What is the significance of encouraging all kinds of capital to participate in the reform and development of state-owned mixed ownership economy?

Generally speaking, economic development tends to share cooperation. Deng Xiaoping said that if a small number of people get rich first, then some people will become poor if they get rich first. In order to answer your question more comprehensively, I found some information for you, hoping to help you: 1. Introduction When discussing the forms of public ownership, the Third Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee clearly put forward for the first time that we should vigorously develop the mixed ownership economy of state-owned capital, collective capital and non-public capital, realize the diversification of investors, and make the shareholding system the main form of public ownership. It can be said that this is an affirmation of the direction of state-owned enterprise ownership reform in the past. In fact, since the reform and opening up, the development of collective economy and the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises have provided unprecedented opportunities for the development of mixed ownership economic components. The mixed ownership economy such as joint-stock system, joint-stock cooperative system and joint venture economy has developed rapidly, and the mixed ownership economy has grown strongly. From 1997 to 200 1, the number of joint-stock enterprises in China has increased from 72,000 to nearly 300,000; The number of employees increased from 6.437 million to 27.466 million; The annual operating income increased from 83 1 1 billion yuan to 5673.3 billion yuan. After the Third Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee, many people in the theoretical circle thought that vigorously developing mixed-ownership enterprises might find a new way for the reform of state-owned enterprises, which was also welcomed by some state-owned enterprises, individuals, private and other non-public economies in practice. So, how to know mixed ownership enterprises? How to standardize and develop? How to get out of the predicament of the original state-owned enterprises? This is a subject of great significance and practical urgency in theory and practice. This paper discusses this problem. Second, the nature of mixed ownership enterprises There are many theories about the nature of mixed ownership enterprises. Generally speaking, it is different from public ownership economy, collective ownership economy and private ownership economy. It is not an independent economic component, but a mixture of various ownership economic components. As far as an industry enterprise is concerned, it is the form of enterprise property right organization and the joint-stock economy of modern enterprise system. It is not a state-owned enterprise or a private enterprise, so its operating mechanism cannot be the same as that of a state-owned enterprise, and of course it is different from a completely private enterprise. We now refer to mixed-ownership enterprises, mostly from the perspective of doing a good job in state-owned enterprises. Due to the state-owned enterprises composed of single state-owned capital, the subject of property rights is empty and the management responsibility is not implemented. Many enterprises have dull operating mechanisms and lack vitality and efficiency. In mixed-ownership enterprises, the integration of state-owned capital with other types of capital by holding shares and introducing diversified investors is conducive to improving the property right structure of state-owned enterprises and promoting them to gradually establish a standardized modern enterprise system and market-oriented operating mechanism on the basis of diversified property rights; Conducive to the flow and reorganization of state-owned property rights, optimize resource allocation and improve operational efficiency; Social capital conducive to cohesion, effectively amplify the radiation effect of public capital on other capitals, improve the control, influence and driving force of state-owned economy, and reflect the dominant position of public ownership. For the arrangement of mixed-ownership enterprises with capital in China, many scholars only emphasize that state-owned enterprises in important industries in the lifeline of the national economy must insist on holding shares, and the state-owned economy can participate in some industries in non-lifeline areas of the national economy. Holding shares is different from participating in shares. Share participation is only for profit maximization, while holding shares is not only for profit realization, but also for controlling the lifeline of the national economy and giving full play to the due role of the state-owned economy. If the state-owned economy loses its controlling position in the important industries in the lifeline of the national economy, it will lose its control, influence and driving force, and it will be difficult to play its due leading role in the development of the national economy. In my opinion, from the perspective of public ownership and socialist nature, this is understandable. The problem is that the purpose of introducing non-public capital is to give full play to its advantages of pursuing profit maximization and flexible mechanism, to change the disadvantages of rigid mechanism and unclear corporate governance structure of the original state-owned enterprises, and to effectively restrain the behavior of operators. If we still only emphasize the control of enterprises and ignore the rights and interests of other capital owners, then mixed-ownership enterprises are only trying to make money, and what's more, they are forced to undertake some social functions undertaken by the original state-owned enterprises, which may lead to the failure to achieve the purpose of establishing mixed-ownership enterprises, and neither non-public capital nor public capital will be invested in them. At present, the persistent bear market in China is largely related to it. So many people still have a vague understanding of mixed ownership enterprises. In my opinion, we must understand its essence from the perspective of building a new enterprise model. Third, the right structure of mixed ownership enterprises China's state-owned enterprises have established a modern enterprise system and corporate governance structure for a long time, involving many enterprises. However, many restructured enterprises still have some problems in varying degrees, such as the dominance of state-owned shares, the relative concentration of equity and the imperfect corporate governance structure. Some enterprises become "flop companies" because they are mere formality, which is one of the key issues that we should pay special attention to at present. As we all know, one of the most basic characteristics of modern enterprise system is the socialization of capital and the diversification of investors, thus forming a stakeholder who cares about the enterprise and lives with it. On this basis, we can establish a perfect corporate governance structure and truly form a complete and independent corporate property right. Capital owners also have the incentive to effectively restrain the behavior of operators. At present, most of the restructured joint-stock enterprises are state-owned shares, which will naturally lead to the situation that enterprises are still at the mercy of the government, and minority shareholders will naturally lose their enthusiasm for caring about enterprises, so that corporate property rights of enterprises cannot be independently exercised. Here is a theoretical proposition and a simple proof: when an institution or an individual owns the shares of another institution to a certain limit or exceeds a certain limit, the owner will go all out to work for the owned party, regardless of whether it is holding shares or not, and its work effort will not increase because of the increase of its shares. The "boundary" in the proposition is not fixed, and it will be different because of different shareholders. This proposition means an assumption that there is an upper limit to the efforts of institutions or individuals. Because people's efforts are limited by their own intelligence, physiology, etc., institutions also have their operating mechanisms and the utility limits of incentive and restraint mechanisms, so it is impossible to work hard forever. According to the existing theoretical research results, the choice of actors' efforts in the principal-agent model can be expressed by the following functional relationship: E=F(A, c, s, e), where e represents the efforts of actors, a represents the number of shares owned by actors, c represents the cost of actors' efforts, s represents the actors' own factors, and e represents random factors. In this expression, e is a systematic random variable, which is beyond human control. C. S. Then, when an operator tries to choose in the process of maximizing his utility function, the only thing that can affect him is his wealth, that is, his share of equity. Inevitably, the actor's efforts will increase with the increase of the owner's wealth. When an actor's wealth reaches a number that allows him to choose the hardest job, it is useless to increase his wealth. At the same time, we can't prove that this boundary is necessarily related to the ranking of the amount of wealth held by the actor. There is a strict positive correlation between the efforts of shareholders to work for the enterprise and their shareholding ratio, which is bounded by the subject itself. After crossing this boundary, the efforts of shareholders to work for the enterprise will reach the maximum, and will not increase because of the increase of their shareholding ratio. It is precisely because of this that we can put forward the view that in the integration of state-owned enterprises and corporate governance structures, it is not necessary to hold the largest number of shareholders to control enterprises, and "the same shares have different rights." Therefore, I advocate that state-owned enterprises should distinguish whether to introduce non-state-owned capital, and should not introduce non-state-owned capital at will or as little as possible in key industries and fields related to national security and the lifeline of the national economy, so as to give full play to the macro-control role of the state, maintain the nature of public ownership, and give play to some special social functions of state-owned enterprises. In the field of perfect competition, no matter whether the state-owned capital is holding shares or not, whether it is absolute or relative, we should vigorously develop mixed-ownership enterprises, put down all kinds of burdens, and aim at making profits and improving the operational efficiency of state-owned capital. Even if we don't give up or keep the controlling stake of state-owned capital in mixed-ownership enterprises, we should break through the existing conclusion and mindset of "allocating control rights according to the proportion of capital contribution" and build the power structure of mixed-ownership enterprises according to the principle of "one director, one vote, and the minority obeys the majority". All parties, including state-owned enterprises, have only one director. Unless there is a large loss of state-owned capital under special circumstances, state-owned enterprises no longer enjoy excessive power, and the ruling under special circumstances should be resolved through legal norms, not through administrative intervention. In this case, as long as the non-public capital reaches a certain share, it will go all out to care for the enterprise, do a good job in the enterprise, and give full play to its binding role on the business operators, and public capital and non-public capital will achieve a win-win situation. At the same time, actively introduce external directors and independent directors, strengthen the role of the board of directors, and strictly separate the chairman from the general manager. In recent years, the development of the board of directors of foreign companies has shown the following trends: First, the supervisory role of the board of directors has become more prominent, the proportion of external directors and independent directors has increased, and the supervision of operators, including chief executives, has been strengthened; Second, the internal structure of the board of directors is more detailed, giving full play to the role of professional committees. For example, the company's independent auditors must be selected by an audit committee composed of independent directors; Third, the board of directors operates more transparently, paying special attention to the timeliness, accuracy and comprehensiveness of information disclosure. Combined with foreign experience, improve the composition of the board of directors, increase external directors and independent directors, directors should be rational, reduce the proportion of internal directors and overcome the phenomenon of "insider control"; In 2002, the average number of independent directors in listed companies was 2.3 1, and the proportion of independent directors was only 23.3% of all members of the board of directors, which was too low. At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen the role of the board of directors, ensure the independence of directors and the board of directors, give full play to the role of the board of directors in investment and business decision-making, especially in strengthening supervision, improve the market competitiveness of the company, and do business according to law, pay taxes according to regulations, do not make false accounts and disclose accurate information. For example, the listing rules of Hong Kong Stock Exchange require at least two independent directors, while the guiding principles of corporate governance structure of foreign institutional investors such as California Public Employees Retirement Fund (CALPERS) generally require that most directors of listed companies should be independent directors. American company law also clearly stipulates that there must be more than half of the external independent directors in the board of directors. The chairman and general manager are not separated. At present, the proportion of chairman and general manager of listed companies in China is as high as over 60%. Some enterprises still prefer the structure of "chairman and general manager" in leadership and personnel, thinking that this is "centralization, strengthening leadership and avoiding internal friction" In fact, it strengthens the "rule of man" that individuals have the final say. This is the traditional concept of natural economy in the way of leadership, which is completely contrary to the scientific governance and democratic decision-making required by the modern enterprise system. This situation actually reflects that these enterprises do not understand the connotation of modern enterprise system, but are only in the initial stage of enterprise system construction in pursuit of changes in the form of enterprise system. They should gradually advance to a legal framework that can really balance each other through constant deepening reform and standardized institutional innovation. At the same time, it is necessary to clarify the status of the legal representative, and not let the chairman pretend to be the "legal representative" and the top leader everywhere, asking the general manager to "lead", disrupting the company's responsibility system and reducing the efficiency of enterprise management. In addition, we should vigorously cultivate institutional investors. Ownership structure is the most important factor to determine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism, because ownership structure determines the distribution of corporate control rights and the nature of principal-agent relationship between owners and operators. The operating history of companies in developed market economy shows that the relationship curve between the concentration of corporate ownership and the effectiveness of corporate governance is inverted U-shaped, and too scattered or too concentrated equity is not conducive to the establishment of an effective corporate governance structure (Wu Jinglian, 200 1). Banks, insurance and other institutions can be allowed to participate in the governance of listed companies as shareholders and play their due governance functions. In particular, we should vigorously develop pension funds and insurance fund investors who pay attention to long-term investment and strict supervision to realize diversification of investment institutions; It is necessary to adjust the legal system and external policies to change the serious asymmetry between the costs and benefits of institutional investors participating in corporate governance; It is stipulated that there should be a certain proportion of external institutional investors among external directors, so as to increase their right to speak in determining the salary of operators, appointment and dismissal of personnel, related transactions, etc., and turn passive institutional investors into active investors. Fourth, protect private property rights and actively introduce diversified investors. For this new enterprise organization model, there are still many gaps in our laws. We should speed up legislation, standardize the corporate governance structure of mixed ownership enterprises, protect legitimate private property rights and protect the interests of private and minority shareholders. Van Buren, an American economist, wrote in his classic book On Enterprises: "Without the formal order of law, citizens' life, freedom or property cannot be deprived, and the formal order is based on the inviolability of property rights. In fact, the reference significance of this economic relationship between individuals is that not only an individual or a group of individuals can legally tend to another person or group with pressure other than money, but also the pressure of money cannot be stopped. "This actually means that personal freedom and personal property are protected by law, and the market principle (that is," financial pressure ") prevails here. Any privilege beyond market principles or legal rights shall not interfere with the market mechanism based on clear property rights and contractual spirit. After property rights are clear, it is very important to protect property rights. He (Lewis) stressed that if it is necessary to protect public property from private abuse, it is also necessary to protect private property from public abuse. His conclusion is not only meaningful, but also very realistic: "In every part of the world, ownership is a recognized system. Without this system, mankind will never make progress, because there is no motivation to improve the living environment. "In the past, the legal protection of private property was mainly limited to the scope of means of subsistence, which could no longer reflect the requirements of the times. The protection scope of private property should include private savings, investment and investment income; The right to inherit private property and other lawful rights and interests; Real estate or chattel of private enterprise. Among the people who get rich first, many people have both labor income and non-labor income such as investment income, interest income and rental income. As long as these incomes are legal, they should be protected. If there are only provisions on the protection of public property but not private property in law, and public property and private property are in an unequal position, it is hard to imagine that a mixed-ownership enterprise with public investors and non-public investors will embark on the road of smooth development. In this way, public investors who invest in mixed-ownership enterprises will suffer because of poor management of mixed-ownership enterprises, and the design of developing mixed-ownership economy will also be frustrated. Vigorously developing the mixed ownership economy requires governments at all levels to change their concepts, change "the purer the public ownership, the better" and all kinds of prejudices against the non-public ownership economy. It is necessary to promote public-owned enterprises, especially state-owned enterprises, to absorb non-public capital through various forms and channels and achieve a breakthrough in the innovation of enterprise property rights system. At the same time, public capital is allowed to participate in non-public enterprises through various forms and channels. To develop mixed ownership economy, we must strictly follow the principles of market economy. The combination or integration of different capitals should be carried out voluntarily within the framework of laws and regulations according to the needs of market competition, and it is not allowed to engage in administrative-led "matchmaking", especially not to force non-public enterprises to participate in shares. V. Conclusion We have high hopes for the mixed ownership economy. In order to promote the reform of state-owned enterprises in China and promote the sustained and rapid development of the national economy, an important premise is that the mixed ownership economy must draw a clear line with state-owned enterprises, change the operating mechanism, improve the corporate governance structure, and clarify the operating objectives. Otherwise, it will repeat the old road of state-owned enterprises in trouble. Mixed ownership enterprises only provide a carrier, where public capital and non-public capital restrict each other, foster strengths and avoid weaknesses, and achieve a win-win result. The effective corporate governance structure in the West is always abnormal in China. The important reason is that the state-owned shares are "dominant" and one dominant share has the right to speak. Then, the original property rights of state-owned enterprises were unclear, the ownership representatives were absent, and they assumed unnecessary social functions. The government used the cadre standard to evaluate enterprises. This has been confirmed by practice. Our joint-stock enterprises will get into trouble again, fundamentally speaking, it is the result of insufficient ideological emancipation of our government and some state-owned enterprise cadres. The government always wants to firmly control enterprises and suspects that enterprises do not act according to their own wishes; Some cadres are unwilling to delegate power, and always want to make money from enterprises, and the idea of official standard is still strong. Therefore, it is the key to the success of our reform to act in strict accordance with the law and change the concept of the government. Note and references: See China * * * broadcast by Xinhua News Agency. Decision of the Central Committee on Perfecting the Socialist Market Economic System 2003- 10-2 1 china securities journal 2003+00 Zhang Weida: Academic Journal 2003 1No. 1 Issue Zhang Weida: Academic Journal 2003 6544. The new idea of state-owned enterprise reform is taken from China Reform Forum Network. In 2003, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee decided-10- 16 to emphasize that "it is important for the state to hold shares" in the development of mixed ownership economy, that is to say, the state-owned shareholders of general enterprises may not necessarily hold shares. Chen Dongsheng, Chairman and CEO of Taikang Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Van Buren, China Finance 2002.2: Enterprise Chinese Translation, Commercial Press, 1957, p. 154 Arthur? Lewis. Chinese translation of Economic Growth Theory, Shanghai Sanlian and Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1994, p. 7 1. Li Yining: Protecting Private Property and Perfecting Basic Economic System, People's Daily, 2003-2-2 1 Xinhua News Agency: Vigorously Developing Mixed Ownership Economy, 2003- 10. Li Yiping: A Hundred Years of Economics-Selection and Evaluation of Socialist Market Economy, Tianjin People's Publishing House, 2002.