The role of law in adjusting tourism

A preliminary study on legal problems in tourism income distribution

Abstract: In the income distribution of tourism, there are many pairs of contradictions between tourism and government, between tourism and tourism enterprises providing different services, between tourism enterprises and employees, and between tourism enterprises and residents of tourist destinations. Based on this, this paper analyzes the institutional causes and solutions of various contradictions from the perspectives of tax system, competition norms, commission system, tourism and contract system, and tourism resource property rights system.

[Keywords:] tourism, income distribution, taxation, commission, property rights

According to Marx's political economy theory, the distribution relationship in a society is an important factor to determine the social production relationship: if the distribution of social interests is fair on the whole, it will stimulate the production enthusiasm of social members, thus improving the social production efficiency-such distribution relationship is compatible with the development of productive forces; On the other hand, if the social income distribution is not normal, then the production enthusiasm of those social subjects who think they have not received due benefits will be frustrated. In the sustainable development of tourism, this theory is also applicable: in order to make tourism develop continuously, it is necessary to solve the contradiction of income distribution among relevant subjects. Some foreign scholars believe that "the essence of sustainable tourism development is to continue to maintain the integrity of the environmental system and culture. And the fair distribution of various social benefits brought by tourism in the destination area. " [1] This paper is a preliminary exploration of establishing and perfecting the legal mechanism of tourism income distribution on the basis of empirical investigation, hoping to be beneficial to the sustainable development of China's tourism industry.

1. Five pairs of contradictions in the process of tourism income distribution

(A) the distribution contradiction between the tourism industry and the government

In the market economy, profit is one of the most fundamental attributes of enterprises. The purpose of a holding company is to gain benefits for the business owners through the operation of the company-it should be noted that profit maximization is the most direct driving force for the development of the company and itself is beyond reproach. However, some unprofitable businesses, such as public facilities construction and social security management, either have a very long investment return period or have no statistical profit return at all. General enterprises will not be willing to invest in these undertakings, but it is extremely necessary for the development of society. Of course, the responsibility for organizing these activities can only be borne by the government. If the government wants to engage in unprofitable undertakings, it must have money to invest. Where did the money come from? The simplest way is "whoever benefits pays the bill": since the ultimate beneficiary of these undertakings is the public, the money will naturally be taken from the public. This is why the state levies various taxes and fees. As mentioned above, tourism enterprises, like other market players, aim at maximizing profits. As far as a single tourism enterprise is concerned, it pays less taxes on the money it earns in the course of operation. This is the distribution contradiction between tourism and government.

(B) the distribution contradictions arising from the competition among the tourism industries.

Competition is an important driving force for the development of market economy, and there is competition because there are many practitioners in the same market. People in the tourism market divide the market cake, and the distribution of benefits will naturally be contradictory. When the market is in short supply, this contradiction of interest distribution is not obvious, but when there are too many peers in the tourism market or the service capacity provided by peers is greater than the total demand, the contradiction of interest distribution among competitors becomes obvious.

(C) the distribution contradiction between tourism enterprises providing different services

The most common business model of tourism is that the tourism enterprises in the tourist source areas are responsible for attracting tourists locally. After the signing of the tourism contract, the tourist enterprises in the tourist source area will send the tourists to the destination, and the tourism enterprises in the tourist destination will directly provide services to the tourists. In this process, there is a problem of the distribution of tourism income between the tour operators in the source area and the tour destination operators.

Because of the fierce competition in tourism, whoever has mastered the source of tourists will have the right to speak in competition. In this sense, tourism enterprises (mainly tour groups) in the upstream position of tourism management process can occupy a favorable position in the distribution arrangement of tourism income by virtue of the tourism resources they have mastered. But this advantage is not absolute. Because the main content of tourism services is still completed by various tourism enterprises in the destination, if their income is taken up by upstream enterprises, they can only survive by lowering the quality and standard of service. The decline of service quality will directly make tourists dissatisfied with the tour group, and then affect the reputation of the tour group, which is very important for the tourism enterprises in the source areas that mainly attract tourists. Therefore, when negotiating income distribution with destination operators, the operators of tourist destinations are actually playing a game-not only to meet the needs of maximizing their own income, but also to prevent excessive discounts on tourist services.

At present, the contradiction between the income distribution of some local tourist source operators and destination operators has become very prominent, which has produced some adverse consequences. Taking Xishuangbanna, Yunnan Province as an example, according to the author's field investigation in this area in 2002-2003, [3] most of the tourists coming to Banna come from Kunming, outside the province and even abroad, and the local travel agencies in Banna basically play the role of reception agencies. In the course of operation, there is a big gap between the price of tourism services provided by tour groups and the price expected by reception institutions. If the reception agencies provide tourism services at the prices of tour groups, their profit margins will be very small. In order to survive, the reception agency can only make up for it by reducing the quality of tourism service, deducting the travel itinerary and increasing the number of shopping, which makes the number of complaints about tourism consumption increase, thus affecting Banna's tourism image. In order to protect their own interests, Banna's tourism industry has adopted the way of price alliance, setting the lowest tour price and even uniformly distributing houses and cars. As a result, the profits of tour groups in Kunming decreased, and tour groups invariably adopted the way of pushing less or not pushing Banna routes, further reducing the number of tourists visiting Banna.

In addition to the distribution contradiction between tourist sources and destination operators, there are also income distribution contradictions between tourism reception enterprises (travel agencies) and enterprises undertaking different division of labor, such as tourism transportation enterprises, tourism accommodation enterprises, tourist attractions enterprises and tourism commodity sales enterprises. The author believes that the contradiction of interest distribution of tourism enterprises in different processes is more prominent, which is directly related to the inherent business model of tourism. In traditional commerce and general service industry, consumers only contact with the final sellers of goods and/or services, and the final sellers have strong control over the quality of goods (services). But in terms of tourism, it is different. Although consumers (tourists) only sign travel contracts with organized travel service enterprises, they are directly related to all working procedures (division of labor)-as long as a "working procedure" goes wrong, organized travel enterprises (travel agencies) may bear losses. In this way, travel agencies (especially tour groups) often have interests distribution disputes with other tourism service enterprises.

(D) the contradiction between the distribution of tourism enterprises and employees

In an ideal state, the relationship between tourism enterprises and employees is wage labor, and the distribution of benefits between them should have been stipulated in the labor contract. If things are really so simple, then the distribution contradiction between all enterprises and employees should not be specifically raised in the article discussing the income distribution of tourism.

But the reality is far from simple. First of all, the income of the tourism industry, in addition to the expenses in the travel service contract signed by tourists and travel agencies, also comes from the extra payment made by tourists during the travel process. In the process of distributing these extra funds, some tourism professionals directly earn income by collecting kickbacks (especially tour guides and station wagon drivers). [4] Secondly, there are a large number of contractual relationships in tourism enterprises (mainly travel agencies). Although the contractor is an employee of the enterprise, he basically provides tourism services alone. They generally don't receive wages from enterprises, but pay contract fees to enterprises according to their contracts. In this case, the distribution of benefits between tourism enterprises and their employees is complicated.

(E) the contradiction of distribution between tourism enterprises and residents of tourist destinations

In Yunnan province, ethnic customs tourism is the main tourism product, which makes the contradiction between tourism enterprises and residents of tourist destinations a prominent problem in the distribution of tourism benefits. On the one hand, tourism enterprises (especially those in scenic spots) need to recover costs and create profits because of their huge investment; On the other hand, the existence of local ethnic minorities and their cultures is an important reason why tourist destinations can attract tourists. Of course, these ethnic minorities should also benefit from tourism. At present, most of the profits generated by tourism are obtained by tourism enterprises, while local residents, as creators and owners of tourism resources, cannot share the profits. [5] How to establish a fair and reasonable mechanism to enable tourism enterprises and residents of tourist destinations to benefit from tourism is an urgent problem to be solved.

In order to understand the concrete manifestation of this contradiction, the author went to the famous scenic spot "Dai Garden" in Han Meng Town (Olive Dam) in Xishuangbanna for field investigation. Here, the Dai Garden Company, which manages the scenic spot, includes five natural Dai villages in the scenic spot, rents Kugaji in the village to build tourist facilities, and uses the unique features of natural villages to attract tourists and collect tickets. Although Daiyuan is called a typical operation mode of "company plus farmers" by local government officials, we still see many disputes between enterprises and villagers in the park in the investigation. For example, the main income of Dai Garden is tickets, but the villagers are not shareholders of Dai Garden and cannot benefit from the ticket income, so the villagers feel that they suffer; Another example is that the villagers want to build new buildings, but the company thinks it will destroy the style of ethnic tourism and do everything possible to stop it, and so on.

Of course, in the process of income distribution of tourism, there are some other subjects, all of whom have their own interests, and there are conflicts between these interests, but in comparison, the above five contradictions are particularly prominent. It can be said that if these five pairs of contradictions can be successfully balanced in the system design, then the tourism market order can enter a virtuous circle, and if these five pairs of contradictions are not well balanced, then the sustainable development of tourism will encounter great obstacles-once a contradiction forms a deformed interest distribution pattern in reality, then any reform will encounter strong obstruction from vested interest groups.

Two. Legal Issues in Income Distribution of Tourism Industry

Before further discussion, it must be emphasized that as far as the function of law is concerned, it "not only protects economic interests", but also "from the most basic interests-protecting pure personal safety to pure ideological wealth", all of which are concerned by law. [6] But in this part, we are concerned about the distribution of social wealth created by tourism as an industry, so the legal issues we are involved here are also focused on the legal issues that need to be studied in the process of balancing the above contradictions.

(1) Tax system: regulating the income distribution between practitioners and the government.

Tourism is a service department with fine division of labor. In the process of traveling, a tourist will have relations with many tourism enterprises, such as tour groups, transportation companies, reception agencies, hotels, scenic spot management companies and so on. On the one hand, this complex service process gives tourism enterprises the opportunity to avoid tax, on the other hand, it may also lead to the phenomenon of unreasonable taxation of tourism enterprises by the state.

First, talk about tax avoidance. Under the current system, the state implements a tax sharing system for each enterprise. If a company loses money that year, then it doesn't need to pay taxes. Under this institutional arrangement, many enterprises and travel companies headquartered in tourist destinations have registered subsidiaries (independent legal persons) in tourist destinations, and these subsidiaries accept the company's team in tourist destinations at a price lower than the normal cost, so that the subsidiaries in the destinations are always in a state of loss and do not need to pay enterprise income tax. China's current national and local tax sharing system, local taxes are directly used for local finance-that is, local public utilities construction. If the company in the destination transfers its profits to the affiliated enterprises in the destination, then the public enterprises in the destination cannot get financial support. This situation is not only unfair to tourism resources, but also related to the sustainable development and utilization of tourism resources-environmental protection and cultural relics protection in sustainable development tourism are mostly public welfare undertakings, which need the strong support of government finance to achieve due results.

Second, the issue of double taxation. Take the tour bus industry that undertakes the tourist transportation business as an example. According to the provisions of China's tax law, as tourism auxiliary enterprises, group travel agencies and tour bus companies pay enterprise income tax according to their respective financial year profits. There seems to be no double taxation. But the problem is that, according to the author's investigation, most station wagon companies don't really enjoy full ownership of all their station wagons-usually a tour bus company only owns a small number of vehicles belonging to the company, and most of the vehicles belong to all station wagon drivers (although the station wagons formally belong to the company, they are actually purchased by the drivers themselves). In this way, station wagon drivers not only have to bear the burden of corporate income tax, but also pay personal income tax for the income generated by the cars they invest in. In fact, the problem of double taxation has been formed. It is precisely because of such a heavy burden that station wagon drivers have to try to avoid paying personal income tax and even seek gray income such as shopping commission.

The key to adjusting the income distribution between the tourism industry and the government is to establish a reasonable tax system, reduce tax loopholes and double taxation, and to achieve this goal, it is not just a matter for the tax authorities. The reasons for the above problems of tourism transport operators are largely due to the incompatibility between national legislation and reality. On the one hand, excessive market access standards make a large number of transport operators unable to obtain business qualifications through their own strength, and can only "link" in transport enterprises; On the other hand, transportation enterprises themselves can't fully meet the supply requirements of the market, so they have to obtain abnormal income by renting market access qualifications. As a means of distribution, the normal operation of tax system needs to be based on the rationality of various supporting legal systems, which is a problem that we often ignored in the study of tax law in the past.

(b) The legal system of competition: limiting the income distribution among peers.

Market competition must be bound by legal rules, which is also an important part of the country's "visible hand" to the market economy. Objectively speaking, compared with the civil legal system to ensure transaction safety, the competition legal system to ensure market fairness is still quite backward in China. What is even more regrettable is that although with the continuous development of social economy, tourism and other service industries occupy a large proportion in the national economy, the legal system for regulating service industry competition in China is very lacking. In the Anti-Unfair Competition Law [7], the only legal competition norm in China, the unfair competition behavior in the process of commodity sales is mainly regulated, but the service industries such as tourism are not paid attention to (for example, although Article 11 of the law stipulates that operators may not sell goods at a price lower than the cost, it does not stipulate whether they can provide services at a price lower than the cost). Among the norms related to tourism, only Article 19 of the Regulations on the Administration of Travel Agencies and Article 33 of the Implementation Rules of the Regulations on the Administration of Travel Agencies involve unfair competition. In these two pieces of legislation with extremely low effectiveness, "counterfeiting the registered trademarks, brands and quality certification marks of other travel agencies", "using the names of other travel agencies without authorization" and "colluding with other travel agencies to set monopoly prices, harming the interests of tourists and other travel agencies, participating in competitive marketing at a price lower than the normal cost price, entrusting non-travel agencies or any individual to operate tourism business or acting as an agent in disguise, creating and disseminating false information that damages the corporate image and business reputation of other travel agencies, in order to attract tourists.

Because most of these regulations belong to the level of rules and regulations, their effectiveness level is low, and they have not received due attention. Some places even carry out unfair competition behaviors that violate these regulations under the impetus of local governments. For example, some tourist areas have set up "trip control centers" and "housing distribution centers" in the name of travel agency associations and hotel industry associations, which have essentially violated the above-mentioned provisions prohibiting the setting of monopoly prices. [8] Income distribution among peers should be achieved through full and fair competition. Abandoning the short-term balance in exchange for competition will only make the tourism enterprises with poor service quality still gain profits, while the enterprises with good service quality lose the motivation to make progress, and finally coordinate the contradictions among their peers at the expense of consumers, which will certainly damage the sustainable development of tourism, which is tantamount to exhausting resources and fishing. [9]

Commission system: standardize the income distribution between enterprises and employees.

Among the legal problems of tourism competition, there is another problem worth pondering-kickback (or commission). Articles 8 and 22 of China's Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Articles 163 and 385 of the Criminal Law, and various tourism laws and regulations all stipulate severe punishment measures for the behavior of collecting kickbacks outside the account, but why are kickbacks still popular in the tourism industry? The author believes that since the kickback phenomenon exists in a large area, it must have its rationality. Simple criticism and banning will not help solve the income distribution problems of tourism enterprises and tourism professionals. After investigation, the author believes that there are at least the following reasons for the repeated prohibition of kickbacks:

First, the competition among operators selling tourism commodities has not been effectively regulated. Tourism commodity sales are an important part of tourism. Strictly speaking, such operators are engaged in traditional trade in goods rather than services. Therefore, in tourism laws and regulations, there is little supervision over the activities of these operators, but in fact, these operators are closely related to tourism. In the case of fragmented administration in China, they are in the gap between tourism administration and industrial and commercial administration. In the case of lax supervision, for their own development, a large number of off-balance-sheet kickbacks and other abnormal competition strategies are used. However, when kickbacks are rampant, this strategy not only doesn't work, but also increases the overall cost of tourism commodity sales enterprises-if drivers and tour guides are not given kickbacks, they will not recommend tourists to shops for extra consumption-and these costs are eventually transferred to tourism consumers, making tourists always form sharp conflicts of interest with the tourism industry in the process of purchasing tourism services.

Second, there are defects in the internal management system of tourism enterprises. At present, the labor relationship between tourism enterprises and tourism professionals in China is very loose. Tour guides and drivers are basically individual employees who are "affiliated" with travel agencies or station wagon companies. They either don't get paid in tourism enterprises or only get a symbolic salary. A large number of drivers and tour guides can only rely on kickbacks as their main source of income in order to survive.

The third is law enforcement. Due to lax enforcement, it has become a common practice for tourist shops to give kickbacks to station wagon drivers and tour guides. If they don't give kickbacks or report kickbacks, they will be considered as "unfair competition" by the industry. At the beginning, lax law enforcement led to the current law not blaming the public.

Because of the above reasons, it is difficult to put an end to kickbacks only by the inspection and punishment of the tourism supervision department. The "public-to-public commission" system, which has attracted much attention since the beginning of 2002, has found a new angle to solve the rebate problem. [10] In February 2002, Guilin City, Guangxi Province issued the Interim Provisions on the Commission Management of Tourism Intermediary Services in Guilin City; In the same month, Hainan Province implemented a collection and payment system for business-to-business bank account settlement between tourism business units and travel agencies such as shopping spots, scenic spots (spots) and diving spots throughout the province. On March 27th, Hainan Province issued the Notice on Rectifying the Order of Tourism Market and Establishing a Legal Commission System, and established a unified settlement center for tourism business transactions with the participation of banks and tax authorities. In June 2002, Kunming also promulgated the Interim Provisions on the Administration of Tourism Commission in Kunming, allowing travel agencies to choose three or five stores as shopping places and withdraw commissions from them through non-cash bank account settlement, and stipulating that no shopping store may pay commissions to individuals in cash. These new measures have just entered the implementation stage, and the specific implementation effect needs to be observed.

The author believes that a series of supporting measures are needed to truly implement the commission system. According to the above analysis, the reasons for the proliferation of kickbacks are profound and complicated. Therefore, to solve the problem of kickbacks, it is not enough to only implement the commission system. It is also necessary to carry out synchronous reforms on some deep-seated problems in tourism:

The first is to reform the market access mechanism and elimination mechanism of the tourism industry. Administrative intervention in the market access of tourism is an important means to prevent too many competitors from causing vicious competition. The reason why the sellers of tourist commodities pay commercial bribes to tour guides and drivers [1 1] is because the market competition is so fierce that tourist commodity sales enterprises can only survive through unfair competition; The reason why tour guides can't get normal wages from travel agencies is that there are too many qualified tour guides, which leads to oversupply in the tour guide labor market, and then makes tourism enterprises dare to violate national laws and establish normal and legal labor relations with tour guides. If the government can establish a strict tourism market access mechanism, then those unqualified enterprises will not participate in the competition; If there is a strict elimination mechanism for tour guides and passengers and the qualifications of poor-quality tour guides are cancelled, then truly good-quality tour guides can realize their value through proper means. In Kunming's Interim Provisions on the Administration of Tourism Commission, it is a useful attempt to establish a commission contract relationship between travel agencies and enterprises that can guarantee a 90-day return. [12] We believe that, in addition, we should also establish a strict elimination mechanism for tour guides, specify the elimination ratio in the annual assessment of tour guides, and change the assessment of customs clearance into selection assessment, so as to establish a dynamic team of tourism professionals.

Secondly, increase the labor law protection for tour guides, drivers and other employees. Strict management of tour guide practice, only those who have signed formal labor relations with travel agencies can obtain tour guide practice certificates. In this regard, the recent regulations in Kunming, Yunnan Province are very timely: travel agencies must ensure that the basic salary of tour guides is not lower than the minimum wage standard set by provincial and municipal governments every month, and must ensure that tour guides participate in social security such as unemployment, pension, medical care, work injury and maternity, as well as relevant insurance stipulated by the National Tourism Administration. In addition, according to the current income structure of tour guides and drivers, we should refine the labor contracts of tourism professionals, formulate model contracts, and allow enterprises and employees to agree on the distribution ratio of public commission.

Thirdly, in order to ensure that all commissions reach the travel agency through the public-to-public way, we should strictly implement the existing laws and regulations on private kickbacks, resolutely and severely investigate and deal with the behavior of not paying the tour guide through the public-to-public commission channel, and anyone who reaches the amount stipulated by law should be subject to criminal punishment. Only in this way can we ensure that all commissions enter the travel agency account in a public-to-public way.

In short, in order to curb the unfair competition that seriously damages the sustainable development of the market, we must establish a set of relevant mechanisms to promote the legalization and rationalization of commissions on the premise of ensuring the legitimate interests of tour guides and drivers. In this process, we must ensure the detached position of the administrative organs, and absolutely can't directly or indirectly participate in the distribution of tourism income.

Tourism contract: balancing the interests of tourism enterprises with different division of labor.

Tourism contract, in general, refers to the contract signed by tourism consumers (tourists) and tour groups to stipulate the time, content, standard and price of tourism services. There is no doubt that the travel contract must meet the conditions for the contract to take effect as stipulated in China's civil law, so as to ensure the legal rights of both parties in the process of performance. But in addition, based on the particularity of tourism contract, it is still necessary for us to study it.

As mentioned above, in a tourism contract, the two parties who sign the contract are tourists and travel agencies, and the tourism service is implemented by various enterprises in the tourist destination. This forms the most striking feature of tourism contracts: third-party performance. There are two legal arrangements for this feature: one is regarded as the commitment of contractual debts, and the other is regarded as the entrusted relationship between travel agencies (not tourists) and tourism enterprises in various processes. According to the first arrangement, according to the provisions of China's contract law, the debtor must obtain the consent of the creditor when transferring the obligations of the civil contract to a third party. Therefore, in theory, a complete travel contract should clearly stipulate which subjects will provide specific services for passengers. For tourists, it is difficult for them to obtain detailed information of tourism enterprises in each process, such as land agency, destination tourism transportation enterprise, destination hotel enterprise and so on. Therefore, in fact, tourists can only conclude a contract for a third party to bear the debt according to the arrangement of the group agency. Therefore, in practice, most travel contracts can only be (and only need to be) concluded in accordance with the second arrangement-the travel contract does not clearly state which enterprise will undertake a certain service for tourists, but only stipulates the standards and grades that each service should reach, such as hotel star rating and dining standards. If tourists feel that the service items can't reach the level agreed in the contract during the tour, they will only have a legal relationship with the package travel agency for compensation for breach of contract, and then the package travel agency will claim responsibility according to its entrusted service relationship with the specific implementers of each service item after assuming the responsibility for breach of contract.

Based on this institutional arrangement, in the process of tourism service, in order to avoid being claimed for the service problems of downstream enterprises, the group travel agency generally adopts the way of paying the tour fee later. In fact, it is the downstream tourism enterprises that provide services first and then charge the tour group. For reception agencies and tourism auxiliary enterprises such as hotels and transportation, the principle of "paying first, then traveling" in China's tourism laws and regulations has become an empty talk that only binds consumers but not service providers. However, although this method ensures the interests of upstream travel agencies, it unreasonably increases the risks of downstream travel agencies and other tourism auxiliary enterprises-once the group travel agency loses money for its own reasons, it is very likely to occupy and default on the money that should be paid to downstream enterprises-which is also the reason why legal disputes often occur between tourism enterprises with different division of labor.

The author suggests that we can try to coordinate the interests of tourism enterprises in different processes with the method of "maximum guarantee". The specific way is: each downstream tourism service enterprise should conclude a contract with the package travel agency (which can be indefinite), stipulate the service price under each specific standard, and set a maximum guarantee amount in the contract (you can use the guarantee, mortgage and other means freely). With the maximum guarantee, the downstream travel agency can ask the package travel agency to pay in advance before the team arrives in the contract. In this way, it not only prevents the risks in the operation of enterprises, but also ensures that the normal profits of tourism enterprises can be obtained on time in each process, which improves the speed of capital turnover.

(e) Confirmation of property rights: solving the contradiction of income distribution between tourism enterprises and residents of tourist destinations.

The author believes that due to the unclear ownership of tourism resources in China's current legal system, the contradiction of income distribution between tourism enterprises and residents of tourist destinations is prominent. Although the constitution stipulates the ownership of land, forests, rivers and other property, in practice, people do not seem to realize the property right attribute of tourism resources. Let's take the "Dai Garden" scenic spot investigated by the author as an example to discuss this problem.

The land in Dai Garden belongs to the collective. When preparing to build a park here, foreign businessmen signed long-term (30-year term, exceeding the provisions of China's contract law) land lease agreements with several villages. Because it is a lease agreement, Wucun is not a shareholder of Dai Garden Company. This has laid the groundwork for the contradiction of income distribution between companies and farmers. After several years' operation, the residents of Man Village in Man Chun, which is located in the center of Dai Garden, have gained much higher income than other villages: tourists concentrate in their villages for sightseeing, and the residents in the villages can earn income by setting up stalls and receiving tourists for accommodation. Therefore, the residents of Man Chun Manchu (especially several "designated reception households") have a very harmonious relationship with Dai Garden Company. But other villages are not, because the number of tourists is not as large as expected, so the residents of these villages have basically not benefited from tourism except the low land rent. So the contradiction between them and the company, and the contradiction between the full village, accumulated imperceptibly. Although Daiyuan Garden Company tried many ways to increase the income of the villagers, it had little effect because of the limited number of tourists.

The author thinks that Dai Garden does not take the creator and owner of tourism resources-villagers into account in the property right arrangement, which leads to the contradiction between villagers, companies and different villages. If at the beginning of the company's establishment, each village takes its own land and tourism resources as shares and shares at a fixed price, then the villagers as owners will no longer be in a position of opposition to the company, but the * * * will share the business risks and the * * * will share the business profits. In China's tourism legislation, the property rights of tourism resources should be recognized, so that the traditional occupants of these resources can have the right to completely dispose of these resources, prevent "loss of ownership", and let the owners claim the interests of tourism resources according to law, thus finding a basis for legally coordinating the income distribution between local residents and tourism developers.

Finally, it should be explained that dealing with the income distribution in tourism is a systematic project, involving many related disciplines, which does not mean that all problems can be solved only from the perspective of jurisprudence-the actual approach should be: gathering various social science methods,