Seeking an essay on Confucianism!

Confucianism is the main body of traditional Chinese culture, and freedom is the basic concept of modern Western culture. The relationship between the Confucian tradition and the concept of freedom was one of the focal points of the debate between political liberalism and cultural conservatism in 20th century China. "During the May Fourth period, liberals emphasized the tension between freedom and Confucianism, stressing that the critique of Confucian ethics was a prerequisite for the construction of the concept of freedom, and thus took a firm attitude of denial toward the Confucian tradition. The cultural conservatives represented by modern Neo-Confucianism, in general, did not reject the spiritual concept of freedom, but their strong defense position in the cultural field made it difficult to make the Confucian tradition compatible with the concept of freedom. However, a noteworthy trend in the second half of the twentieth century was the emergence of a number of figures in both liberalism and cultural conservatism who were committed to seeking a modern connection between the Confucian tradition and the concept of liberty in order to break away from the extremist views that had characterized the period since the May Fourth Movement. Their efforts are of great significance in the history of ideas, but the theoretical construction of the modern connection between Confucianism and the concept of freedom is still very weak from a doctrinal point of view. The question that arises is how to conduct an in-depth theoretical analysis of the relationship between Confucianism and the concept of freedom in order to promote the modern connection between the two? I think that distinguishing the connotation of meaning, the nature of the category and the cultural characteristics of the concept of freedom will be the prerequisite for the discussion of the problem.

Although the connotation of the concept of freedom is complex in the Hispanic context, the division between negative and positive freedom by the famous British thinker, Mutual-Burling, provides an important analytical framework for grasping the concept of freedom. According to Burling, the concepts of negative and positive freedom are related to two different sets of issues: the former concerns the scope of control, and the latter the source of control. It is on the basis of the answers to these two different sets of questions that negative and positive freedom have different conceptual connotations. Negative freedom has the connotation that; the individual possesses the scope to make choices and activities independently from the control of others; freedom itself cannot be free from legal limitations, since there exist values equal to or higher than those of freedom; a minimum of freedom must be preserved, and consequently, limitations on freedom by public **** power cannot themselves be free from limitations. In this sense, the essence of the concept of negative freedom is that there should be a minimum range of individual freedom that is inviolable in any metrical sense, and thus a marginal line should be drawn between the individual's right to freedom and the public * * * authority of society. This is what Yan Fu meant when he said, "the group has already established the boundary of power". The concept of positive freedom is different in that it stems from the individual's desire to be his own master. It means that I want my life and my choices to be determined by me, not by any outside force; I want to be the instrument of my own will, not the will of others; and I want to be the one who takes the initiative, who makes the choices for myself and is responsible for my choices.

The above two concepts of freedom are not only different from each other in meaning, but also belong to different systems of categories. Negative freedom involves the relationship between individual rights and public **** authority, deals with socio-political issues, and belongs to the category of socio-political theory; it basically does not involve the issue of freedom of the will, and does not belong to the category of moral philosophy. Therefore, J. S. Mill, in his book "On Liberty", the first point is that the freedom to be discussed "is not the so-called freedom of the will, ...... but civil liberty or social liberty, that is to say, to explore the nature and limits of the power that society can legitimately exert on the individual. " Positive liberty is concerned with the individual's "search for the moral dignity of life and the meaning of creation by means of free will," and it leads to the conclusion of moral liberty on the basis of the freedom of the will, which leads to the discussion of political and social liberty. Thus, positive freedom is mainly a category of personal ethics and moral philosophy.

In the opinion of the author of this paper, the two concepts of freedom are not only different from each other in terms of meaning and nature of categories, but also have different cultural characteristics. Negative freedom as a socio-political concept, its recognition and protection of the individual's basic rights of freedom, and vigilance and prevention of public **** power infringement of freedom, reflecting the historical requirements of the market economy and civil society in the West since the modern era, with distinctive features of modernity, is a typical Western civilization's value concepts. Positive freedom as a category of moral philosophy is different. In terms of its emphasis on the freedom, autonomy and self-discipline of moral will, it is obvious that it cannot be regarded as a thought resource unique to Western civilization.

Based on the above analysis of the two concepts of freedom, the following will review the relationship between Confucianism and the concept of freedom from two levels.

Two

As early as 1895, Yan Fu, the Enlightenment thinker, when comparing the differences between Chinese and Western cultures in his famous "On the Urgency of World Changes," already pointed out the fact that Confucianism, as a representative of traditional Chinese culture, lacks the resources of freedom of thought: "Freedom of thought is really a word that the Chinese sages and sages of all ages have feared y, and have never set up as a teaching. " Yan Fu, who is well versed in the Western tradition of free thought and has translated Mill's On Liberty, the basic theoretical reference for his thesis is precisely the concept of negative liberty in the sense of the social theory mentioned above. The question is, from this concept, what is the main basis for judging the Confucian tradition as lacking in the resources of negative freedom thought?

From the point of view of the value system, the Confucian tradition emphasizes the order of human relationships, such as the "Book of Rites" (礼记-礼运篇), in which the father's kindness, the son's filial piety, the brother's Liangliang (良良), the brother's brother's brother's tithing (悌), the husband's righteousness, the woman's listening (聽), the elder's favorability (长惠), the younger's obedience (幼顺), the gentleman's benevolence (仁), and the subject's loyalty (忠). " (Mencius - Tengwen Gong Shang) The order of human relationships reinforces ethical norms and moral obligations, not a sense of rights in the political and legal sense. In the shroud of Confucian human order, obligation is the first concept of order, and human rights consciousness is always compressed and dissolved under the concept of obligation. With the compression and dissolution of man's sense of right, there is no way to confirm the scope of freedom, because the scope of freedom is essentially the scope of man's right.

As far as political thinking is concerned, there is no boundary distinction between politics and ethics under the vision of Confucianism, and political life is nothing but an extension of the order of the incomes. "Within the political realm, the king or emperor is naturally the center point of the human order. Therefore, any improvement in politics must begin with the value consciousness of this center point. This is the theoretical basis of the 'inner saint and outer king'. "1 The so-called "grasping the wrongs of the king's heart," "benevolent government with a benevolent heart," and " The so-called "the right of the king's heart", "benevolent government", and "righteousness and sincerity" are only the ethical and moral constraints and norms for the holders of power. This ideological tone of the Confucian tradition has never been able to form a set of systematic use of laws and institutions for political power to restrain, checks and balances. The lack of this concept is another important sign that the Confucian tradition does not have the concept of negative freedom, because one of the basic elements of the concept of negative freedom is to prevent the infringement of the scope of freedom by political power through the constraints of law and institutions.

In terms of social function, since the Han Dynasty, when Dong Zhongshu put forward the idea of "dismissing the hundred schools and honoring only the Confucians," the social function of Confucianism has gradually been located in the theoretical justification of political legitimacy in traditional China. Dong opened the prelude to the argumentation of legitimacy by saying that "the three principles of the Way of the King can be sought in the dry sky" (Chunqiu Fanlu - Keiyi), and Confucianism thus began the historical process of scripturalization. The evolution of the form of Confucianism from the present-day Confucianism, ancient Confucianism to the Song School did not change the socio-political function of Confucianism. Historical experience has shown that Confucianism, which assumed the legitimacy argument, supported an authoritarian system of government centered on imperial power. Thus, at the level of socio-political function, Confucianism was in high tension and sharp conflict with the spiritual concept of negative freedom, because the concept of freedom in the socio-political sense was exactly the antithesis of the authoritarian regime. This is the basic reason why the Confucian tradition was rejected and criticized by political liberals during the May Fourth period.

It should be noted that the above analysis is not primarily a value judgment, but a description of the historical fact that the Confucian tradition lacked the resources of negative freedom thought. The purpose of stating this historical fact is to show that the ancient Confucian tradition is, after all, far away from the socio-political concepts of modernity. Therefore, it is neither possible to directly prescribe the concept of negative liberty from within the Confucian tradition in a one-way direction, nor can there be a simple two-way interface between the two. The modern connection between Confucianism and the concept of negative freedom must come out of the misunderstanding of ideological and theoretical deduction and be constructed in the cultivation of social soil conditions. This means that the modern connection between Confucianism and the concept of negative liberty needs to construct the corresponding social premise, and the spirit of the concept of negative liberty is realized in the operation of the system, and its foundation is rooted in the market economy are the two fundamental aspects. This is because negative freedom is not only a set of conceptual system, but more importantly, an institutional framework to safeguard the basic rights of human beings, and a check and balance mechanism to prevent the infringement of freedom by public **** power. At the same time, negative liberty, whether as an ideological concept or an institutional structure, is itself a product of the market economy; in other words, the market economy is the fundamental supportive condition for the concepts and institutions of negative liberty. Under non-market economic conditions, since the State, as the public **** power, is the main monopolizer of social resources and the sole provider of various services and employment opportunities, it "possesses unlimited coercive power", and there is no way to talk about negative freedom at all. Only with the construction and cultivation of the corresponding social soil conditions of institutional structure and market mechanism can the concept of negative freedom gain a solid foundation for Confucianism's dialog and communication with this modern concept.

The connection can find a realistic support. From this point of view, the modern connection between Confucianism and the concept of negative freedom is not something that can be solved by the theoretical deduction of the conceptual layer of two points and one line, but is itself a social evolutionary process of gradual adjustment between the three points (the market economy and the corresponding socio-political mechanism, the concept of negative freedom, and Confucianism).

The Confucian tradition, though lacking in negative freedom concepts in the sense of socio-political theories, is extremely rich in positive freedom resources in the sense of moral philosophy. This ideological resource is centered on the expression of the proposition "to be kind to oneself", which in essence is the confirmation and realization of the freedom of individual moral will. "The discovery of the freedom of the moral will, and the realization of its importance, has been in China since Confucius. This is indeed an extremely significant discovery in Chinese history. After this discovery, only after this discovery can one speak of one's true self, human dignity and being one's own master, which are important human principles." ⑤

From the history of the Confucian tradition, the confirmation and strengthening of the autonomy and freedom of choice of the individual moral will has been a main thread running through the development of its thought. Confucius has repeatedly emphasized that "to be benevolent is by oneself" (《论语-Yan Yuan》), "I want to be benevolent, but I am benevolent to the end" (《论语-Shu而》), and "to be benevolent is not to let one's teacher be" (《论语-Wei Linggong》). ). Mencius expanded the self-seeking of benevolence into the active choice of righteousness: "Life is also what I desire; righteousness is also what I desire. I can't have both, but I will give up my life for righteousness." (Meng Zi - Zu Zi Shang Zi) (Meng Zi - Su Zi Shang) Song Dynasty scholars further recognized benevolence as the "Divine Principle", elevated it to the height of ontology, and emphasized the conscious experience and practice of the Divine Principle, i.e., benevolence, as well as the self-abandonment and suppression of selfishness: "Benevolence is the complete virtue of the heart. ...... heart of the whole virtue, nothing is not the reason of heaven, but also can not not be bad in the human desire; therefore, for the benevolent, must win the selfish desire and return to the ritual, then all things are the reason of heaven, and the virtue of the heart, back to full in me carry on." (Zhu Xi: "Four Books Annotated - Analects Volume Yan Yuan") From the pre-Qin Dynasty to the Song Dynasty, exalting the subject's moral self-discipline and establishing the solemn greatness of human ethical subjectivity constitute valuable spiritual resources in the Confucian tradition.

Confucianism highlights the subject's moral autonomy and moral self-discipline not only in the moral and ethical level to demonstrate the universal positive significance, but also in the socio-political level to play a special normative function. If the universal significance of the former points to every individual, advocating that everyone be Yao and Shun, and become a gentleman and a moral person; the special function of the latter is mainly directed at the rulers, requiring them to perfect themselves morally, exercise moral self-discipline, and become saints. Thus, on the one hand, only those who have become saints and virtues can be kings, and the way of cultivating and ruling the world constitutes the normative model for those who acquire and hold power. On the other hand, "the way of governance must be based on the rectification of the heart and the cultivation of the body" (Zhu Zi Yu Zi, Volume 108, p. 3), so that the ruler should be strictly disciplined, and should be righteous and correct himself. Only when one is correct in oneself can one be correct in others. "If one's body is upright, one does not follow orders; if one's body is not upright, one does not follow orders." ("Analects - Zilu") rulers should always reflect on themselves, review themselves: "not to do the opposite to seek their own", so that "his body is correct and the world to the" ("Mengzi - Li Lou on"). Obviously, the high emphasis on the moral self-discipline of those who hold power "is as high as the Confucian philosophy of political ethics can reach." (3) From this perspective, the rich intellectual resources of positive freedom in the sense of moral philosophy in the Confucian tradition do have a positive function and significance in the political realm, for moral self-discipline has always been an indispensable and important aspect in restraining the holders of power.

However, as mentioned above, the Confucian tradition has always blurred the boundary between ethics and politics and moralized political ethics, which has led to the double consequences of the use of its moral resources of positive freedom in the political sphere: on the one hand, the inner moral self-discipline embodied in positive freedom will be weakened in its functioning in the political sphere in the absence of the external institutional checks and balances of power as a moral constraint on power. On the one hand, in the absence of external institutional checks and balances on power, as a moral constraint on power, its functioning in the political sphere will be softened and ultimately nullified. This is because the historical experience of traditional Chinese politics shows that it is in fact completely useless to talk about correcting one's mind and cultivating one's body and moral self-discipline to tyrants and corrupt officials. On the other hand, moral autonomy, which is the embodiment of positive freedom, means in the Confucian discourse system that one has to be selfless, to be benevolent, to be virtuous, i.e., to be a saint. But the problem is that a saint not only establishes himself but also establishes others, and not only becomes himself but also becomes things. To establish oneself and to become a person is to cultivate one's mind and cultivate one's character, while to establish a person and to become a thing is to serve heaven and help the people, and to educate them. From establishing oneself to establishing others, and from establishing oneself to establishing things, is the process of transformation from an inner sage to an outer king. This transformation gives the holy king the function of moral mastery and moral education in social life, that is, what the Song Confucians called "enlightening the living beings and removing the dusk of the living beings". Under the moral mastery of the Holy King, the individual is completely deprived of the freedom to make any moral choices, and is obliged only to obey completely, "to survive the reason of heaven and to extinguish the desires of men". In order to ensure the individual's obedience and the absolute domination and rule of the holy king, criminal law and education and culture became the two indispensable means of rule for the holy king: "The holy king ruled by fixing punishments and penalties in order to unite the people, and by teaching and educating in order to improve the customs." (Erchengji - Henan Cheng's遣书, Volume 2) The former is to kill people by punishment, hard control, the latter is to kill people by reason, soft constraints. In this way, the transformation from sage to sage-king is actually a process of alienation of the sage's moral autonomy into the dual despotism of morality (indoctrination) and politics (punishment): the positive freedom at the moral level finally goes to the opposite of freedom in the socio-political sphere.

It can be seen that the ideological resources of positive freedom in Confucianism are like a double-edged sword: at the ethical and moral level, it exalts the freedom of will of the subject of morality, strengthens the subject's moral self-discipline and moral perfection, and has the normative function of political ethics; however, at the socio-political level, it is finally oriented to the tyranny of morality and politics, and goes to the opposite side of freedom. In the author's view, the key to resolving this double-edgedness lies in the stem, setting the marginal boundaries of the ethics and morality of positive freedom, i.e., locating the meaning function of positive freedom in the individual and in the field of ethics and morality. In this way, on the one hand, the freedom of individual moral choice can be ensured, and thus the political-ethical function of moral self-discipline can also be facilitated. Under these conditions, the ethical and moral resources of positive freedom in the Confucian tradition, such as self-restraint, self-discipline, uprightness of mind and cultivation of body, and moral integrity, will play a positive role in modern life, including the shaping of political personality. On the other hand, it is to avoid the confusion of the issue of choice of personal moral will with the socio-political issue, so as to win an independent space for the construction of the concept of negative freedom. Because the above conceptual analysis shows that negative freedom belongs to the socio-political category, which is directed to the socio-political field and involves the safeguard of the political and legal system of the individual's basic rights of freedom, and has nothing to do with the freedom of the individual's will and moral choice referred to in positive freedom. To paraphrase Confucianism, negative freedom is the scope of "ruling others", while positive freedom is the domain of "cultivating oneself". Mixing "self-cultivation" with "governance" will not only weaken and jeopardize the ethical and moral significance of "self-cultivation," but more importantly, it will also impede the development of "governance" (political and legal). More importantly, it will hinder the institutional design of the "rule of man" (political and legal). In short, only through the demarcation of boundaries (ethical and moral versus political and legal), and the positioning of functions (individual and social), the ethical and moral resources of positive freedom in the Confucian tradition can gain modern significance, and the construction of the above concept of negative freedom can win the space for independent development.

Based on the above analysis, the conclusion of this paper is that, at the socio-political level, the society of the Confucian tradition has to introduce the concept of negative liberty, and to realize the spirit of this concept in the operation of the system, and to make its foundation rooted in the market economy. Under this condition, the modern connection between Confucianism and the concept of negative freedom can be supported in reality; at the ethical and moral level, the culture of Confucianism needs to internalize the resources of the idea of positive freedom, locate it in the individual, set the ethical and moral boundaries for it, and play the meaningful function of its political ethics. These are two indispensable aspects of the modern connection between Confucianism and the concept of freedom, and the organic combination of the two will lead to the mutual support and two-way complementarity between negative freedom and positive freedom, politics and ethics, modernity and (Confucian) tradition.

Note:

[1] John Mill, On Liberty, translated by Cheng Chonghua, Commercial Press, 1982 edition, p. 1.

[2] Lin Yusheng: The Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition, Sanlian Bookstore, 1988 edition, page 73.

[3]]Yan Fu ji, vol. 1, edited by Wang Zuai, Zhonghua shuju bureau, 1986 edition, p. 3.

[4]]Yu Yingshi, The Modern Interpretation of Chinese Thought Tradition, Jiangsu Immigration Publishing House, 1995 edition, p. 33.

⑤ Wei Zhengtong: "Genus Family and Modern China", Shanghai People's Publishing House 1990 edition, p. 83

[6] Li Jinquan: "Chinese Confucianism and Retreating Streams on the Thought Characteristics of Interpersonal Relationships" Philosophical Research, 1987, No. 9.