How to deepen the reform of rural economic system in China is of great significance.

China's economic system reform began in the countryside. The reform of rural microeconomic system with household contract management as the main content is the reform of management system, not the reform of property right system. The establishment of the family-style management model and the result of its reform may at most be a rediscovery of the ancient family-style management model. However, due to the inherent causal relationship between the change of management mode and property right system, the family contract system will inevitably lead to the change of property right system while realizing the change of management mode. This is the essence of the family contract system. This is the deep reason why China's rural microeconomic system reform has made remarkable achievements.

First of all, the reform of rural microeconomic system in China began with the separation of the two powers.

In 1950s, the highly centralized planned economy system chosen by our country was based on ignoring or even denying the local interests of microeconomic cells, which inevitably led to the sharp contradiction between the interests of the state and farmers. The rural people's commune of "unity of politics and society" and "one university and two schools" has formed a buffer between the state and farmers, not only playing a buffer role when the interests of the state and farmers conflict. It is also convenient for the government to enforce its own intentions and implement the mandatory plan issued by the government. In view of the fact that the regulating effect of price on production is mainly through the influence of price level on the interests of producers, so that all micro-subjects can automatically adjust their behaviors and change their decisions. At that time, China mainly weakened the regulating effect of prices on agricultural production by transforming rural microeconomic entities. It has weakened the position of microeconomic subjects in their decision-making. This is embodied in the fact that the transformation from individual farmers to primary cooperatives, advanced cooperatives and people's communes is to weaken the influence of product prices on production and sales decisions. In China's rural people's commune system, because its decision makers, namely commune chairman, production captain and production captain, are not only representatives of the interests of collective economic organizations, they should also reflect the will and interests of the government. Because their identity was granted by the higher government. What's more, the rural people's commune system, which integrates politics and society, means that subordinates obey superiors. Therefore, when the interests of microeconomic subjects conflict with macroeconomic interests, macroeconomic interests will be protected at the expense of microeconomic interests. Of course, the transformation of individual family management with close combination of power, responsibility and interests into large collective management also disconnects the interest relationship between farmers and collective economic organizations. It is not so closely related to the interests of family members and family economic cells, which makes the management behavior of rural microeconomic organizations in the past likely to deviate from the principle of maximizing microeconomic interests to a great extent. In such a system that the unified purchase and marketing of agricultural products in China and the micro-economic organizations of rural people's communes are linked with a highly centralized planned economy system, the function of adjusting income distribution is increased due to the exchange of compulsory purchase prices of agricultural products. The income distribution function and exchange function are intertwined, while the resource allocation function inherent in price is completely replaced by mandatory planning. This serious distortion of price function is based on the administrative function of rural people's commune which combines politics with society and is insensitive to price reflection, and also on the condition that the exchange of products between workers and peasants is not equivalent.

Since the goal of China's urban and rural economic system reform is to change from a highly centralized planned economy system to a socialist market economy system, it requires a fundamental reform of the previous micro-economic system that adapts to the planned economy system model, and remoulds the micro-economic organization into a market subject that can make timely and sensitive responses to market supply and demand and price changes. There is no such market subject. The market economy will not develop. Because the traditional rural micro-economic organizations in China exist as an appendage of the government, they have no autonomy in production and operation and cannot form a real market exchange. The so-called market is tantamount to the exchange relationship between many independent economic activities. Without the independence and autonomy of microeconomic organizations, there would be no market. Implementing the autonomy of rural microeconomic organizations in production and operation is a prerequisite for them to enter the market. The first step in the reform of rural microeconomic system in China is to gradually eliminate the traditional microeconomic system of "integration of politics and society", and return the autonomy of production and operation to the grassroots actors through the implementation of the contract responsibility system, so as to realize the separation of ownership and management rights and ensure the autonomy of production and operation of microeconomic organizations. It is closely related to the role of the market mechanism. It can even be considered as two sides of the same problem, because from another perspective, only when rural microeconomic organizations are liberated from the direct control of the government and the market directly guides their production and business activities instead of the government can the autonomy of rural microeconomic organizations be truly implemented.

Second, deepening the reform of rural microeconomic system in China needs "two rights in one".

For a long time, people have always used the theory of "separation of two powers" to summarize the characteristics of rural microeconomic system reform in China. The practice of reform shows that this view is one-sided. This is first manifested in the "separation of two rights" in agriculture, which mainly refers to agricultural land, the ownership belongs to the collective and the management right belongs to the individual. At present, most of them are individual investments by farmers. The ownership and management rights of this part of the means of production are unified with farmers, and there is no problem of "separation of the two rights". Strictly speaking, even agricultural land cannot be understood as a complete "separation of the two rights." Because under the premise of long-term stability of the household contract system, the contractor is allowed to have a certain right to dispose of agricultural land, that is, farmers have the right to transfer, lease and mortgage the land. And make this system reflect the laws of the market. This means that the final ownership of the land belongs to the collective and the legal person ownership belongs to the farmers during the contract period. If farmers don't have ownership in this sense, they have no right to dispose of and the right to operate on the premise of disposal. Although the implementation of the household contract system has not changed the collective ownership of land, it has changed from the collective unified management of land to the decentralized management of farmers. It will inevitably lead to obvious changes in the property right structure of collective land ownership. Since then, land rights have been divided into "separation of ownership and use or management rights". With the development of land management mode and the implementation of land circulation and subcontracting, various rights such as land contracting right, management right and subcontracting right are gradually divided. It embodies the collective ownership of rural land. The right to land contract embodies a right of farmers as collective members, that is, farmers have the right to collectively contract land. Land use right is a right of farmers as cultivators, which reflects the relationship of land use. Defining this right is a condition to ensure the normal use of land. The division and definition of land rights is the basis of land market construction. Because every activity in the land market will show the exchange of rights. Clear division and definition of land rights.

Secondly, people who hold the view of "separation of two powers" regard the reform of rural microeconomic system in China only as the reform of management mode, and do not further realize that it also involves the reform of ownership. Yes, the reform of rural microeconomic system in China began with the reform of management mode, that is, the traditional highly centralized collective management is unified. Reform has become a two-tier management system that combines collective unified management and household decentralized management. Once the ownership and management right are separated, as the contractor of the basic production and business operation unit, in order to continuously add value in the economic operation and expand the scale of production and operation, it is objectively required to divide the ownership to the original collective ownership. In other words, the ownership of the second person is regenerated. This truth is not difficult to understand. Under the traditional collective ownership and highly unified collective management system, the fruits of its production and operation naturally belong to the collective. However, under the "separation of two rights" based on family management, the collective only owns the ownership of the part of the means of production that originally belonged to the collective. However, it does not fully own the ownership of all products (or income) created by the contractor using these means of production (including other means of production owned by the contractor, of course), because under the new rural microeconomic system, the contractor is an economic unit that operates independently and is responsible for its own profits and losses, and its production and operation results naturally belong to the contractor first. In addition to paying a certain tax to the state and a certain amount of public funds to the collective, the rest of the products and benefits are owned by the contractor. Since these products and benefits are owned by the contractor, the property right relationship is very clear. No matter what form the contractor uses this fund, whether for accumulation or consumption, it will not change the nature of individual ownership. This will achieve the unity of management right and ownership to a certain extent, or the combination of management right and ownership. Enhance farmers' ability of self-accumulation and self-development. With the implementation of the household contract system, farmers have changed from simple workers and consumers in the past to associated workers, operators and investors. Farmers have the function of accumulating private property while gaining ownership and control over some surplus products, thus stimulating farmers' enthusiasm for labor and investment.

The reason why China's rural microeconomic system reform will inevitably touch on the reform of ownership structure, and re-establish the important position of farmers' ownership on the basis of the reform of management mode is to realize the proper combination of farmers' management right and ownership, and on this basis, truly shape farmers into independent commodity producers and operators who are self-employed and responsible for their own profits and losses. In order to meet the needs of the transition to the socialist market economy, the rural microeconomic system reform is relatively thorough compared with the urban microeconomic system reform, which makes the adjustment of economic interests closely related to the transformation of economic operation mechanism. That is, there is no problem that the economic operation mechanism is difficult to transform after the adjustment of economic interests. The important reason lies in the reform of rural microeconomic system in China. From the beginning, it didn't just stop at the change of management mode, but touched the core of property right system, that is, the change of ownership structure, thus realizing the combination of management right and ownership and the high unity of rights, responsibilities and interests.

It is not difficult to understand that the reason why we want to raise the reform of property rights system to the breakthrough position of deepening the reform of microeconomic system is to transform the traditional microeconomic organization into a new microeconomic subject with clear property rights and hardened property rights constraints, so as to minimize the externalization effect of its economic behavior. This is because rational economic man is related to the pursuit of maximizing his own interests. It is necessary to constantly calculate the benefits and costs in order to maximize the benefits and utility. Only through reform can the externalization effect of economic behavior be minimized, social costs be internalized into the costs of microeconomic organizations, and microeconomic organizations can improve the input-output ratio and improve the efficiency of economic operation. The clearer and more perfect the definition of property rights, the smaller the external effect of the economic behavior of microeconomic entities. The higher the operating efficiency of microeconomic organizations. Looking at the course of rural microeconomic system reform in China, it has generally experienced the evolution from the premise of combining ownership and management rights (the characteristics of traditional microeconomic system) to the separation of ownership and management rights, and then to the combination of management rights and ownership rights. However, the latter combination is not a simple repetition of the former combination, nor a regression of the former combination, but a new combination based on the innovation of microeconomic organization system, in order to

Three, China rural microeconomic organizations property rights system reform problems and reform direction.

After 30 years of rural microeconomic system reform, the framework of rural land property rights system linked with the socialist market economic system has been initially established, and the vast majority of farmers have obtained long-term unchanged land contracting rights and use rights. The long-term capitalization and property rights of rural land use rights have basically been determined as the development direction and trend. However, the rural land property right system is still far from perfect. How to maintain farmers' land ownership, protect farmers' legitimate rights and interests, and ensure the sustained growth of farmers' income are the fundamental problems that must be solved in deepening the reform of rural land property rights system. According to the provisions of China's Constitution and the Land Law, rural land belongs to farmers' collective ownership, except that it is specially stipulated by law to be owned by the state. However, in practice, farmers have no organizational forms and procedures for exercising land ownership. It is often a few cadres in rural areas who really exercise collective land ownership, especially land transfer rights. Farmers who live on land and cherish the collective ownership of land have no right to know, participate and appeal at all, and it is even more difficult to protect their land from infringement. According to China's current laws and regulations, the state is the only land supplier. To turn rural land into non-agricultural land, it must be requisitioned by the state and then provided to land users. Farmers have no right to transfer the ownership of their land through bidding or other forms. Including a large number of commercial development land. This kind of land system arrangement means that farmers' collective ownership can only be transferred to the state (or government), and it can only be a one-way and irreversible transfer, which is an administrative compulsory and non-market exchange transfer. Farmers' collective land ownership has not been realized economically, let alone fully realized.

The starting point of rural land expropriation system reform in China should be based on safeguarding farmers' interests. Its basic spirit is that land, as a factor of production, should be allocated by the market. Land price should be formed in market competition. The policy and institutional obstacles that hinder the normal circulation of land should be gradually eliminated. We should strictly distinguish between public land and business land, and clearly define the scope of government land acquisition. Strictly control the scale of land acquisition. Public welfare land should implement the land acquisition price hearing system, improve the collection method, compensation standard and compensation mechanism, establish and improve the employment placement and basic living security system for landless farmers, and gradually establish a new trinity model of "economic compensation, social security and employment service". Commercial land should be withdrawn from the scope of government expropriation and operated according to market rules. Comprehensively implement the system of bidding, auction and listing of land use rights, actively explore ways and means for collective non-agricultural land to enter the market, let farmers share the value-added benefits brought about by changing land use for a long time, and recognize the commodity attribute of land, so it is necessary to ensure the integrity of land property rights. Because commodity exchange is actually the exchange of property rights. When a commodity appears in the market, two bundled rights will be exchanged. Rights are usually attached to tangible goods or services, but it is the value of rights that determines the value of exchanged goods. An important function of property right is to guide people to realize the motivation of internalization of externalities. Unclear definition of property rights is the main source of externalities and hitchhiking. In fact, the origin of property rights is also intrinsically related to externalities. Effective property rights can reduce or even overcome externalities. The formation of property rights is essentially a process of internalization of externalities.

In the process of urbanization in China, the core of the land problem is an institutional problem, which is who should share the value-added part in the process of land differential income appreciation. According to the current laws of our country, the compensation for individual or even collective landless peasants is determined according to the value of land as agricultural land. This means that the compensation paid by the government to farmers for land acquisition only recognizes the output value of land as agricultural land. It is not recognized that the huge differential rent brought by land as non-agricultural land is related to farmers, that is, farmers have no right to share the land value-added achievements brought about by land urbanization. Practice has proved that the current compensation standard for land expropriation is far from enough to compensate the losses of landless farmers, let alone guarantee their sustainable livelihood. Corresponding to the dual structure of urban and rural areas, rural land is transformed into urban construction land through low-cost expropriation, which makes China's urbanization develop rapidly. To a large extent, it is realized through the unequal exchange between the government and farmers. Farmers have paid a high price for the urbanization of China. If the benefits of urbanization in China are mainly enjoyed by urban residents, rural population groups (including migrant workers) can only enjoy the marginal part of the fruits of urbanization, and even the benefits of urbanization development have nothing to do with most rural people. This urbanization model is not worth advocating, and it does not meet the requirements of Scientific Outlook on Development.

The irrationality of rural land property right system in China has attracted the attention of the central government. This is reflected in the central government's decision-making process of forming a new pattern of urban-rural economic and social integration, which puts the distribution of land value-added income in an important position. In 2007, the No.1 Document of the Central Committee clearly pointed out that the increase of land transfer income for rural construction should continue to be higher than that of the previous year. The new income after the increase of taxes and fees for construction land is mainly used for "agriculture, countryside and farmers". In 2008, the central government document 1 also emphasized that the increase of government land transfer income for rural construction was significantly higher than that of the previous year. It should be noted that even the compulsory land acquisition that really belongs to the public interest must follow the principle of "land acquisition is compensated according to the market". Only by giving farmers corresponding compensation according to the collective construction land price formed by the market can we effectively protect the interests of landless farmers. At present, a prominent contradiction in China's land acquisition work is that the compensation funds for land acquisition in the investment budget of national key construction projects are seriously insufficient. In order to ensure the smooth progress of national key construction projects, the central competent department often pays the land acquisition fee to the local government in one lump sum, and pushes the contradiction with farmers to the local government. In the process of promoting industrialization and urbanization, local governments are facing great pressure to develop local economy. They must introduce various projects with preferential land conditions to attract investment. The first condition for its low-cost development is to obtain land from farmers at low prices. For local governments, this can not only accelerate the economic growth in the region, but also greatly increase the fiscal revenue of local governments and maximize their political achievements during their term of office. The compensation price for expropriation of farmers' land by the state is set at a very low level. First, it is to give priority to national interests. Its original intention is that the country will turn farmers' land into state ownership for public interests. The problem is that farmers' land is not expropriated for public welfare, but a considerable part is used to build markets and run factories. Especially for the development of commercial land such as real estate. After the government expropriated farmers' land at the price of tens of thousands of yuan per mu, it transferred the land use right at the price of dozens or even hundreds of times, which infringed on farmers' interests to some extent. According to the official figures of the Ministry of Land and Resources, the national land transfer income was 550.5 billion yuan in 2005, more than 700 billion yuan in 2006 and 9 1000 billion yuan in 2007. Land sales have become an important source of local government revenue. In some cities, half of the fiscal revenue comes from land transfer, which is called "land finance". Theoretically speaking, the process of farmers realizing land property rights is the process of gradually marketizing land elements, and it is also the process of gradually eliminating the urban-rural dual structure associated with it. However, there is still a long way to go to achieve this goal. The reform of rural land property right system in China has entered a crucial stage.