Seeking the Problems of Rural Governance in the New Period (Paper)

Rural Governance and Industrialization Development under Market Economy

65438+February 6, 2005 12: 27 Nongbo. com

-Take the rural areas of Shanxi and Hebei as examples.

Jia Dameng Road Hu Xiang (School of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University)

Abstract: With the vigorous development of market economy in China, many new problems have emerged in the process of rural governance. For example, can the government directly push farmers to the top of the market? How to solve the problem of rural stability in development? Can rural governance achieve real democratic governance of villagers? Wait, these problems exist objectively. Through the empirical investigation of rural areas in Shanxi and Hebei, the author summarizes several problems existing in rural governance at present, puts forward several difficulties in the development of rural governance, and finally puts forward relevant empirical suggestions. The author believes that in the current rural governance, grass-roots government (including village level) is the leading factor. Due to the influence of market economy, its ideas and some practices have triggered the crisis of rural governance, shaken the stability of rural areas and questioned the legitimacy of government administration. In this regard, on the basis of empirical investigation, the author discusses the problems, difficulties and countermeasures of rural governance under the conditions of market economy.

Keywords: market economy, rural governance, grass-roots government, rural stability

1 Introduction

The market economy has been going on in China for more than ten years, and the great changes it has brought are obvious to all. Some important ideas and theories of market economy are also recognized by China people, such as competition, efficiency, profit-seeking, and the hypothesis of "economic man". As an important part of China market, rural areas in China are inevitably affected. According to the author's rural investigation in recent two years, the author believes that the spread of this market economy in rural areas has gradually shifted from the economic field to the rural management field, entered the rural political level, and touched the stability of rural areas, which is manifested in the decline of farmers' participation and the vacillation of the legitimacy of grassroots government policies, which inevitably leads to the topic of rural governance under the market economy, that is, how to conduct rural governance under the market economy.

In the past two years, the author has conducted a large number of rural surveys in rural areas of Shanxi and Hebei, and observed and thought about some problems or phenomena in the process of rural governance. On the basis of empirical investigation, this paper will discuss the problems existing in current rural governance, put forward the dilemma of rural governance under market economy, and put forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions on the basis of empirical investigation.

Two questions

Rural governance refers to how to manage rural areas in China, or how to manage rural areas independently in China, so as to realize the orderly development of rural society (He Xuefeng, June 2004). The development of rural market economy destroyed the development order of traditional villages in China, and also broke the traditional grass-roots management system in China, resulting in many problems in development, some of which were predictable and some were "caused" in practice. Of course, this in itself does not prove that the development of market economy in rural areas is wrong, because market economy has been proved by the development of China in recent ten years to be the only way for China to develop, so we must examine the problems existing in rural governance in China from other angles. The author thinks that one of the angles is the institutional level of our countryside and the concept of grass-roots government. First of all, we should make it clear whether to adapt the market economy to our traditional management system or to adapt the management system to the development of the market economy. The author raises such a question in order to provide a thinking platform for the following questions.

2. 1 Power monopoly in rural governance

When I did research in a rural area of Hebei Province, I found that the local village committee has great power to decide village affairs, and all the affairs in the village are decided by several "leaders" of the village committee, such as how much taxes and fees to collect, how to use the money in the village, who are the members of the village committee and so on. However, the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees stipulates that villagers' congresses exist in name only. The local villagers said that they had not held a villagers' meeting for many years. This has created a power vacuum in the local area, and outsiders simply can't get in. As the core of rural governance, villagers' autonomy has actually evolved into the management of several people in the village, forming a power monopoly phenomenon in rural governance.

Further analysis shows that the power monopoly of village committees is related to township governments. In the above-mentioned villages, the village head and village party secretary are actually not the products of the law, but the symbols of the expansion of local power of township governments. In other words, the village committee is closely related to the town government, or the town government is the protector and supporter of the power monopoly of the village committee. The reason for this phenomenon, the author believes, is mainly caused by the huge benefits brought by power monopoly. We know that the village head, branch secretary and post itself are not very beneficial, but under the current rural system, the great benefits brought by the power of the village head branch secretary are unknowable in the normal sense. For example, the village public * * * resource control rights, the right to use, the advantages of mastering policy information and so on. For thousands of years, due to the shackles of China's rural "officials are superior" thought, villagers are generally indifferent to this kind of power that originally belonged to their own rights, and they don't know the rights protection (interests) hidden behind these powers, which encourages their (villagers') power agents (village committees) to seize power. Coupled with the "tacit understanding" (or collusion) formed in the process of dealing with the town government at ordinary times, they (the village Committee) encroached on power. It will eventually lead to the monopoly of rights in the process of governance.

Monopoly of rights creates conditions for grass-roots governments to seek rent. Especially in the market economy, the government, as a hypothetical economic man, is also pursuing the maximization of its own interests, so rural corruption emerges one after another, and the opposition between farmers and the government intensifies, which has to attract our attention.

2.2 Lack of villagers' participation

A very important content of rural governance is villager autonomy, that is, villagers should manage their own affairs independently, on the premise that villagers should participate extensively. However, according to the author's survey results in rural areas of Shanxi and Hebei, farmers' awareness of participation in most places is still very weak, and farmers generally show fear and lack of self-confidence.

Villagers' autonomy has always been regarded as the most extensive democracy in China by scholars, but in reality, villagers' indifference greatly compromises the system design of the government and scholars' good wishes. Analyzing the causes of this problem, the author thinks that there are two aspects: First, farmers lack the awareness of rights. The first part analyzes that the lack of villagers' awareness of rights creates opportunities for power monopoly. In this part, the author thinks that the lack of villagers' awareness of rights directly leads to the lack of participation. The "authority" established after the government monopolized power made the villagers feel scared. The villagers think who is the village head has nothing to do with "I" It's all the same anyway. Let those who want to be officials do it. Most villagers are afraid or unwilling to show their power in public. The second reason is that under the condition of market economy, farmers have become more and more frustrated and insecure. The development of rural areas is quite unbalanced. Even in a village, the ability, temperament and self-confidence of different villagers are quite different due to the difference in contact with external information. The colorful world under the market economy has made some people adapt to the environment and easily absorb some new ideas, so they want to show these new ideas in the process of rural governance. However, most farmers cannot accept the invasion of these new ideas. When they face these new things, they are more novel and confused. Compared with the reality they live in, they gradually become less confident, so they don't want to come out to participate in rural governance.

The lack of villagers' participation has affected the effect of rural governance. For example, as an important part of villagers' autonomy, villagers' election has become a game of rural elites, losing the original institutional desire.

2.3 the relationship between the two committees in the village

The relationship between village committees is a prominent problem in the process of villagers' autonomy, and it is also a problem often mentioned by scholars. The Organic Law of Villagers' Committees has stipulated that the village party branch is the core of leadership, but it is not clear about some specific matters, so there are many problems in operation, which is also an important reason for the relationship between the village committees. The author thinks that this is only from the perspective of system, and we can also say it from the perspective of village head and village branch secretary. In fact, the current problem of the relationship between the two village committees, that is, the problem of the village head and the secretary of the village branch (excluding the village where the two are combined), is a problem arising from the power struggle between the two. Because of the great temptation of the benefits brought by power, the two are fighting and refuse to accept each other. The village party secretary said that I was the party secretary and the top leader, and you should listen to me, but the village chief did not show weakness, saying that I was elected by everyone and I could best represent everyone. The power struggle between the two committees has caused tension between them. The author found that the village head of a village in Zuoquan County, Shanxi Province had been preparing for party member for more than four years, but the village party secretary refused to become a full member for fear that his power would be taken away. Therefore, the author thinks that the relationship between the village Committee and the village party secretary should be handled first. In fact, it is difficult to say clearly at the operational level, and more often, the cooperation between the two committees is needed.

2.4 the relationship between town and village

After the implementation of villagers' autonomy, the pattern of rural power has changed. Members of village committees are directly elected by villagers, not appointed by towns and villages. The Organic Law of Villagers' Committees also stipulates that the relationship between villages and towns is the relationship between guidance and guidance. For some township cadres, this change still regards the relationship between them as the relationship between the leader and the led, interfering with village affairs everywhere, leading to rural autonomy becoming a mere formality.

The author also found another phenomenon when investigating Matian Village in Zuoquan County, Shanxi Province: Matian Village consists of seven natural villages. However, for a long time after the joint village, the joint village party branch has been vacant, and each village is still the original party branch or a group of people. In this way, according to the organic law of the village committee, the village branch plays a leading role in the development of the village, so that Matian Village after the village merger has seven leading cores. In this way, the joint village Committee should take care of the opinions of seven party branches when carrying out its work, and its difficulty can be imagined. According to the Law on Villagers' Groups, village committees work under the leadership of village branches. In this way, Matian has a village committee with seven leaders. In fact, the Matian Town Government made a mistake at the beginning, that is, it should set up the Liancun Party branch before the election of the Liancun Committee to avoid this situation. The town party Committee should come forward to integrate the members of the branch and maintain the normal governance order after the joint village. However, due to the unclear understanding of this power consciousness, the governance is chaotic. The author believes that the relationship between towns and villages should abide by the relevant provisions of the villagers' group law, and the government at the town level should clarify its functions and powers, change leadership into guidance, and at the same time change its concept to handle the relationship between guidance and autonomy in rural governance.

2.5 the opposition between villagers and grass-roots governments

When the author investigated the rural areas in Hebei, many farmers reported that the local government was too corrupt and handled the problems rudely, so that many farmers attributed the root of the current problems concerning agriculture, countryside and farmers to rural corruption, and thought that as long as the central government eradicated rural corruption, the rural problems would be solved. What I hear most in rural surveys all over the country is rural corruption. When I heard these incidents before, I always thought it was the peasants' radical words. But after repeated investigations, especially when some farmers cried in front of me and held my hand for a long time, I felt it necessary to write it out in order to attract more empirical researchers to pay more attention to these events in rural areas.

The author believes that villagers' hatred of rural corruption is likely to cause the accumulation of unstable factors in rural areas. At present, farmers in some areas collectively petition, many of which are related to grassroots governments. This kind of farmers hate rural corruption, especially more and more villagers are troubled by rural corruption, and this unstable factor will gradually move to the other side, such as committing suicide against the unreasonable treatment of the government. Because farmers are vulnerable groups, they are at a disadvantage in the game with the government, so farmers themselves can do nothing about this corruption. However, in this process, the legitimacy of the government is questioned, which directly affects the stability of rural areas. This is an important problem and obstacle in the process of rural governance.

2.6 the lack of rural elites

Before the quality of farmers is generally improved, it should be the elites in rural areas who really implement rural governance in rural areas. According to the principle of efficiency and cost saving, this is also desirable. However, under the market economy, more rural elites have flowed out, which is also desirable according to the principle of optimal allocation of resources. The author calls this situation the paradox of the lack of rural elites under the market economy.

When I was in rural areas of Hebei and Shanxi, I found that there are still many talents in the village. Most of them have skills, such as agricultural cultivation, family farming and business. However, there are still some differences between these talented people and the rural elites I mentioned here. The village elite here mainly refers to people who can organize and lead the villagers to carry out effective autonomy, have certain leadership and management capabilities, and have certain prestige among the villagers. There are too few such people in the countryside now, and it is difficult for such people to display their talents in the countryside. The first reason is that their existence directly threatens the interests of some powerful people in the village. Moreover, as a superior township government, they don't like elite governance, because then they will lose some privileges under the original system, such as the newly elected village head can't listen to the words of villages and towns, the villagers have a strong sense of autonomy, and the authority of villages and towns will decline. In short, the existence of rural elites will be crowded out in many ways, resulting in a large number of elite outflows. As the author said earlier, this is also the result of optimal allocation of resources. Since this place is not suitable for them, of course they have to leave. However, I want to emphasize that this is not the real optimal allocation of resources. These places also need them, but due to various restrictions, the talents of the elites can not be fully exerted, so we must eliminate these obstacles and realize the real optimal allocation of resources, so that the paradox of rural elite shortage will disappear under the market economy.

2.7 Regional differences in rural governance

The regionality of rural governance means that the quality of rural governance is closely related to the location of villages. For example, the village where the town government is located is better than the village at the junction of the two places. The effect of village governance caused by regional differences is very different. What I saw in Matian village in Shanxi and some rural areas in Hebei was very different. Matian village is the seat of the town government, and the village governance is relatively good, and the villagers complain less about the grassroots government; Most of the rural areas I have been to in Hebei are at the junction of two or three counties. In these places, the contradiction between cadres and masses is tense, the opposition between cadres and masses is serious, and there are many petitions. This regional difference in rural governance can explain why some places have good rural governance and some places have poor rural governance. Knowing this, the government should give more consideration to the problem of village governance in "remote rural areas" when making decisions, and then focus on solving it, so as to reduce the number of petitioning villages and "nail households".

The above is the author's summary of some problems existing in current rural governance after rural investigation. Of course, there are still many problems in rural governance, such as village finance and serious rural imbalance, so I won't discuss them here.

3 Dilemma

In addition to the above problems, the author also feels that there are many difficulties in rural governance under the market economy after investigation:

3. 1 Modernization and rural governance

The goal of socialist market economy construction is to realize modernization. The meaning of modernization is rich, which can be simply divided into two points: one is people's material prosperity, and the other is spiritual prosperity. At the same time, relying on good system design, the development of human beings and society can be sustainable. According to the current level of rural governance, there is still a big gap from modernization. Rural governance depends on the cooperation and participation of villagers, and at the same time, it needs certain financial resources to provide a large number of public resources needed for rural development, including social security and other social welfare systems in cities at present. However, in the survey, the author saw that these are very lacking in rural areas. Even the water conservancy and transportation facilities as an important public resource in the village are very backward, and the villagers' awareness of participation and cooperation is not optimistic. Coupled with the widening income gap between urban and rural areas in recent years, farmers have less money and are not rich materially. On the contrary, some villagers are poor because of serious illness or children going to school. At the same time, the rural systems in China are still not perfect, and some problems in the process of modernization can't find suitable solutions, such as rural areas. These present situations have caused difficulties in rural governance, but these are inevitable in the process of modernization, so the relationship between modernization and rural governance must be handled well. There are many traditional factors in rural China. There are many uncertainties in the process of governance from traditional to modern, and there are governance risks of the government. Therefore, whether the government only paves the way for modernization through compulsory control or seeks a good balance between modernization and rural governance in development practice is a major dilemma of rural governance.

3.2 Stability and development: a difficult choice under the market economy

Stability and development should have been a pair of coordinate words. Stability can lead to development, and development can lead to better stability. However, in rural areas, this interdependent content has been distorted and sometimes even retrogressed. The work of our party centers on economic construction. In the current rural areas, local grass-roots governments are also actively calling for efforts to develop the local economy. However, due to the institutional defects and profit-seeking behavior under the market economy, many places plunder the people's wealth in the name of holding exhibitions, and corruption has become a common practice, which has seriously affected the image of the party's grass-roots political power among farmers. Some local governments also compete with farmers for profits, which leads to heavy complaints from farmers and a large number of farmers petitioning, which increases the unstable factors in rural areas.

When investigating a village in Shunping County, Hebei Province, the author found that all the village collectives retained in the village were contracted out by the village party secretary, which is euphemistically called developing the village economy. However, these privately contracted land are covered with houses (factories are to be built according to the agreement), and the discerning people in the village know that there is a problem at a glance. One more thing, there is a big river in the north of the village, and the riverbed is higher than the village. In the past, whenever there was a flood, the village was often flooded. So the villagers built dikes to dredge the river and stopped flooding for more than ten years. Seeing that there was no water for so many years, the village began to ponder the land without water in the riverbed and contracted out the riverbed. Now the riverbed is full of crops, and the original river is only a few meters wide. The villagers reported that in the event of a flood, the river would quickly overflow the bank and the whole village would be flooded because of the poor river channel. The local villagers petitioned several times on this matter, but there was no news. The villagers complained bitterly about the grass-roots government.

Therefore, the author thinks about some questions: in the process of rural development, can rural areas develop their economy freely in full accordance with market practices? Do rural areas have the resources to develop the economy freely? Including effective government and effective mechanism to prevent interest rent-seeking. How to handle the relationship between development and stability in development? This is a choice that must be made in the process of rural governance, but this choice is very difficult.

3.3 Vulnerable farmers and market forces

Farmers are a vulnerable group, which I deeply felt in my investigation. There are many aspects to say that farmers are vulnerable groups, and the author summarizes them here as two points: one is farmers to the government, and the other is farmers to the market. Farmers are the weak group of the government, which is mainly manifested in the dialogue status between farmers and the government. The difference between the two is so great that farmers simply have no power to compete with the government, including fighting for their legitimate rights and interests. Farmers are vulnerable to the market, which means that individual farmers are often powerless when facing the market. The fierce competition mechanism in the market can easily bankrupt small farmers. Because of the weak nature and long periodicity of small-scale peasant economy, it can't stand the impact of market storm. Once small-scale peasants are washed away, it is quite difficult to recover. The author calls the gap between this market and the disadvantaged farmers market power. The greater the market power, the greater the pressure on farmers, and the greater the risks faced by farmers. In the investigation, the author found that with the development of market economy, the market power has gradually increased, and many bankrupt small farmers have appeared. Below, the author focuses on the problem of weak farmers and market forces. If farmers can solve the pressure from the government through legal procedures or channels (mainly referring to individual illegal acts), then farmers are really powerless in the face of the market.

When I was investigating in Shunping, Hebei (July 2004), I encountered such a thing: farmers here planted many kinds of peach trees and walked on the mountain road, with peach trees on both sides, as if they had entered a paradise. When we got there, it was the ripe season for peaches. The green peach leaves are dotted with hearts, which are really beautiful. At that time, I thought to myself, the industrial structure here is well adjusted. This year's peaches must be a bumper harvest, and farmers' income will also go up. In Beijing, peaches like this cost at least 1 kg to 2 yuan, and farmers don't make money yet. However, the fact is not as optimistic as we thought. When we went to Chaigezhuang, we found that the villagers here were not happy. On the contrary, their faces were covered with gloomy clouds. After investigation, it was found that peaches were too cheap this year. The biggest and best peaches cost only fifty cents a catty. Ordinary peaches can sell for 3 or 4 cents if they are successful, but most of them are below 3 cents.

There is a peach farmer who has only sold 20 yuan so far, not even one-fifth of the cost. When he introduced us, he pointed to a basket of peaches that had just been picked and said helplessly, "This basket of peaches sells for two yuan at most. Peaches are worthless, like in previous years, they can probably sell 1.5 yuan. " We were all shocked at that time. Incredibly, this basket of peaches weighs at least 50 Jin, but only costs two yuan.

The following interview convinced us that this was not a joke. A peach farmer showed us several baskets of peaches with different prices. The cheapest one was less than 30 cents a catty, and there were cracks on the peaches. There are 1 hairs, 2 hairs, 3 hairs and 5 hairs. I can't see any difference except the size. According to peach farmers, the general harvest of peaches this year, coupled with the increase of farmers planting peaches in recent years, has led to the fullness of several fruit trading markets nearby, while few vendors collect peaches, leading to mutual price reduction and vicious competition among peach farmers. Finally, selling peaches is enough. Peach farmers say it's better to sell than to rot at home. They generally reflect that planting peaches this year is not as good as growing grain. But this is a mountainous area, and the grain harvest is not good. Many farmers are in a dilemma, but many farmers have said that they will cut down peach trees next year and stop planting them. We know that farmers are reluctant. After all, these peach trees have been planted for five or six years, which is not easy, but there is really no other way.

When we left the local area, we heard that an old farmer in a nearby village was so angry when he came home because he didn't even sell a peach after a busy day (later confirmed by his classmates who did social practice in Hebei Agricultural University). Because of the time, we didn't know the situation in detail.

Cheap food will hurt farmers, just as cheap peaches will hurt farmers. Farmers also know that if there are too many things, they will not make money. However, farmers' current ability can not make reasonable decisions according to the market. Whatever is valuable, everyone will plant it together, and in the end, they will not make money and will not plant it again, which fully shows the blindness of farmers in the face of the market.

We stayed there for two nights. Every night after 1 1, when we sleep, we will hear the sound of agricultural tricycles in the village. We know that some farmers go out to sell peaches at night (because agricultural vehicles are not licensed, they dare not go on the road during the day). They usually go home at five or six in the morning.

This is the fact that the author personally realized, so what has the market economy brought to farmers? Can individual farmers face the market directly? In this case, should the government do something for farmers? In fact, peaches can be sold for 1 yuan a catty, as long as they can be shipped out. Although the local peach market is saturated, there are not many peaches in the national market, after all, it is only a few cents a catty. The key is that a single farmer can't transport it. The cost is too high. If you don't make money, you will lose more. So we must think about how to solve these problems (the author will discuss them in the third part).

In short, the existence of market forces has broken the rural development model under the traditional system. Under the current imperfect system, the weakness of farmers and the pressure of market forces have increased the difficulty of rural governance and formed one of the dilemmas.

4 countermeasures

Based on the experience and investigation in the past two years, while thinking about problems and phenomena, the author also thinks about relevant countermeasures, which are summarized as follows:

4. 1 Improve farmers' ability to cope with the market

In the rural governance under the market economy, one of the first problems we have to solve is to improve farmers' ability to cope with the market. No matter how powerful the market power is and how risky the market is, we must improve farmers' ability to cope with the market, which plays an important role in reducing governance costs and improving governance efficiency.

So how to improve it? The author thinks that there are two points: one is to speed up the information circulation in rural areas, and the other is to let farmers cooperate. (These two points will be discussed in detail in the following two parts).

The author believes that improving farmers' ability to cope with the market is the basic premise of effective rural governance under the condition of market economy, otherwise any rural governance will be greatly discounted, because improving farmers' ability to cope with the market has brought a series of external positive effects, such as the establishment of farmers' self-confidence, the further improvement of farmers' quality, and the strengthening of farmers' awareness of protecting their legitimate rights and interests. Facts have proved that villages that are in harmony with the market have also done better in rural governance. But now most of our farmers' friends are still very weak and can't resist the big waves of the market. Therefore, all sectors of society should try their best to improve farmers' ability to cope with the market. But I am opposed to pushing farmers directly to the market from the beginning. If so, I think it is irresponsible to farmers. After all, the idea of small farmers for thousands of years is still very heavy. We need to take it slow. We need to change farmers' ideas slowly. I think it is a good idea for some scholars to build Xinxiang village now.

4.2 the establishment of farmers' own organizations

Through the investigation of peach farmers in Shunping, Hebei Province, I think it is necessary to organize farmers and set up cooperatives. It is difficult for individual farmers to face the market, and fierce market competition can easily bankrupt small farmers. There are too many uncertainties in the market and there is information asymmetry. In this case, individual farmers will inevitably make wrong decisions. Because the agricultural production cycle is long, once the decision is wrong, it will affect a year or even longer. In this way, farmers will not make decisions according to the market, but wait and see what my neighbors are planting and what other villagers are planting, which will inevitably lead to the phenomenon that peaches are cheap and farmers suffer. However, if farmers are organized to form cooperatives, the price of peaches will not be 1 gross, 20 gross or even a few cents a catty, but may become 1 yuan a catty. Mainly because individual small farmers are easy to suffer losses in the face of the market, but they are unable to take corresponding protective measures. Just as it is impossible for a person to run a large enterprise and need a joint-stock system, farmers must also set up their own organizations.

From the market point of view, the formation of farmers' cooperatives is a good way to improve farmers' ability to cope with the market. Everyone shares market risks, transaction costs and collects market information, which not only improves market efficiency, but also reduces the cost of individual farmers. From the perspective of farmers to the government, the establishment of farmers' cooperatives has improved the confidence and success rate of individual farmers' negotiations with the government, which is conducive to safeguarding farmers' rights and interests. Therefore, it is necessary to set up cooperatives. We made a survey in Zhaicheng Village, Dingxian County (the location of Yan Rural Construction College founded by Mr. Wen Tiejun), and found that farmers are still very welcome to the cooperative and have high enthusiasm. We need the government to pass legislation to regulate cooperatives as soon as possible, and use the system to ensure the development of cooperatives, so that farmers can benefit from cooperation and reduce the resistance of rural governance.

4.3 Strengthen the publicity and circulation of rural market information

In rural areas, due to various conditions, rural information resources are seriously scarce, but today's society is a highly developed society with a large amount of information and a fast speed of information transmission and update. Whoever updates and has more information will undoubtedly be in an invincible position in the market. This is what farmers lack, which greatly reduces their decision-making ability in the face of the market. So now most farmers are confused, resulting in lack of confidence, and the governance effect is not good over time. Therefore, we must speed up the publicity and circulation of rural information.

The rural market information here includes agricultural science and technology information, legal information, supply and demand information of agricultural products market, rural policy information and other information related to farmers' vital interests. During the rural investigation, it was found that farmers lacked this information, but at the same time they needed it. Information asymmetry is an important reason why farmers make wrong decisions when dealing with the market. To this end, I think the government, as the owner of information, has the responsibility to intervene in the rural information market and minimize the rural information asymmetry. Local governments should sincerely do something for farmers in line with the ruling concept of "all for the people". For example, the government can publicize the information it needs to farmers through various media, and can also help farmers publicize their products to the outside world through the media. We can also use the system to regulate the circulation order of agricultural products market and truly realize farmers' increase in production and income. At this point, the role of the government is the key. At the same time, non-governmental organizations and volunteers from all walks of life should also join in and work together to gradually make rural information symmetrical.

4.4 The government's ruling idea should be changed.

An important assumption implied by the author of this paper is that the grass-roots government plays a leading role in rural governance. Under the current rural governance order, it is difficult for other organizations in rural areas to play the role of self-governance, that is to say, before the real self-governance in rural areas is realized, the role of the government cannot be underestimated. However, as the author said earlier, under the market economy, the government conforms to the hypothesis of economic man and has its own interests to maximize demand, so there are more incidents of power rent-seeking in rural areas. Most of these events are directly related to the interests of farmers, so there is often a game of interests between the government and farmers, but farmers are weak to the government. Even if farmers form cooperatives, cooperatives are often unable to resist the infringement of government rights and interests because of the serious imperfection of the current cooperative system. So the government often gives it to farmers.