What is the opposition's view on the Reform Movement of 1898?

The failure of the Reform Movement of 1898 was, of course, related to the bourgeois reformers' adoption of improved methods, pinning their hopes on the emperor, Yuan Shikai and foreign invaders who had no real power and being divorced from the people. But if we analyze it carefully from the viewpoints of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, it is by no means as simple as described in books. From inside China, there are several reasons for its failure.

First, objectively, the contrast between the old and new forces is obviously unfavorable to the reformists.

The fundamental purpose of the reform is to replace the feudal autocratic political system and the self-sufficient natural economy with capitalist political, economic, social, cultural and educational systems, which will naturally be opposed by conservative forces. The success of political reform depends largely on the strength comparison between reformist forces and conservative forces.

At that time, the balance of power balance was obviously tilted towards conservatives. From most princes and nobles who hold military and political power to military generals and scholars who can only write eight-part essays, they all oppose political reform in order to safeguard their vested interests, forming a strict network to resist political reform from top to bottom. Intriguingly, the Westernization School, which was originally full of contradictions with the conservatives, shared the same pronunciation with the reformists in "using the West", but stood openly in the conservative camp in order to maintain the "China style", making the reformers weak.

Guangxu, the main backer of the reformists, was nominally an emperor who had taken power, but the supreme power was still monopolized by Cixi. During the political reform, the reformists had only one power, that is, the power to draft letters. Besides, they can't do anything. In this case, they can only rely on imperial edicts to implement the new political reform policy, but the imperial edicts promulgated during the Hundred Days Reform were rarely actually implemented. Strictly speaking, reformists have never been real reform practitioners.

The most fatal thing is that the reformists have never recognized Guangxu clearly, not seeing that Guangxu was only the defender and reformer of the old ruling order, and did not advocate building China into a constitutional monarchy ruled by the bourgeoisie. Although the realistic crisis prompted him to choose the road of political reform, its fundamental purpose was to realize his deep-seated ideal of "the supremacy of the monarch." Therefore, in so many imperial edicts issued, the reformists' demands for founding the country and formulating the constitution were not reflected.

In addition, as a new force in China's modern society, few people directly participated in or supported the reform. Only some intellectuals with bourgeois ideas encourage reform, so the failure of reform is inevitable.

Second, subjectively, the reformists acted improperly and were too radical, which accelerated the pace of failure.

Any reform, especially political reform, is a systematic project with a gradual development process. It is unrealistic and impossible to expect the completion of World War I. Reformists who have no experience in political struggle expect the reform to be immediate and quickly reverse the long-term poverty and weakness in China. In fact, haste makes waste.

First of all, the reformists used excessive rhetoric and willful and emotional practices in public opinion propaganda. In the absence of real power and authority, it is required to abolish the traditional bureaucratic system represented by six ministries. What's more, when talking with the wily Rong Lu, Kang Youwei even bluntly said: "You kill two or three products or more and obstruct one or two ministers of the new law. The new law will do." This irrational strategy can only reduce the sympathizers and supporters of the reformists.

Secondly, the reformists did not establish a broad and powerful alliance. For any reform, the most active supporters and opponents are a minority, and more are waiting, watching and moderates. For reformists, it is very important to win the support of moderates to the maximum extent and expand the allied forces to the maximum extent. Otherwise, you can only be besieged on all sides and passively beaten. Although Weng Tonghe put forward the idea of "harmony between the two palaces" and asked Cixi to lead the reform and political reform instead of Guangxu, it was rejected by Kang Youwei and others. In the end, Cixi decided that the reformists were only loyal to Guangxu and hated her guts, and then suspected that the reformists' motive for political reform was only to seize power from her, which made her stand on the side of the reformist opposition without hesitation.

Third, the reformists adopted a comprehensive attack and go hand in hand policy to promote the implementation of the reform policy. In a short period of 103 days, more than 300 reform orders were issued through Guangxu, covering various fields. This eagerness for success has made all social strata in China, which were already vulnerable to reform, even more disgusted and disgusted with reform, and the resistance to reform has suddenly risen.

To sum up, internal cause is the root of change, external cause is the condition of change, and external cause always works through internal cause. In the social environment with powerful conservative forces, the reformists' ideal of saving the country and the people was finally brutally strangled.