office". And this usage of Kant's we can only find a basis in philosophical theory. Kant's generalization of empirical social office to "Privat" is also opposed to the broadest "universal-public", a philosophical "universal-public" which is a philosophical "universal-public". -This philosophical "universality-publicity" is "infinite", accessible and enjoyable to all, whereas all social "public offices", no matter how large their remit, are "private". All "public offices" in society, no matter how large their competence, are "limited".

Kant understood and utilized "private-private" and "public-public" at the philosophical level of "finite" and "infinite". "public-public".

Reason is by its very nature "infinite", but in the real world, in the empirical world, it is "finite". The delimitation of these two "boundaries" and the exploration of their relationship are precisely the manifestation of "enlightenment", of "maturity": "reason-freedom" is "infinite" in the sense that "reason" is "infinite" in the sense that "freedom" is "infinite" in the sense of "reason". -Freedom" is "infinite" in the "essential-ontological realm" and "infinite" in the "phenomenal realm", whereas "freedom" is "infinite" in the "phenomenal realm". in the "phenomenal world", it is "limited".

In his treatise on Enlightenment, Kant emphasizes the delineation of such boundaries in order to call for the granting-permission-encouragement of the freedom of "reason" from any restriction within the sphere of its public use, while pointing out that this public use is not limited to the freedom of "reason". Kant emphasizes the delineation of such boundaries in order to call for the granting-permission-encouragement of unrestricted freedom of "reason" within the scope of its public use, while pointing out that this freedom of public expression of ideas does not impede the exercise of one's own authority in practical life and in all kinds of official duties. The "freedom of thought" that Fichte later called for is implicit here.

This is the idea of "boundaries" involved in Kant's treatise on Enlightenment; what we want to discuss further here is the intrinsic connection between this idea and Kant's entire philosophical thought, and an understanding of this connection will be helpful to us in further grasping the spirit of Kant's philosophy. Understanding this connection will help us to further grasp the spirit of Kant's philosophy. This connection has already been suggested in Foucault's paper mentioned above, but it needs to be further elaborated on a philosophical level. We will see that the "purity" of Kant's philosophy does not only emphasize "abstract forms", but is really very practical, from a "pure" philosophical level, always concerned with real problems. In the real problems, so the mention of "pure", as if it will be out of touch with the reality of such a kind of preoccupation, is a kind of historical misunderstanding.

What is "critical philosophy"?

Kant called his philosophy "Critical Philosophy", and the so-called "Critical-Kritik" is certainly not the "Great Criticism" that we used to say. The so-called "Critique-Kritik" does not mean what we used to call "Great Criticism", but "Critique" means "Critique-Critique", and the so-called "Critique-Critique" means exactly "Critique-Critique", which means "Critique-Critique". Criticism" means "scrutinizing and defining", and the so-called "scrutinizing and defining" means "drawing a clear line". The notion of "boundary" is a core concept of classical German philosophy from Kant to Hegel; and the establishment of "boundary" is the key to "rationality", "enlightenment", "enlightenment", "enlightenment" and "enlightenment". The establishment of "boundaries" is a sign of "rationality", "enlightenment" and "maturity". Thus, in the philosophical sense, in Kant's view, the traditional philosophy of the past - metaphysics - suffers from unclear "boundaries" and is thus not "mature" enough. Thus, the "critical philosophy" is not a "handful" but a "mature" philosophy of reason with "boundaries".

In Kant's conception of philosophy, the field of "philosophy" is like a "kingdom". This kingdom is ruled by "reason" and is therefore orderly, not "anarchic"[11]; however, "reason" is not a "dictator" either. Reason, however, is not a "dictatorial" "monarch", and "reason" is not a "centralized" despot and "centralized" authoritarian who indiscriminately combines many powers in one person. Reason is not a "centralized power" that indiscriminately combines many powers in one "autocrat" and "dictator", but rather, it differentially exercises the corresponding "powers" in different "territories" and "domains", and the various "powers All these different "powers" are "limited", and thus "reason", in exercising its own powers, also has a problem of "usurpation", and it is important to delimit the "powers" of "reason" in the "territorial domain" of "reason". Reason has different "competences" in different fields of philosophy, so that it does not "overstep its position" or "overstep its position" or "downgrade its position" or "out of place". It is the primary task of Kant's "critical philosophy" to delineate the different "competences" of "reason" in different fields of philosophy, so as not to "overstep its position" or "degrade its position". Thus, in Kant's eyes, the kingdom of philosophy, as well as the kingdom of reality, the most ideal politics, is "*** and system" [12].

We know that Kant's "Critical Philosophy" contains three major "Criticisms", the first "Critique of Pure Reason" is the foundation work of this philosophy, with epoch-making impact, historians of philosophy believe that this book opens up the direction of modern philosophical epistemology. .

The Critique of Pure Reason deals with the field of "knowledge" in philosophy, which, in Kant's view, is first and foremost a "field of reason" - the "terretorium". In Kant's view, this is first of all a "terretorium" of "reason", in which the concept of reason has the "legislative power" of the "territory-Gebiet, ditio", and "knowledge" in which the concept of "reason" has the "legislative power" of the "territory-Gebiet, ditio". It is in this part of "knowledge", i.e. in the "territory" where reason has "legislative power", that "necessity", "universality", "universality" are spoken of. The "scientific system" of "necessity" and "universal validity" is to be found in this part of "knowledge", i.e., in the "territory" where reason has "legislative power", while the other parts of "knowledge" are only the "domicilium" of empirical concepts, although they have to be "inhabited" by reason. The other parts are only the "domicilium" of the empirical concepts, although they have to "conform" to the laws of reason, but do not have the "legislative power" over the object, so the empirical concepts are contingent, rather than the necessary concepts of science [13]. What Kant endeavors to do in his book Critique of Pure Reason is to demonstrate how "reason" has the "right to legislate" in the "territory" of "knowledge", while "reason" has the "right to legislate" in the "territory" of "knowledge", and "reason" has the "right to legislate" in the "territory" of "knowledge". and that to exercise this power "outside" this "territory" is a "usurpation" of "reason", and that reason loses the power to "legislate". "Reason loses its "legitimacy". Because of this pattern of thought, we can successfully understand Kant in the critical philosophy of the writings, a large number of the use of the concept of jurisprudence of the time this phenomenon.

In this sense, Kant first of all distinguishes between the "domain" of "empirical concepts", which have been fully revealed by Hume, and his "scientific knowledge", which is the "domain" of the "scientific knowledge", and the "domain" of the "scientific knowledge", which is the "domain" of the "scientific knowledge". "domain" and his "scientific knowledge". Academically, Kant does not reject Hume's work in its entirety, but points out the scope of his theory, i.e., he affirms that the conformity of "empirical concepts" is indeed the result of empirical generalization, and does not have the "necessity" of "a priori-a priori". "What Kant wants to point out, however, is that "knowledge," though derived from experience, does not "end" in experience. It does not "end" with experience. "Reason itself is not "dependent" on experience.

The proposition that "reason" is not dependent on "experience" is also generally accepted, and Hume recognized that logic and mathematics are not the product of "habit", but are The question is how this "innate form" is combined with the "acquired content", and how this "combination" can be realized in the form of a "priori", but also in the form of a "priori". The question is how this "innate form" can be combined with the "acquired content", and how this "combination" can maintain the "innate" character of "reason" needs to be elucidated, since Hume's work indicates quite powerfully that such a "combination" is a priori, and that it is a priori. The work of Hume points quite strongly to the impossibility of such a "union". Thus, the question of how "innate synthesis of judgment" is possible becomes the primary question that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason needs to address.

The question of "how an innate synthesis of judgment is possible," in the sense that we are concerned with it here, is the question of how "reason" can have not only a "domain" but also a "territory. also has a "territory" - a "territory" in which it has a legitimate "domain" over sensory-empirical materials through "natural concepts". On this "territory", reason, through the "concept of nature", has the legitimate "legislative power" over the material of experience, and this function of reason is called "Verstand" by Kant. knowing" legislates for "nature".

We see that in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tries his best to reveal how "reason", through the form of "spatio-temporal" innate intuition and the concepts of "categories", "applies" to the material of sensory experience. In the Critique of Reason, Kant endeavors to reveal how "reason", through the form of "spatio-temporal" innate intuition and the concept of "category", "constructs-constitute" the material of sensory experience so as to become the "necessary knowledge" of "theory". That is to say, "scientific knowledge" consists of a system of concepts, both "empirical" and "a priori-transcendental", so that "scientific knowledge" consists of a system of concepts, both "empirical" and "a priori-transcendental". "Knowledge" is also divided into "empirical" and "a priori", and "a priori knowledge" is that which is universally necessary. A priori knowledge is that knowledge which has universal necessity, without which the edifice (kingdom) of "scientific knowledge" will be tumbling down, and Kant considers his work to be to save the edifice from tumbling down, to save science from peril, and to make the kingdom of "scientific knowledge" to be "scientific" and "scientific knowledge" to be "scientific" and "scientific knowledge" to be "scientific". The kingdom of "scientific knowledge" can "legitimately" exist.

Kant accomplished his "Copernican revolution" in this saving work.

The key to the possibility of "knowledge" lies in the "subject" and the "object" - the "concept" and the "object". The key to how "knowledge" is possible is how "subject" and "object" - "concept" and "object" - can have "coherence". According to Kant, the failure of the previous philosophical theory of knowledge is that the "subject" revolves around the "object", and the "subject" seeks to "conform" to the "object". The "subject" seeks to "conform" to the "object" in order to obtain correct knowledge-truth about the "object". In Kant's view, such a line of epistemology makes it impossible to really obtain the "consistency" of "subject-object" and "concept-object". ". Now this relation is reversed so that the "object" revolves around the "subject", i.e., the "object" revolves around the "concept". "In this way, the two can be truly consistent under the "legislative" function (Vermoegen, faculty) of the "intellectual concept". In this way we can also understand Kant's famous statement in the Critique of Pure Reason that the conditions of empirical possibility are also the conditions of empirical object possibility. That is to say, under the "condition" that "reason" legislates for "nature," "experience" and "object of experience" are not the same. The "object of experience" originally originates from the same condition. The "legislative" function of "knowing" makes possible not only empirical knowledge, but also empirical objects: sense data, which are provided through the senses, become possible empirical objects.

This means that the legislation of "knowing" provides "empirical scientific knowledge" with legitimate "objects of (knowable) knowledge". At the same time, furthermore, since the legislating role of "knowing" is rooted in reason itself and not in the externally provided sensory materials, only those materials that "pass through" the legislation of reason can legitimately become the "(knowable) objects of knowledge" of the "kingdom of rational knowledge". Kingdom of Rational Knowledge", and those who do not pass these laws are rejected (denied a visa) outside the gates of this kingdom, and are not allowed to legally enter its territory. -Territory.

Under these legal conditions, if any "outlaw" enters the country "illegally", he will be expelled from the country once he is found out, and the function of this examination is to "criticize philosophy"; and if any "outlaw" enters the country "illegally", he will be expelled from the country once he is found out, and the function of this examination is to "criticize philosophy". This function of censorship belongs to "critical philosophy"; and if there is a "legislator" who "oversteps his bounds" and "recognizes" those who are not "empirical objects" as "parts" or "concepts", then it is a function of "critical philosophy". -If there is an "overstepping" "legislator" who "admits" into the country those "parts" of "concepts" which are not "objects of experience", then this is an "usurpation" of "reason", and the "usurpation" of such a "usurpation" is not a "usurpation". The examination and revelation of such "usurpation" is also within the competence of "critical philosophy".

The "subjects" that "reason" can accept in the territory of the "kingdom of knowledge" are only those who can enter the "spatio-temporal intuition". The concepts of "transcendence" such as "God", "immortality", "infinity, the whole of experience", and so on, are not concepts of "transcendence (experience)". concepts, such as "God", "immortality", "infinite-experiential compendium", and so on, are not the legitimate subjects of the "Kingdom of Knowledge", and these concepts, although rational, do not have the "right to legislate" within the territory of "Knowledge", and therefore cannot be "established". These concepts, although rational, have no "legislative power" in the territory of "knowledge", and therefore cannot "establish" "empirical objects", and therefore have no "right" to become "knowledge". In the realm of "theory of knowledge" - i.e., in the territory of the Kingdom of Knowledge - Kant declares that they are only "rational" "ideas-ideas", and that they are "notions-ideas", and that they are "notions-ideas", but "ideas-ideas". "and "unknowable".

We see that the "legislative power" of reason in the sphere of knowledge, as the "concept of nature", is "limited", and the competence to define the natural concept of reason is the competence of "critical philosophy". It is the work of "critical philosophy" to define the terms of reference of the natural concept of reason. "Critical philosophy defends the legitimate power of rationality over the concept of nature, and also "limits" the illegitimate transgression of reason over the concept of nature.

Reason has a clearer "limit" on the scope of its "competence," and reason has a clearer "limit" on itself. "Reason" has a clearer understanding of itself - "reason" has "matured", which is exactly what Kant means by "enlightenment". ".

In the realm of "knowledge", "reason-knowledge" legislates for "nature", "constructing" it as "nature". nature" as the "object" of "(knowable) knowledge", so that the "domain" of "knowledge In this way, the "domain" of "knowledge" becomes the "territory" of reason itself, and the "subjects" of this territory, the "concepts of nature", become the "territory" of reason itself, and the "subjects" of this territory, the "concepts of nature", become the "territory" of reason itself. The concepts of nature in this territory have the legitimate right to "constitute" a harmonious kingdom, because the "ruler-reason" and its "subjects" (which enter the categories by means of spatio-temporal intuition) are "one"; and those "sensory concepts" which do not "enter" spatio-temporal intuition are "one"; and those "sensory concepts" which do not "enter" spatio-temporal intuition are "one". The "sensory material-chaos" and the "rational concepts-God, immortality," etc., which have not "entered" space-time, may "dwell -They may "reside" in the "Kingdom of Knowledge", but they are not "natural concepts", they are not lawful subjects of the Kingdom, they do not have lawful rights, and the "Rational Ruler" does not have any rights over them. -The "ruler of reason" does not have the power to "legislate" over them, although they may "conform" to the "rules" of reason, and may carry out the appropriate "rules" of reason. Although they may "conform" to the "rules" of reason, and may reason appropriately, and formally "conform" to "logic", these "conformities" are either empirical or merely empirical. conformity" are either merely empirical "habits" and therefore "contingent" (Hume), or "transcendent" (Hume). "spatio-temporal" and therefore empty and contentless "ideas" (theology), for which the "rational-ruler" only serves as a kind of "regulating-regulating-regulativ" role, but cannot "construct-constitute" them into an "object" of knowledge. object" of knowledge. We see that Kant's rather difficult distinction between "regulating" and "constructing" may become clearer in this perspective.

"Reason" is not "free" in the domain of "nature", it is the domain of "necessity". It is the realm of "necessity", although in this realm "reason" also exercises the power to "legislate" from itself, and not from external sensible materials, to formulate the "laws-laws" of the "kingdom of knowledge". "laws-laws" of the "kingdom of knowledge"; thus, in the "kingdom of knowledge", the "freedom" of Reason is "limited in the "kingdom of knowledge"; thus, in the "kingdom of knowledge" the "freedom" of reason is "restricted" and "limited", just as "freedom" is restricted in the "private-private" sphere. The "natural (physical) knowledge" is limited. Both "natural (physical) knowledge" and "social positions" are limited by "experience".

"Knowledge" "stops" at "experience", beyond which reason has to "presume" to exercise "legislative power". The "arrogation" of "reason" is a manifestation of "immaturity" of "reason". Traditional metaphysics attempts to incorporate the concepts of "God, immortality of the soul, and freedom of the will" into the "kingdom of knowledge" of reason as if they were "natural concepts". The attempt of metaphysics to incorporate the concepts of "God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will" into the "kingdom of knowledge" of reason as if they were "natural concepts" is a major example of this "immaturity. To reveal the "immaturity" of such a practice is the foundational work of Kant's critical philosophy.

This led to Kant's famous phrase: Limit knowledge to make room for faith.

Three: Reason legislates for "freedom"

"Freedom" has no legal status in the realm of "nature-knowledge. It can, of course, "reside" in this realm, and thus reason does not completely reject the concept of "freedom" to "think-think," but the concept of "freedom" does not have a legitimate place in the realm of "nature-knowledge," which is the realm in which it resides. However, the "free concept" has no right to "legislate" in the "field of knowledge" as the "natural concept" does, because in the "natural-knowledge" field the "free concept" has no right to "legislate". Because in the realm of "nature-knowledge", "freedom" has no access to spatio-temporal intuition, and therefore, in the empirical world, it is "objectless", and reason cannot "construct" for it. Reason is unable to "construct and establish" an empirical intuitive object for it, and therefore its concepts, although they can be "thought", cannot form an intellectual-scientific conceptual-theoretical system, but only an "idea". It is only a "conception-idea", and therefore, for "discursive reason-theoretical reason", "freedom" is "unknowable". However, when it comes to the realm of "practice", i.e., the "moral kingdom", reason legislates for this kingdom through the "concept of freedom". It is through the "concept of freedom" that reason legislates for this kingdom, and it has the legitimate "right to legislate".

The distinction-competence of such a "legislative" power of "reason" is crucial for Kant's critical philosophy.

To allow only "free concepts" to have "legislative power" in the moral sphere is an important way of delimiting the boundaries between "virtue" and "happiness". It is the cornerstone of Kant's moral philosophy that "virtue" is related to the "moral law" and "happiness" is related to the "natural law". "natural law".

"Morality" relates to the domains of "practice" and "will". "Practice" is the realization of "cause and effect" according to "concepts", but there is the realization of cause and effect according to "natural concepts", and also according to "free concepts". But there are those who realize cause and effect according to the "concept of nature" and those who realize cause and effect according to the "concept of freedom", and there is a difference of "principle" between the two: the former follows the principle of "nature", while the latter follows the principle of "freedom", and only the principle of "freedom" can be realized. Only the "cause and effect" realized according to the "concept of freedom" is "moral practice", while the "cause and effect" realized according to the "concept of nature" is "moral practice". The "practices" according to the "concept of nature" are in fact still within the scope of "theory", since they follow the principle of theoretical knowledge, according to which rationality is a "moral practice", while the "practices" according to the "concept of nature" remain within the scope of "theory". There is a difference in principle between legislating on the principle of the "concept of nature" and legislating on the "concept of freedom" for "moral practice" in accordance with reason.

Kant's in-depth analysis-critique of the concept of freedom is a great contribution to the history of European philosophy, and in a sense, it can be said to be of epoch-making significance. Perhaps we can say that Kant's "critique" of "freedom"-that is, his "critique" of "practical reason"-has a landmark significance in a sense. Through the "critique" of "freedom" - that is, the "critique" of "practical reason" - Kant pushed European philosophy - metaphysics - to "maturity" and "enlightenment".

What does "freedom" mean? "Freedom is "unrestricted", "free" means "unlimited".

The idea of "infinity" is not new in the history of European philosophy, but it is rather vague and abstract.

The concrete sciences take the "finite" as the "object" of study, and "philosophy" takes the "infinite" as the "object". "This seems to be a natural and reasonable division, however, this kind of cut-off distinction between "finite" and "infinite" makes traditional metaphysics go into a dead end. Traditional metaphysics has come to a dead end. According to Kant's "critique", this traditional metaphysics is an act of usurpation of reason: on the one hand, "philosophy" restricts itself to the level of "theoretical knowledge", on the other hand, it wants to extend its tentacles to the level of empirical knowledge, and on the other hand, it wants to extend its tentacles to the level of empirical knowledge. Philosophy, on the one hand, limits itself to the level of "theoretical knowledge" and, on the other hand, extends its tentacles to the idea of the "infinite", which cannot have any real content in the field of empirical knowledge. This "infinite" conception is in fact a "leap" in theory-reasoning, and therefore a product of "imagination".

The concept of "infinity" must have "freedom" as its content, "infinity" is "freedom". The idea of "freedom" is "practical", not "theoretical". The "practice" of "freedom" - the "practice" of "freedom" - is the reason why "morality" is "practical", not "theoretical". The "practice" of "freedom" is the basis of what makes "morality" "morality". Without "freedom", there is no "morality".

Practice involves the realm of "will", and "will" is "desire"; there is the realm of "nature", and "nature" is the realm of "will". There is the "desire" of "nature" and the "desire" of "freedom". "Natural desires are governed by the laws of nature, and free desires are governed by the laws of nature. The "natural" "desire" is governed by the "law of nature" and the "free" "desire" is governed by the "moral law", the former being "happiness" and the latter "the highest good". Kant draws a strict distinction between the two, a distinction that is "principled" in the sense that "happiness" obeys the "law of nature" and "virtue" obeys the "law of freedom". "happiness" obeys the "law of nature" and "virtue" the "law of freedom".

On the face of it, Kant sees the "unrestricted-infinity" of "freedom of the will - free will" as the "rationality

On the surface, Kant's view of "unrestricted infinity" of "free will" as "reason" "legislating" for the form of moral practice, with no reference to empirical content, does reflect his failure to escape completely from the shadow of the traditional conception of "infinity", and is therefore often criticized. It is only that we should also see that in his formalist ethics and liberalism, there is still a spirit of tendency to "reality", and his liberalism-moral philosophy does not "stop at" "form", so that his "legislation" does not involve empirical content. His liberal-moral philosophy does not "stop" at "form", and therefore his concept of "infinity" is not abstract and contentless, but "tends" to reality, which has already given birth to Hegel's later concept of "infinity-truth" as an abstract and contentless concept.

The "infinite" without content is an empty concept, and "the greatest without the greatest - the smallest without the smallest" is only an extension of the concept of the word, which is precisely the meaning of "reason" criticized by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. This kind of meaning is exactly what Kant criticized in the Critique of Pure Reason, that is, the "notion" that "reason" wants to "extend" its "intellectual content" apart from its content, while it is actually impossible to have such a content. is the "arrogance" of "reason"; it is only in the Critique of Practical Reason that "infinity" and "freedom" are combined, and at this point "infinity" and "freedom" are combined, and at this point "infinity" and "freedom" are combined, and at this point "infinity" and "freedom" are combined. It is only in the Critique of Practical Reason that "infinity" is combined with "freedom", and at this time "freedom" is the characteristic of "will", which belongs to the field of "practice-action", that is to say, in the field of practice, "freedom" is the characteristic of "will". That is to say, in the field of practice, "reason" itself has the power to act, that is to say, "reason" has the power to act according to a "concept", not an irrational one. That is to say, in the realm of practice, "reason" itself has the power to act, that is to say, "reason" has the ability to act according to a "concept" rather than an irrational mechanical activity. This activity according to a "concept" can be divided into two categories: one according to the "concept of nature" and the other according to the "concept of freedom". Since "moral" behavior is behavior according to the "concept of freedom," "freedom" in this sense means "behavior-action," and not just "behavior-action.

Since "morality" is an act, and an "act" is always "real", to be revealed in experience, to be visualized, in the Kantian sense, it is "phenomenal" and therefore "in accordance" with the "law of cause and effect"; however, moral behavior is behavior according to the "concept of freedom", and what is called "free conception" is not a behavior. However, the moral act is an act according to the "concept of freedom", and the so-called "freedom" is "unrestricted-unlimited", so that such an act, although it "conforms" to the "law of causality", is "phenomenal", and therefore "in accordance with" it. the law of cause and effect", but is "not governed by the law of cause and effect", it is "not subject to the law of cause and effect", and it is "not subject to the law of cause and effect", but is "not subject to the law of cause and effect". The "act" of "freedom" is a "break" in the "series of cause and effect", a "break" in the "series of cause and effect" of antiquity, a "break" in the "series of cause and effect", a "break" in the "series of cause and effect" of antiquity. The "act" of "freedom" is the "break" of the "series of cause and effect", the "initiator-beginner" of antiquity, the "first cause" of Aristotle.

"Freedom" is not governed by any sense-experience, and "produces" "acts" from its own conception, in the sense that the The "action" of "freedom" is already a "creation",

What is "creation"? What is "creation"? "Creation is the passage from "nothing" to "something", which in European philosophical thought was a new concept brought about by the Judeo-Christians.