The Limitations of the Ancient Chinese Supervisory System

The ancient Chinese inspection system lasted for more than 2,000 years, and it did play a certain role in the political operation of the ancient state in monitoring and restraining the power of the state, the power of the government, and the power of the bureaucrats. However, we should also recognize that the role of the ancient Chinese inspection system is limited and has its obvious historical limitations. It can be said that the main features of the ancient Chinese inspection system have always formed a dichotomy with its historical limitations. The historical limitation of a single vertical line is the nature of the inspection system; the historical limitation of a high position of power is the structure of the ancient national political system; and the historical limitation of the legalization of the inspection activities is the traditional rule of man. In ancient China, the supervision officials were commonly known as the "imperial secretaries", and the word "imperial" in this imperial secretaries represents the meaning of personal ownership and possession by the emperor (monarch), who was the supreme ruler of the ancient state. This is also true in history. As early as in the Warring States period, the post of imperial historian appeared, and its duties were mainly in charge of the affairs of the king's side, and then gradually evolved into a supervisory official. Zhou Li - Chun Guan ": the Warring States period, the Royal Historian totaled 172 people, its initial position for the book in charge of the decree, with the king around the secretary and secretary of the official. Later on, the king often learned about the situation of various aspects and places in the country through the royal historians, and later on, the king relied on the royal historians to supervise the central and local officials. In this way, the royal historian gradually became the eyes and ears of the king. The origin of the royal historian in ancient times determines the nature of the ancient monitoring system, which was the eyes and ears of the emperor (the monarch) and his tools.

In addition, the traditional Chinese political system has established a centralized authoritarian state since the Qin Dynasty. In such an empire, the emperor relied mainly on bureaucrats to rule and govern the state. However, in the eyes of the emperor, bureaucrats were merely a tool of rule. The aristocracy was unreliable, and so were the bureaucrats. Levinson, a famous American historian and sinologist, argues in his book Confucian China and Its Modern Destiny that there are two kinds of changes in China's historical changes, one is the change within the traditional Chinese society, and the other is the change between the tradition and the modern times. Traditional Chinese society was not a pool of stagnant water; it was full of tensions and conflicts, such as those between the monarch and the bureaucracy. (Note: Levinson, Confucian China and Its Modern Destiny, China Social Science Press, "Preface to the Translation", p. 8). According to Levinson: What the monarch needed were private bureaucratic agents, and the bureaucrat, which had been an instrument of anti-feudalism for the monarchs of the Qin-Han and later Tang dynasties, was now in direct opposition to royal power. Having helped to remove all rivals to royal power, the bureaucrats themselves became the only force that could stand against it. The Chinese emperor could neither deprive the bureaucrats of their formidable bonding, prestige, and behavioral functions at the outset, nor could he attract them later with an appreciation that went beyond the bureaucrats by conferring on them the title of true nobility. It is clear that successive Chinese emperors developed and utilized the system of surveillance to the fullest extent in their tensions and conflicts with bureaucrats. In explaining the nature of this inspection system, Guan Zi - Jiu Shou (管子-九守) argues that the monarch's purpose in establishing a full-time inspection is: "First, to grow the eyes, second, to fly the ears , and third, to tree the brightness." "Xunzi - the way of the king" also believes that the monarch set up to monitor the intention of the royal historian is: "outside the wall, the eye does not see also; before the mile, the ear does not hear also; and the master of the people to keep the division, far from the world, close to the territory, can not not be a little know also." Yuan Ye Yeqi "grass and trees" book, the Yuan Shizu Kublai had a saying: the administration of the province is my left hand, the military Privy Council is my right hand, the supervision of the Royal Historian is I used to heal these two hands. This is a very vivid description of the nature of the ancient Chinese supervisory system.

Since the monitoring system in ancient China was the eyes and ears of the emperor, the tool of imperial power, but also a system of constraints on bureaucrats, such a monitoring system will inevitably lead to a direct historical limitations: who will monitor the emperor? Although the ancient Chinese inspection system was unilinear and vertical and independent, the source of its power was in the emperor, and its independence was relative to the bureaucratic system, never independent of the emperor. For example, the impeachment system, which was popular in ancient China's inspection system, was only excepted by the emperor, the supreme ruler, which is in marked contrast to contemporary rule of law countries. One of the direct consequences of this historical limitation is that the emperor, who resided above the supervision system, could only rely on his personal reason and ability to restrain himself. However, human reason and ability are limited, so is the emperor. As a result, there was no guarantee that the emperor himself would not make mistakes, nor could he consistently maintain the normal operation of the inspection system. Moreover, from the perspective of comparing inspection systems, such a historical limitation creates the fact that the inspection system in ancient China was designed to strengthen imperial power rather than to represent the will of the citizens, to protect and assert the rights of the citizens, and moreover, to constrain and supervise the institutional mechanism of monarchical power. Take the process of the emergence and development of the English Parliament and the establishment of the parliamentary system from the late 12th century to the 15th century as an example, the first and foremost function of the English Parliament was to try and supervise the king and the royal family in accordance with the law, and this was the case with the trial of the younger brother of Richard I, the legal heir to the throne, by the Great Council in February, 1194. (Note: The History of the Political System of England by Cheng Han-Da, China Social Science Publishing House, p. 76.) The Magna Carta, signed and adopted by the king on June 15, 1215, proclaimed the principle that the king should be subject to supervision and that the nation had the right to lawfully rebel against the government (Note: Cheng Handa, A History of the Political System of England, China Social Science Press, p. 80). In the 14th century, the English Parliament gained the right to criticize and supervise the king's political power, and even had the right to depose the king, such as deposing Edward II on January 20, 1327, and deposing Richard II in August 1399 (Note: Cheng Handa, A History of the Political System of England, China Social Science Press, p. 108) . In comparison, the historical limitations of the ancient Chinese supervisory system were such that it never arose or appeared, and could never have arisen or appeared at all, to supervise and depose the emperor as a function of the system. Mr. Li Shenzhi, in his recent article, "Chinese Cultural Tradition and Modernization" (Note: Strategy and Management, 2000, No. 4.) argues, "According to my observations and research in recent years, China's cultural tradition can be summarized in one word: 'authoritarianism'." According to Mr. Xu Fuguan, the state system of ancient China was "the authoritarian and centralized system of government of the emperor alone". According to Mr. Jin Yaoji, China has practiced monarchy for two thousand years (Note: Jin Yaoji, From Tradition to Modernity, People's University of China Press, p. 19). . The reason for the strength and development of the ancient Chinese inspection system was determined by the structural features of the ancient Chinese state political system. It was characterized from the Qin and Han dynasties onwards by the "family world" of the emperor system, centralization of power and bureaucracy, a monolithic centralized structure, and the supremacy of imperial rule at the highest level of power. Therefore, in order to consolidate and strengthen the imperial power, the emperor had to rely on the bureaucratic group to rule and govern on the one hand, and on the other hand, he had to strengthen the supervision system to carry out all-around close supervision on the bureaucratic group. At the same time, because the ancient Chinese bureaucrats, unlike the modern administrative officials, had a strict division of labor, and were a group that encompassed political, administrative, legislative, judicial and other privileges, in order to effectively supervise such a privileged group, it became necessary to strengthen the ancient system of supervision by the imperial historians, so that the power of supervision could be independent of, and higher than, the power of the bureaucrats. However, the unipolar, monolithic and centralized political system has produced a supreme imperial power (monarchical power), and thus it is impossible to form a multi-powered supervisory structure based on the separation of supreme powers, both vertically and horizontally, and even bi-directionally. In this way, the checks and balances of power, the rule of law, and even the supremacy of law could not be achieved, and mutual restraints of power and democratic supervision could not emerge from them. Therefore, the structure of the traditional Chinese national political system is both the main reason for the strength and development of the ancient supervisory system and another trap that led to the historical limitations of the ancient supervisory system. This characteristic of the traditional state political system led to the supremacy of imperial power and the unchecked supreme power of the state. Thus, the government that aided the emperor in governing the country also had corresponding unlimited power. Such a power structure, which manifests itself in vertical constraints and supervision, is often weak and sometimes even ineffective vertically due to the lack of horizontal power checks and balances, constraints and supervision at every level. In ancient China, the prevalence of "deception", "officials protect each other", local protectionism are a reflection of this power structure.

Huang Minlan, in an article discussing the relationship between political power and official corruption in ancient times, argues that in ancient Chinese society, there was only one social group with political power, and that was the bureaucratic group. Bureaucratic groups relied on strong power and mastered all important sectors of society, and no other political power could restrain them institutionally, and in fact no other political groups existed at all. Therefore, if individual members of a bureaucratic group are corrupt, they can be dealt with from within the group. If corruption is widespread throughout the group, there is no external force in society to control it. So although the bureaucrats were perfectly capable of setting their own legal standards for lawful and unlawful behavior, and were almost always able to enforce the law and punish corruption at the beginning of many dynasties, the legal system then became more and more lax, and then was finally abandoned. He believes that the root cause of this consequence is that the power structure of ancient China produced the inevitability of corruption, and summarizes it in three aspects: first, the influence of the imperial authoritarian system on corruption; second, the influence of the authoritarian ministers on corruption; and, third, the universal authoritarianism resulting in universal corruption. (Note: Beijing Social Science, No. 2, 1995.) As a result, within such a power structure resulting from the structure of the national political system, supervision can be said to be unable to supervise and inspect, and in the face of corruption caused by the defects of the institutional power structure, supervision is ultimately helpless!

Then from the aspect of the comparative political system, the political system of medieval England, as early as around the 10th century AD, has gradually formed a more reasonable power structure. In short, during this period, the English created a form of dual separation of powers political structure that laid the foundation of the English tradition of limited monarchy (parliamentary constitutional monarchy). On the one hand, there was the vertical separation of powers between the central government and the semi-autonomous local governments (limited unitary system), and on the other hand, there was the horizontal separation of powers within the various levels of governmental organizations, i.e., between the king and the Council of Wise Men, the Sheriffs and the Council of Shire Districts, and the Hundred Commissioners and the Hundred Commissioners of Districts, which thus constituted a criss-crossing mechanism for restraining the dual powers: the power structure created by this feature of the political system was helpful in preventing the over-centralization and individualization, and is conducive to curbing the unlimited pangs of royal power (monarchical power). Therefore, during the transition period from the Middle Ages to modern times, when absolute monarchies were generally established in various European countries, the British royal power, though strengthened, never reached the level of absolute monarchy, and still maintained the political power structure of limited monarchy. (Note: A History of the British Political System, p. 34.) Moreover, in the modernization process of countries such as Europe and America, as Huntington said: modernization breeds corruption. In the history of modernization in countries such as the United States, Britain, Germany and France, with the increase in governmental power and the expansion of the tendency of bureaucratic autonomy, there had also been a great deal of corruption. However, due to the evolution of the power check and balance structure of the traditional European political system, state power, government power, and bureaucratic power in modernization such as in Europe and the United States have all been constrained. Therefore, the kind of systemic corruption that existed in ancient Chinese countries did not exist in the modernization process in Europe and the United States. In ancient China, the imperial inspectors paid more attention to the legalization of inspection activities in the inspection process, however, this "legalization" does not mean the rule of law. In ancient China, since the Qin and Han dynasties, the "six articles of inspection" practiced by the imperial inspectors were actually the ancient law of governance, which belonged to the same legal system as the ancient "official system" and "official law", which was different from the modern administrative system. system, which cannot be equated with the modern administrative law. It cannot be equated with the modern administrative law, nor can it be compared with the modern law. This is mainly because the traditional Chinese state has always advocated the rule of man politics, the rule of man politics is not the general understanding of the people do not talk about the rule of law, do not formulate laws, but refers to the law is only a tool in the hands of the monarch.

The traditional Chinese politics of the rule of man leads to the operation of the power of the rule of man, and the operation of the power of the rule of man of the institutional framework, is the so-called "pyramid". There is only one subject of supreme power and only one owner of supreme power. And in the system, legally, the power of this one and this one person is not subject to constraints, not subject to legal control. Guanzi - Congfa said: "The one who creates the law is the ruler; the one who abides by the law is the minister; the one who rules by the law is the people." This is a typical argument for the rule of man, in which the monarch is the source of the law, and the officials must fulfill the laws enacted by the monarch, i.e., "the law of the ruler", while the general public becomes the object of punishment by the law. In such a model of a political system in which power is ruled by man, tensions between power and law inevitably arise. Laws and systems give power to operate under the rule of man, and in turn, the operation of power under the rule of man creates the "incompleteness", "insufficiency", and "limitedness" of the apparently developed legal system. "The main elements of the political system are the system, the system, and the system. The main elements of the political system are the system, the law and its power, of which the system and the law constitute the way power operates. It can be safely assumed that after China entered centralized power, within the political system of monarchical absolutism, the mode of operation of power was the rule of man. When the highest power is not controlled and is not subject to constraints, the system and the law are in the state of being controlled by the power, which is exactly the opposite of the situation in the political system of the modern state, where the system and the law are in the position of controlling and constraining the power. In ancient China, such a top-level system, law and power relations, the formation of a top-down, unipolar or unidirectional power and system, the relationship between the law, power in the three elements is active, arbitrary, and the system and the law is passive. The origin and change of system and law in history can be regarded as mainly a result of repeated personal interactions and multiple games. In the state, society, the market, the collective need for a **** the same framework and rules, an all agree on the justice of the operating system. Therefore, the system and the law is also the state, society, the market and the collective code of conduct, should be above the power, should have the initiative, should control the arbitrariness of power. Although power has a public ****, power does not always reflect public ****. Power is often held in certain classes, certain groups, certain individuals, therefore, the power relatively has a personal tendency, if the power to expand to the unrestricted, can not be controlled, not subject to constraints, then the power will become very dangerous. Therefore, power should be under the system and law, and power should be relatively passive and controlled. Unfortunately, the traditional Chinese politics of rule of man has resulted in unlimited power and doing whatever one wants. This is the total root cause of the paradoxical phenomenon that on the one hand, the political system and the legal system are very developed, but on the other hand, corruption is prevalent in China's history, and Mr. Wang Yannan even believes that a 24th history is a history of corruption.

Why is this? Why this strange historical phenomenon? Mr. Mou Zongsan argues in his Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy that the result of the Legalist theory of respecting the emperor makes the position of the head of state unlimited, and from unlimited to unlimited. The emperors of later times are all unlimited bodies, which is absolutization rather than full objectification. There is no objectivity in any being in the political organization of mankind if that being has no limitations according to the political law. What makes objectivity objective is that it is limited by a political law if it is obeyed. As a result, the political objectivity of the scholar or bureaucrat is not fully objectified, even though he or she has an objective status. The key lies in the fact that the emperor is an unlimited body, not subject to any law, so the objective status and political objectivity of the scholar and the bureaucrat cannot be guaranteed. Mr. Mou Zongsan's "objectification" here refers to the limitation of power by the rules of system and law. The emperor is an unlimited body, because the highest power above the system, the law, which will inevitably affect the "objectivity" from the top to the bottom, so that the original system, the law provides for the objectivity of the cab or bureaucrats, but also become inadequate, so that the original full, developed, rich system, the law provides for the bureaucrats, the powers, duties, obligations, etc., become the most important thing. Powers, duties, obligations, etc., become sometimes bright and sometimes dark, or have or have not, there is no law, there are not followed, the will of the chief, power over the law, etc. has become a common phenomenon of political activities.

Kong Feili, a famous American sinologist, argues that the traditional Chinese bureaucratic monarchy was characterized by a long-term interaction between conventional and non-conventional powers, and that the emperor was always impatient with the rules and regulations that governed his role. He responded by tightening the screws on the day-to-day functioning of the bureaucratic machine on the one hand, and injecting his own unconventional power into the operation of this machine on the other, thus strengthening the control of the monarch's unconventional power over the conventional power of the bureaucrats. (Note: (U.S.) Kong Lifei's Calling the Soul, Shanghai Sanlian Publishing House, p. 251.) As a result, the unconventional power of the monarch must force the conventional power of the bureaucrats to be suppressed and undermined, and must also force the legalization of surveillance activities to become extremely unstable, and this instability is reflected in the following aspects: first, surveillance depends on the emperor's own saintliness and mediocrity. That is to say, among the emperors of all Chinese dynasties, there were bright emperors, dim emperors, and even tyrants. Therefore, for monitoring officials or admonition officers, emperors of different qualities would have different attitudes. For example: the emperor Tang Taizong has to accept the advice and listen to the amount of elegance, so that Wei Zheng became famous; arbitrary emperor like flattery, face flattery, do not like the words of advice, Emperor Yang of Sui, that is, the death penalty to deal with the advice of the officials; Tang Xianzong is because of the Han Guai against the welcome to the Buddha's bones, in a fit of anger, will be devolved to the Chaozhou; Hai Rui in the Ming Shizong when the admonition that the local government, "the officials are greedy, officials across the" and was sent to death! Hai Rui was sent to death row when Emperor Ming Shizong remonstrated with the local government that "the officials were greedy and the officials were arrogant". Secondly, when the emperor himself was in trouble, the supervision was also in trouble. In the ancient Chinese political system, supervision was originally a tool of the emperor, so when the emperor's rule was weakened, it was only natural that the supervisors would meet with disaster. For example, Li Ying, a famous bureaucrat in the Han Dynasty, fiercely attacked the eunuchs' arrogation of power when he was a lieutenant of the Secret Service. As a result, most of the bureaucrats who followed Li Ying were killed in the two scourges of party confinement. During the reign of Emperor Xuanzong of the Tang Dynasty, Li Linfu and Yang Guozhong were heavily utilized by Emperor Xuanzong, but the path of admonition was blocked by these powerful ministers. Li Linfu threatened, "Now that the Lord of the Ming Dynasty is on the throne, the ministers will be too obedient to do anything, so I don't want to say anything more!" During the reign of Emperor Xizong of the Tang Dynasty, a counselor was killed for saying that the emperor was "devoted to games". The Ming dynasty Tianshun years Cao Jixiang, Shi Heng, etc., lawlessness, the three imperial censor jointly impeached, the results of all were dismissed from office and banished. Third, the supervision of the royal historian by the emperor's authority to do whatever he wants: the most typical such as the Han dynasty, Du Zhou, this person is extremely proficient in the doorway of the Chinese people's politics, well aware of the supreme ruler of the emperor's will is the source of the national law. Therefore, in the case of all the above ideas prevail, people criticized him: "not follow the three feet of the law, dedicated to people's ideas point to the prison!" Du Zhou said: "three feet an out of it? The former lord is written for the law, the latter is the sparse for the order, at that time for the yes, what ancient law!" When Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty first succeeded to the throne, he needed to get rid of the old ministers, Du Zhou understood the situation, and opened up the killing power, arresting innocent people indiscriminately, catching hundreds of high-ranking officials above 2,000 stone in Chang'an every year, which affected 60,000 to 70,000 people, and thus was reused by Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty, and appointed as one of the Three Ministers of the Imperial Historian! When Wu Zetian (武则天) was in power, there was a royal historian who started his career as an informer and could not read a word. Wu Zetian asked, "How can you be a civil official if you can't read or write?" The man replied, "The Xiezhi beast can't read either, but can't it also recognize loyalty and treachery?" In the ancient Chinese autocracy, the emperor was a huge source of power, at the top of the power pyramid, and could supervise any departments and officials. In addition to the emperor, all court officials were supervised by their "higher authorities," so ancient China developed a system of supervision by the imperial historians that was rare in the world. During the Qin and Han Dynasties, the status of the Imperial Historian was still subordinate. Although the Imperial Historian, together with the prime minister and the lieutenant, was called the "Three Dukes", his actual authority was to "take charge of the supervision and assist the prime minister in supervising all political facilities. It is the vice prime minister, according to the Han Dynasty custom, must be the imperial historian, only to be promoted to prime minister." Later on, the imperial historian organization gradually became independent, and the supervisory power was slowly separated from that of the prime minister. The central development of the Imperial Academy, the Academy, and the factory guards and other special agencies, the local inspection of the imperial censor, the governor, according to the Secretary, etc., a huge imperial inspection system can be established. At this point, in addition to the emperor, from the central to local officials have their corresponding "superior" inspectors.

Secondly, this kind of supervision was a kind of complete supervision, that is, the higher power supervised the lower power in all aspects, and even completely replaced the operation of the lower power under certain circumstances. There is no clear division of functions between the supervisor and the supervisee, only the size of the scope of the exercise of power. The authority of both is of the same nature, and is a kind of undifferentiated full power, but there is only a difference between the upper and lower levels. Therefore, when supervising, the higher power can act on behalf of the lower power. China's thousands of years of ancient history, the state power has never existed a clear division of functions, legislative power and judicial power has never been independent, the state power to show obvious holistic and administrative. The means of realizing the supervision of power is not through the division of functions, but through the vertical distribution of power, adopting the way of "the above controls the below", whereby the superior power is at first only partially supervised and corrected, and then gradually replaces the original power in its entirety, forming a new level of power and institutions. This feature is clearly reflected in the formation of local administrative regions and the evolution of central government institutions. "Above and below, comprehensive supervision" can be described as the essence of the vertical power supervision model.

Thirdly, under this kind of power supervision mechanism, the vertical and longitudinal layers of power show an increasing trend. Because there is no division of power, can not realize the function of mutual checks and balances, but the power can not be over-concentration, so only in the vertical establishment of many different levels of authority, so that each level of power level by level to narrow, to achieve the purpose of the above the imperial subordinates. The lower level of power needs the higher level of power to supervise, the latter in turn needs a higher level of supervision, so that the upward push level is constantly increasing. The many and complex administrative levels in ancient China are directly related to this mode of power supervision. In Chinese history, the only real administrative divisions were the counties in the Qin Dynasty, and since then the so-called administrative districts have evolved from the imperial inspection districts. This evolutionary process has been described in detail in the first part of this article, and can be visualized in the following diagram:

From the above diagram, it is clear that the formation of each new level of administrative districts was mediated by the corresponding central inspectors, and that the new districts were directly or indirectly derived from the original supervisory districts. The central authority was transformed from the inspection power to the administrative power, and produced new inspection power, and then transformed into a new administrative power, and so on and so forth. It is conceivable that if the Xinhai Revolution had not interrupted this cycle, there would have been new magistrates formed after the governor-general. In fact, in the Qing Dynasty, there were already new supervisors above the governor-general, that is, the ministers of Qinzhi, ministers of strategy, and ministers of counselor, which were often sent by the Qing court. Even after the Xinhai Revolution, there were still traces of this cycle, and were not the governors of the provinces also representatives of the central government sent to rule at the local level? In the history of New China, at the beginning of the founding of the country, there were six administrative regions, namely, Northeast China, North China, Northwest China, East China, South China, and Southwest China, with regional people's governments or military commissions. At that time, the Region was the highest level of local administrative division in China, with provinces, cities and administrative districts under its jurisdiction." It can be seen that the influence of this tradition cannot be eliminated overnight.

There is another distinctive feature of the ancient Chinese power supervision system, namely the recusal system. The principle of recusal can be said to be a major feature of China's traditional system of government, the Tang, Song, Ming and Qing dynasties more and more perfect, especially in the Ming and Qing dynasties for the full. "The Ming and Qing dynasties practiced avoidance system, the system, in addition to the Tusi area and the provisions must be in power by the Confucian family name of Qufu County, the rest of all the county officials must be served by the people from other provinces, (the province outside the county also can not be, and even across the province for the official, the distance from the place of origin in 500 miles in the list of prohibited, there are not only avoid the origin of the dynasty, but also avoid the place of residence, the place where the residence stops, (the location of one's own family and wife's property) and the term of office was very short." The system of shunning cut off the way of combining local officials and local power, and facilitated the control of local power by the central government. Under such a system, the court's governmental orders could be implemented to the end, and the network of intertwined relationships at the local level could be weakened to a minimum.

The advantage of the vertical power supervision model is that it has a high degree of authority and efficiency. Under the centralized model, the exercise of power is unimpeded, and the one-way "administrative efficiency" is very high. However, this mode of power supervision has a fatal weakness, that is, it is necessary to constantly set up a higher level of supervisors to supervise the "supervisors", which, on the other hand, reduces the efficiency of the operation of the whole power system. Worse still, because of the one-way supervision, the lower power cannot supervise the higher power, so in order to prevent the alienation of the higher power, it is necessary to set up a higher power to supervise it. Such an upward extension leads to an ever-increasing hierarchy of supervision. Ultimately, we must establish a "ultimate power" with the highest authority, without any supervision, otherwise the power supervision will be endless cycle, forming a "bottomless pit". However, how to ensure the legitimacy of the "ultimate power" and prevent the alienation of the ultimate power is the vertical power supervision model can not solve the problem.

In the vertical supervision mode, officials at all levels are only from the top, deception, bribery and bribery and other official corruption are institutional shortcomings, "supervision of the supervisor" problem is always difficult to solve. Some specific systems are also mostly a mixture of advantages and disadvantages. For example, the recusal system, we know that the recusal system in Western countries is mainly applicable to the judicial field, other government departments require the qualification of residents of the region to become the region's government officials, and its election law generally stipulates that the candidates must have the corresponding "place of origin" and the number of years of residency, so as to facilitate the voters to better understand the candidates, and to monitor the elected officials. The election laws generally require candidates to have a corresponding "place of origin" and length of residence, so that voters can better understand the candidates and monitor the elected officials. The "technical" advantages of the ancient Chinese recusal system are obvious, but it does not serve a legitimate purpose. The root cause of the recusal system was that local officials were not locally elected, but were "representatives" of the central government to the local government, and in order to prevent and minimize the possibility of "representatives of the central government" combining with local forces to fight against the central government, the recusal system had to be implemented. In the system of recusal, the system of the flow of officials, local officials are often only responsible for the superiors and disregard for the people's feelings, more likely to breed "short-term behavior", scavenging behavior.