The biggest problems in Chinese soccer

With the October 2, 2004 away strike by Beijing Guoan FC as a prelude, and with the October 17 speech by Xu Ming, chairman of Dalian Shide FC, about reforming the management mode of Chinese soccer and setting up the Chinese Football Professional Clubs Union Co. The 2004 China Football Super League (CFSL) fiasco initiated by some "soccer investors" and labeled by some media as "China's soccer revolution" finally ended with the CFA meeting some of the demands of the "revolutionaries", namely, the 2004 Chinese Super League (CSL). The CFA met some of the demands of the "revolutionaries" - a "moratorium on relegation" for the 2004 Chinese Super League, the release of the budget and final accounts of the current year's Chinese Super League to the clubs, and the establishment of a group to deepen the reform of the Chinese Super League system - in exchange for the "revolutionaries'" approval of the 2004 Chinese Super League. -to exchange to the "revolutionaries" on the CFA has the power to manage Chinese soccer according to the law and have all kinds of national soccer competitions generated by the property rights of the temporary recognition and respect and temporarily subsided, the league continued to carry out. However, the storm is not over, with the November 11 CFA set up a "Super League deepening reform working group" and "member associations to deepen the reform of the working group", and formulated a specific reform schedule, the reform of China's soccer business management system once again The government has also made a major effort to improve the quality of its services, and the government is now focusing its attention on the issue.

While the waves of what has been labeled the "soccer revolution" are not spectacular, they have revealed some thought-provoking issues, and it can even be said that these issues epitomize the problems of Chinese society. From a legal point of view, the soccer industry has long been difficult to solve the game corruption, referee "black whistle" and other favoritism "chapter" of the problem and the rest of the society there is a corruption phenomenon, the judicial system crisis of confidence is the same. However, this article is mainly on the storm triggered by some of the clubs and the CFA in deepening the legal issues involved in the reform of China's soccer management system to analyze the theory and system of social and economic law for the innovation of China's soccer management system to provide the basic concepts and specific legal tools to support.

In the context of the pervasive power of modern capital, sports have long been industrialized and socialized. In the 20th century, the economy as the spiritual qualities of the capital invaded all fields - the field of charity and the field of culture, sports, health care, etc. In the late 20th century, the third domain of non-profit organizations flourished: on the one hand, a large number of autonomous private organizations, no longer keen on profit-seeking for their shareholders or managers, but committed to the state's formal mechanisms outside the public ***On the one hand, a large number of autonomous private organizations, no longer eager to pursue profit for their shareholders or managers, but committed to public goals outside the formal mechanisms of the state, continued to differentiate between for-profit and nonprofit organizations (the distinction between the two lies not in whether or not they are engaged in business but in whether or not they were established with the purpose of distributing operating profits to investors); on the other hand, there was a convergence of the two, and it became difficult to differentiate between the two (because nonprofit organizations also operated in a manner that was consistent with the operations of for-profit organizations, and for-profit organizations were also presented with a social responsibility). responsibility). Thus, it would not be surprising if a soccer association in a European country had both a regulatory function and a business in the soccer industry, and the Chinese Super League fiasco in 2004 was a typical, vivid and concentrated manifestation of the rare Chinese experience of competition and cooperation between for-profit, not-for-profit and governmental organizations in the autonomy of the Chinese Super League. It involves a third domain of non-profit organizations - the CFA and fan associations - and a private domain of for-profit organizations - the clubs, their investors, sponsors, and television broadcasters - as well as a public domain of public power - the State General Administration of Sport (SGS). -the State General Administration of Sports (SGS). The investors of the Chinese Super League clubs challenged the CFA to share and exercise the property, operational, management and supervisory rights of the Chinese Super League, using strikes and delays in the remaining matches of the year as their weapons. The clubs and their investors fully expressed their capital's demand for profit and voice through the convening of the "Joint Investor's Meeting" and in various names. The CFA, by convening the CFA Executive Committee, has firmly defended its right to manage the league and its property rights. Although both sides of the conflict claim to have the same goal - to solve the problems of the soccer league and to improve Chinese soccer - they do not share the same specific views. The differentiation and integration of organizations in two important domains of social autonomy-the for-profit private domain and the nonprofit third domain-as well as between them and governmental organizations, is extremely prominent in the Chinese soccer arena, and the issues raised by the fiasco are are typical of the problems of competition and cooperation in the realm of social autonomy. Such changes in corporate bodies demanding autonomy will ultimately promote social and economic legislation and the corresponding judicial capacity.

Social law and economic law is the traditional public law and private law can not properly solve the increasingly complex modern society's pluralistic, multi-level interests of the cross-fertilization and conflict of contradictions and the emergence of a new legal sector, which is based on the interests of the public in specific areas of society, to coordinate the "social power" between the "social power" and the "social power" to the "social power" and the "social power" to the "social power". "Social power" and public power, the public in specific areas of the conflict between. However, social and economic law is still a new phenomenon in China's social life which is not well known and fully understood. The functioning of social and economic law depends on the self-limitation and innovation of public power as well as the power of autonomous organizations, and without a balanced match of power it is difficult to make changes in the rule of law happen, and even if laws are transplanted or enacted according to the rational elite's sense of supremacy, it is still difficult for them to play their proper roles in the real life. The 2004 Chinese soccer super league controversy provides a typical material for the study of social and economic law, and a good opportunity to arm the various forces involved in the change with the theory of social and economic law and to promote the peaceful and orderly realization of the change.

National soccer league is a typical autonomous field of social life in the developed countries of the West, but in contemporary China, it needs to be gradually freed from the domination and dictation of the government and evolve into another more adaptable face - the realization of competition and cooperation between for-profit and non-profit organizations under the support of public power. The competition and cooperation between for-profit and non-profit organizations under the auspices of public power. This fiasco is a concentrated and intense manifestation of the demand to redefine the rights and interests of all parties that is bound to happen in the change of China's soccer management system. Happily, despite some unpleasant incidents, both sides of the conflict have taken out their legal weapons. Under peaceful conditions, interests are directly expressed as legal rights, so the dispute between the two sides also focuses on legal issues.

I. Property rights of the Chinese Super League

The first thing that the change encountered is the ownership of the league's property. Because with the United States, Europe and other countries, the operation of the property rights of the league, especially the start-up mechanism is completely different, the property rights of the Chinese soccer league is not Xu Ming and other clubs, "investors", nor is it the CFA, which is semi-official and half-civilian non-profit legal person associations (which is only the league property rights of the owner's representative of the commissioned agent), and the property rights of its owners are Its property owner is the "whole nation", i.e., the league's property is state-owned. Since the launch of China's soccer reform in 1992 and the reform of professionalized soccer into professional soccer in 1994, China's national soccer leagues have begun to socialize and marketize their operations. However, apart from the clubs' own investment in their teams, the entire organization of the league (undertaken by the CFA and its local associations) and the initial investment cost taxpayers' money. Since the property of all people cannot be directly owned by all people, the direct representative of the league's ownership is the State General Administration of Sports under the State Council. The membership fees of the clubs and the sponsorships of the sponsors are the consideration for the services provided by the league to them. Therefore, it is difficult for the club investors represented by Xu Ming and others to claim ownership of the league's property rights, and the resolution of the CFA Executive Committee at its meeting on October 26, 2004, which stated that "the CFA is the initial owner of the ownership rights arising from the competitions", is also problematic, as it is only a delegated authority of the owner (the whole nation) and the representative (the State General Administration of Sport). The CFA is not the owner, nor even the representative of the owner, but the proxy of the representative of the owner (the General Administration of Sport of the People's Republic of China). As a result, both parties who claimed property rights in the 2004 Chinese Super League fiasco lacked a legal basis. If the league's owner (the whole nation) decides to privatize the league, it needs to make a decision and make a reasonable valuation under a fair, just and open procedure, and acquire the property right after the relevant legal entity pays a reasonable price. If the owners of the league decide to maintain the status quo of state ownership and public operation, they can continue to entrust the management of the league to the CFA, a non-profit legal entity, by the representative of the owners (the State General Administration of Sports). However, in line with the trends represented by the Third Sector Community Revolution and the Reinventing Government movement that began at the end of the 20th century, the Chinese Super League needs to be gradually transformed from being owned by the entire population to being owned by a Third Sector Community (CFA) or a Private Community (CSL) through a fair process. In this sense, both the clubs and the CFA represent the demands of the times by claiming ownership, but they both need to pay a fair price and take social responsibility - for example, by taking a certain amount of the league's revenues and setting up a fund to pay for the training of the national team at all levels, the cost of matches, and for the cultivation of young soccer talents. Whether the league is publicly owned or partially or fully privatized, property rights need to be strictly defined as the basis for the league's operation. It should be noted that the property rights of a league and the property rights of a club are two different concepts and should not be confused. A "club investor" cannot become an investor in the league by changing the concept, let alone take possession of state property, or else there will be a loss of state assets.

The 2003 version of the "FIFA Statutes," Article 71, paragraph 1, provides that "FIFA, its member associations and intercontinental football federations are the initial owners of all the rights arising from the events and competitions under their jurisdiction and are not subject to any content, time, place and law. These rights include various financial rights, audio-visual and broadcast recording, reproduction and broadcasting rights, multimedia rights, market development and promotion rights and intangible property rights such as emblems and copyrights." The Chinese Super League, as a tournament under the jurisdiction of the CFA, shall be nominally owned initially by the CFA for its various financial rights, audio-visual and broadcasting recording, reproduction and broadcasting copyrights, multimedia copyrights, marketing development and promotion rights and intangible asset rights such as badges and copyrights. This is consistent with the General Administration of Sport authorizing the CFA to exercise the league's property rights, but it should be emphasized that the property rights of the Chinese Super League remain state-owned until it is privatized.

The second problem encountered in the change is the effectiveness of autonomy. The change in the management system of Chinese soccer has been a gradual process of adapting to the world trend and the needs of China's institutional transformation, and the creation of the professional league in 1994 has gradually transformed the original professional teams from being dependent on the government to becoming market players, and the investment in the soccer business has also shifted from being borne by the state to relying on the market to operate and increase the inputs from multiple channels. In addition, the professional league has gradually changed the management and organization of the league from a government-led committee to a local association, and the Chinese Super League was established in 2004 with the intention of further improving the standard of Chinese soccer by changing the league's management and administration system. According to Yang Yimin, Vice President of CFA, the CSL is to establish a new management system - a management system with democratic consultation and decision-making under the leadership of CFA, with the CSL Committee as the leading body and the CSL clubs as the main members, and with the CSL statutes as the basic basis. The changes in the soccer operation and management system over the years are in fact the gradual socialization and marketization of the government-run soccer business and the promotion of social autonomy in soccer. However, the effectiveness of autonomy depends on a number of factors.

First of all, the effectiveness of autonomy depends on the flexibility and efficiency of the coordination mechanism between the corporate bodies, and the current autonomy mechanism lacks a legal channel for the clubs to check and supervise the CFA, making it difficult for the clubs to influence the decision-making of the federation. One of the purposes of the establishment of the CFL was to establish a platform for dialog and a mechanism of constraints between the CFA and the clubs through the formulation of the CFL Statutes and the establishment of the CFL Committee, but it has not proved to be as effective as it should have been in practice. This is certainly related to the authoritarian bureaucratic style of the CFA, but also related to the unclear division of property rights, operation rights, management rights and supervision rights between clubs and the CFA in the Chinese Super League. Under the current system, the CFA, as the principal agent on behalf of the owners of the league's property rights, is the dominant player in running the league, but the clubs, as one of the league's producers, should share the corresponding benefits, and the basic part of such benefits should even be fixed, and the risk of mismanagement should be borne by the CFA rather than by the clubs. After privatization, the risk of mismanagement should be borne by the organization that takes over the property rights of the league (e.g., the league company proposed by Xu Ming and others), and the CFA should receive a fixed income from which it can run the national team and cultivate young soccer talents. Since the property rights and management rights of the CFL are not clear, its autonomy mechanism does not work at all. Therefore, reforming or clarifying the existing property rights and the corresponding risk burdens are the basic conditions for the autonomy mechanism of the Chinese Super League to work, otherwise it will still be a muddled account, which will not be able to mobilize the enthusiasm and sense of responsibility of all parties in the autonomy group. In addition, the clear definition of the league's property rights and management rights needs to be resolved through the negotiation of all parties in the self-governing organization and the support of the General Administration of Sport, which is also in line with the provisions of Article 71(2) of the FIFA Statutes. This provision stipulates that the Executive Committee of the Association shall decide on the use of these rights and their content and establish special protocols in this regard. The Executive Committee may decide for itself whether to use this right alone or to exercise these rights in cooperation with or exclusively through third parties. Therefore, there is no legal obstacle to the operation of the Chinese Super League through the establishment of a Chinese Super League company, but it requires a corresponding consultation mechanism and legal institutional arrangements.

Secondly, the effectiveness of autonomy depends on the supervision and control of the league by consumers and producers. Fans' associations, players' unions, referees' groups and sponsors can all exert pressure in one way or another on the autonomous soccer body corporate, whether it is the CFA or the league company, and they can either express their voices through their collective power or vote with their feet -- to leave the Chinese Super League. What is unfortunate in this fiasco is the relative passivity of Chinese fans. The development of the Chinese soccer league has led to the formation of numerous soccer fan associations, but these fan associations have not made much of a strong voice when it comes to their own interests. Nonetheless, there were some notable highlights. Before the Super League Standing Committee meeting, fan representatives from the Beijing Fan Association distributed flyers and accepted interviews outside the venue. In the leaflet entitled "Respect the rights and interests of the fans, purify the environment of the stadium", they put forward the demand of "adopting a fan hearing system and respecting the interests of the fans". One of the fans insisted on holding up a sign saying "Request to observe the meeting" and shouted slogans demanding to observe the meeting from time to time. It was also reported that the China Fans Union, a group of five fan clubs from Shanghai, Qingdao, Wuhan, Nanjing and Tianjin, jointly sent an open letter to the CFA on Sina.com and put forward a six-point proposal for the reform of the Chinese soccer industry: increasing the marketization of the reform of the soccer industry, setting up a standardized management system for the league, letting the fans participate in the key decision-making process, protecting the rights and interests of the fans, developing the fans' groups, and standardizing the ticketing market of the clubs. This is the realization of the supervisory role of civil self-governing power. This is the role of civil self-governance forces in monitoring, but it is insignificant compared to the huge number of fan organizations. From this, we can see that the expression ability and desire of China's civil self-governing force is still limited. Despite the fact that the CFA later held a forum for fans, and despite the fact that both sides of the conflict put the interests of the fans above the banner that they held up, the fans had very little direct impact on the change. Since they can't play any direct role in changing the soccer management system, they simply say nothing, and Chinese pragmatism is fully reproduced here.

Once again, the effectiveness of self-governance also relies on media scrutiny. The media's open, transparent and timely reporting and negotiations over broadcasting rights are powerful restraining forces that can go a long way toward promoting the formation of an autonomous, self-regulating mechanism. It is the media that needs to be commended in this fiasco. The soccer news in mainland China at least has relative "freedom of the press", and everyone who cares about soccer in China has no difficulty in getting the specifics and even details of the whole incident from the recent free media reports, and from the traditional mass media and the new electronic networks, from all kinds of people who have commented on the incident, which has been labeled as the "soccer revolution", as well as from the media. It is not difficult to get all sorts of comments from the traditional mass media and the new electronic network on this storm, which has been labeled as a "soccer revolution". Some people agree with and support the "revolutionary behavior" of Xu Ming and other "revolutionaries", believing that their actions are not only to push China's soccer management system towards full marketization, but also that such behavior, which goes beyond the realm of soccer, is a "typical act of constitutional civil disobedience". Some people oppose and question the qualifications and motives of Xu Ming and other "revolutionaries"; others, although long dissatisfied with the CFA's authoritarian incompetence, tend to believe that Xu Ming's "Tycoon Revolution" is nothing more than a "revolution" of the "tycoons", which has long been a source of discontent with the CFA's authoritarian incompetence. Tycoon Revolution" is just a farce, or a "plundering plot" under the banner of "full marketization" and "who invests, who earns, who enjoys" to embezzle people's assets. The timely implementation of the "plunder plot". All in all, the media gave great enthusiasm and attention to the incident, making full and free reports and comments, and all kinds of different voices were fully expressed, providing the opportunities and platforms necessary for the formation of an autonomous mechanism of China's civil society.

Finally, the effectiveness of self-governance also depends on the State General Administration of Sport repositioning and reviewing its own functions. In this fiasco, no matter how much the leadership of the General Administration of Sport guided the work of the FA behind the scenes, it never openly interfered with the autonomy of the FA, and strictly adhered to the provisions of Article 31 of the Sports Law - "National single-sport competitions shall be managed by the national association of that sport ". However, the fact that the top officials of the CFA are still appointed by the General Administration of Sport (GAS) fully demonstrates that the CFA is still a semi-official organization with strong official colors. This is the bottleneck that makes it difficult for the autonomy mechanism to be effectively realized, which is also contrary to the provisions of the FIFA Statutes. Article 17 (1) of the statutes states that "The bodies of the member associations may only be elected or appointed through elections within their own associations. Associations must set out in their respective statutes the procedure for elections to guarantee the complete independence of elections and appointments." FIFA does not recognize member association bodies, even of a transitional nature, if they are not elected in accordance with the above procedure. Therefore, further reforms may also require reforming the FA itself and the relationship between the General Administration of Sport and the FA to promote the separation of government and affairs. This is also a contemporary need for differentiation and integration between organizations of public power and social autonomy.

Handling the division of labor and cooperation between the state and corporate bodies in accordance with the law and effectively safeguarding the independent legal status of corporate bodies are important issues that need to be resolved for the autonomy of groups. If the civil autonomy of the group can not be guaranteed, the state invades or inhibits the group too much, will certainly reproduce the phenomenon of the end of the Roman Empire, the end of the Middle Ages, the mid-20th century, the shrinking of corporate bodies in Western society, the role of the decline and the loss of vitality of the society. Only in a period of group autonomy and a reasonable division of labour and separation between groups and public power organizations can groups flourish and social life become vibrant. Therefore, legislation defining the different legal status and scope of functions between associations and the relevant State bodies - registration authorities and professional administrations - is very important. This separation and division of labor is a product of the modern bourgeois revolution in the West, but a product of reform and opening up in China.

Autonomy is not about getting rid of regulation, and the trend of regulatory innovation in the reinventing government movement is not about not wanting to regulate, but rather about reconfiguring the relationship between autonomy and regulation. Control is to further expand autonomy, here, government regulatory innovation and competitive autonomy are "two sides of the same coin", they are not exclusive relationship, but a kind of integration and mutual expansion of the relationship.

In the Super League, the boundaries between the public, private and third domains are extremely blurred. This situation requires adequate consultation, coordination and cooperation, as well as adequate competitive constraints, and even more so, the law to regulate and safeguard. Therefore, in the wave of autonomy in the new century, sociology's so-called normative hunger has not diminished, but rather manifested itself in a new form - that is, the emergence of social and economic law that transcends the public and private domains and even the third domain. In keeping with its social orientation, social and economic law is a powerful tool for harmonizing the conflict between community autonomy and government regulation.

The third problem encountered in the change is the competition and cooperation between corporate bodies. According to the Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Public Organizations promulgated and implemented by the State Council in 1998, the current management system of public organizations has adopted two measures to restrict competition: first, where public organizations with the same or similar business scope already exist within the same administrative region, the establishment of new public organizations is generally not permitted; second, to restrict the public organizations from engaging in activities across the registration and administration region, the regulations on the territorial requirement for the names of public organizations, the prohibition of the establishment of territorial branches, and the prohibition of the establishment of public organizations with the same or similar business scope. Second, it restricts social organizations from engaging in activities across registration administration regions, as reflected in the regulations on the territoriality of the names of social organizations, the prohibition on the establishment of territorial branches, and the requirement that the articles of association must clearly stipulate the activities of the organization. Although not all social organizations are subject to the above-mentioned territorial restriction, it is reasonable to impose the above legal restriction on certain organizations in order to ensure the order of competition. This is most typical in the field of sports. Article 31 of the Sports Law stipulates that national individual sports competitions shall be administered by the national association of the sport, while article 40 stipulates that national individual sports associations shall administer the popularization and improvement of the sport, and represent China in the corresponding international individual sports organizations. In the case of the Chinese Football Association (CFA), according to article 2 of the Constitution of the CFA, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 2003 and registered in accordance with the law, the CFA is the only nationwide, non-profit-making social body corporate of the People's Republic of China, formed voluntarily by units and individuals engaged in the sport of soccer in the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Football Association is the only member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) representing China (excluding the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) and Taiwan Province). Geographic singularity requirements similar to those of the CFA are abundant in China and other countries, and the geographic singularity of such groups is not created through competition, but rather through laws that achieve monopoly status. If the CFA is poorly run and managed, Chinese clubs and fans (consumers) have no choice but to support another social group. In the West, incompetent management can be replaced through elections, but the management of the CFA is not fully democratic. Therefore, although such a social organization, which has acquired a territorial monopoly through legal authorization, needs to be strictly regulated by government authorities in the early stage of its creation, the problem should eventually be solved by gradually promoting autonomy in accordance with the law.

Whether the property rights of the league are transferred to the CFA through legal procedures or to a league company set up by the clubs, the CFA's right to manage the league cannot be ruled out. The CFA has the function of managing and supervising the league, whether in its current semi-official capacity or as a thoroughly private organization after it becomes fully autonomous. This brings us to the question of how competition and cooperation between for-profit clubs and between them and the non-profit CFA should be regulated. Whether it is a mechanism whereby the CFA dominates the cooperation and coordination among clubs by owning property rights, operating rights, and supervisory rights, or a mechanism whereby clubs dominate the cooperation and coordination among clubs participating in the league by acquiring property rights through a league company, the mechanism of cooperation and coordination is necessary for the operation of the league, but neither of them may violate the requirements of the anti-monopoly law, and neither of them may take advantage of the monopoly or dominance to prey on the consumers of the league - the consumers of the league - nor may they take advantage of the monopoly position. However, they must not violate the requirements of the antitrust law, and must not use their monopoly or dominant position to prey on the consumers of the league - sponsors, media, fans - or use their "social power" to oppress the laborers - players and referees. --The strikes, threats of indefinite suspensions, and manipulation of match results and chasing of referees that characterized the 2004 China Football League fiasco were in fact acts that disregarded the interests of both consumers and workers (although they may have included the interests of workers). (although they may have been prompted by the issue of "black whistles," for which there must be a solution that is recognized by all parties as being consistent with the rules of the game). In the Chinese Super League, each club team is a member of a monopoly group, and any form of cartel agreement or concerted behavior or abuse of dominant position or mutual shareholding or affiliation between some or all of its members to form a combination of two clubs in any sense of the word is in violation of the fundamentals and spirit of the antitrust laws. In the European Union, the manipulation of match ticket prices by soccer associations and member state soccer associations is potentially subject to scrutiny by competition law enforcement authorities, and prices are to be determined by the market and not by a monopolistic interlocking association.

Thus, Article 18, paragraph 2, of the FIFA Statutes states that "Each Member Association shall ensure that the decisions of its Clubs on any matter relating to membership shall be free from the influence of outside bodies and irrespective of the legal structure adopted by them. In all cases where the integrity and competitiveness of the game is at stake, the member associations shall ensure that no natural or legal person (including holding companies and subsidiaries) controls more than one club at the same time." The purpose of this clause is to maintain the competitiveness of the league, thus presenting the league's anti-monopoly requirements. Therefore, anti-monopoly is an important function of the CFA.

In fact, Article 72 of the FIFA Statutes, which states that "FIFA, its member associations and the intercontinental federations shall have the right to exclusively authorize the distribution of images, sound and other means of data transmission of soccer matches and tournaments within their respective jurisdictions, without restriction as to content, time, place and technical and legal aspects," merely states that associations have the right to control the distribution of soccer matches and tournaments. "It simply means that the association has the right to exclusively authorize the broadcasting of matches, and this exclusive authorization itself is not subject to legal restrictions, but the association is still subject to the antitrust law if it abuses its monopoly or dominant position to the detriment of downstream enterprises (broadcasters) and consumers.

The competition between corporate bodies for the provision of social services and the competition for the provision of services by drawing on funds (financial support from the government, social contributions, appropriate fees, etc.) needs to be safeguarded by corresponding legal norms for the maintenance of fair competition. Therefore, the promotion and relegation of the league is an important system of "competition to win a higher level of the market". Therefore, the suspension of the promotion and relegation of the 2004 Chinese Super League by the Football Association is a temporary abolition of competition, with insufficient justification, and is only a kind of unprincipled compromise. And this compromise is in the actual lifting of the rumored belonging to the "revolutionaries" leader Xu Ming's "real" Sichuan Guancheng relegation of the situation, which makes people inevitably produce the CFA incompetence and unprincipled impression.

The fourth problem with the change is the ultimate guarantee of justice. The league in the "gambling", "fake", "black whistle" and other illegal problems must be seriously dealt with, ruthless crackdown, otherwise all other problems can not be solved, which requires the depth of judicial intervention. This requires the deep involvement of the judiciary. The legal status of soccer autonomous organizations, ownership protection, the formation and effective operation of the coordination mechanism between associations, competition and cooperation norms, etc. also need the ultimate protection of justice. Justice provides an authoritative adjudication mechanism for autonomous organizations to resolve differences and disputes within and among themselves, and provides a fair place and procedural safeguards for all parties to defend their interests in accordance with the law. However, China's current judicial system may not yet be able to provide a perfect safeguard mechanism for this. Therefore, the reform, improvement and enhancement of the judicial system is the social law and economic law to play its social justice based on the complexity, ambiguity, high-level law requires a higher quality judges and a higher level of the judicial system.

The so-called private domain corporate bodies of private law autonomy behavior is based on the interests of the parties and the strength of the contest, is based on the market economy, free competition, the survival of the fittest, so the judicial protection of civil and commercial law in a sense with the jungle rules of the jungle of the weak and the strongest traces of the jungle rules, whether it is its intention to express the behavior itself or to the court to carry out the corresponding persuasive work, and even the final The judicial coercion. Social and economic law, based on full respect for the norms of corporate autonomy, aims to curb the "evil" of social and market power and to promote the cooperation of the weak and their opportunities for development. In the field of social autonomy is both divided and integrated, judicial review is no longer possible to strictly differentiate between the two behavioral differences, but unified judicial review, but in specific matters to apply different concepts to the application of the law.

As Turgot pointed out at the end of the 19th century, "Although the corporate body is not the only question of public concern, there is no question of greater importance, because the discussion of other questions depends on the solution of this question. We cannot have a strong movement to change the legal system if we do not create the groups necessary for a new kind of legal system. Therefore, if we were to try to create detailed laws now, it would indeed be an exercise in futility." Therefore, the group changes brought about by China's 2004 Chinese Super League fiasco will also inevitably bring about new legal system changes, and will inevitably raise new issues for existing legislation and justice, which are worthy of in-depth exploration from various perspectives.