Traditional Culture Encyclopedia - Traditional festivals - An analysis of the stories of celebrities starting businesses at the age of 40.

An analysis of the stories of celebrities starting businesses at the age of 40.

It is never too late to start a business. What are the stories of entrepreneurial celebrities now? Let's take a look at the stories of entrepreneurial celebrities!

A celebrity story about starting a business at the age of 40 started a business at the age of 40 in a society that has almost interrupted the business tradition. The founder of Lenovo Group has always been ahead of the times for 20 years.

Over the past 20 years, Liu Chuanzhi has played many roles: a scientific researcher, an intellectual who went to sea, the founder of the largest computer company in China, and a football fan? But almost no one could have imagined that he would officially fade out of Lenovo Group as a role he had never tried before: the transaction creator.

Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's personal computer business is a world-renowned transaction? Although before February 8, 2004, 65438, internationalization? It has become one of the most fashionable words in business circles in China, and there are many bold testers like Haier, Huawei and TCL. However, Lenovo's big acquisition has made it the pinnacle of China enterprises' overseas ice-breaking trip in the past 20 years: before that, no China enterprise had annexed the assets of a larger and more mature western iconic enterprise.

This kind? Think twice before you act? This is not the first time for Liu Chuanzhi, 60. While most domestic entrepreneurs are still racking their brains for survival, Liu Faxian Lenovo provides a typical solution to a series of problems such as the survival, reorganization and inheritance of China enterprises. Before his retirement, Lenovo, which started from the Institute of Computer Communication of Chinese Academy of Sciences, was synonymous with the IT industry in China, defeating the western computer giant David in the local market. As fortune magazine commented:? A weak computer company in China tried to absorb the wisdom of overseas partners and then ate their lunch. ?

Therefore, Liu is widely praised as a business leader in China by public opinion. But he is not a technical genius like Gates. What did his business start with? The important thing is to do something. Simple faith; Unlike Welch, he doesn't have a lot of management metaphysics for his peers to worship, but only a simple management concept formed with the help of China's traditional wisdom; He doesn't have a long sleeve like Li Ka-shing. Lenovo Group always? Half-beat? There are few successful cases of diversification attempts; He is inferior to Shi in creating his own brand, and what he left to his successor is a huge suspense. As far as the strategy of market attack is concerned, he is even inferior to Ren, so that Lenovo can forcibly break through the dangerous beach. It is such an imperfect association that has become the best endorsement of China's own brand and the closest model to becoming stronger and bigger.

What's valuable is getting used to it with other contemporaries? Still hiding half her face behind her guitar? Compared with domestic flag-bearer entrepreneurs, Liu is more willing to put Lenovo's success or failure in the spotlight.

What is more exemplary is Lenovo's new corporate governance culture in China. This is actually the most important cornerstone of Lenovo's success. Since starting his business, Liu has always believed in the power of market and management. He integrated his personal realistic, honest and steady style into Lenovo's DNA. Although there are still people using it? Iron fist? Such a vocabulary to evaluate Liu's authority, but in fact, in a lack of system, rule by man? In the current business environment, Lenovo's board of directors led by Liu makes Lenovo one of the most transparent modern companies in China, although it will bring Lenovo more pressure from the capital market, lose its vitality and reduce its efficiency.

After 20 years, can New Lenovo really grow into a world-class company as Liu wishes? This is still an open question. However, Lenovo's 20-year exploration experience is far ahead of the times for Liu Chuanzhi, who started a business in a society that has almost interrupted the business tradition at the age of 40.

Far from the headquarters of Lenovo Group in Shangdi Development Zone, near the South Road of Academy of Sciences in the North Fourth Ring Road, there are several square buildings with gray metallic luster: Ke Rong Information Center. Just a few years ago, there was an old-fashioned white building where Block A was located. It used to be the headquarters of Lenovo Computer, and now it is the location of Lenovo Holdings, which owns 45% of Lenovo Group.

In his most commonly used conference room, there are three woodcuts: the reception room borrowed from Chinese Academy of Sciences when Lenovo started its business, the Zhongguancun White House which was occupied for many years later, and now the Ke Rong Information Center. Just as Bill Hugh Park Jung Su and Steve Jobs started their businesses in the carport of Silicon Valley, at 1984, Liu He 1 1 colleagues created a place completely unrelated to the legend? Legend? (Legend).

Liu Chuanzhi, a native of Shanghai, graduated from Xi 'an Institute of Military Engineering and Technology, majoring in radar system, 1966. Worked as a researcher in Chinese Academy of Sciences before and after, and worked as a magnetic recording circuit for 13 years. Until the beginning of 1984, 40-year-old Liu Chuanzhi got the opportunity to start a business.

At that time, there were three typical ways for intellectuals to start businesses in the sea: approval, cheap foreign exchange and smuggling. Although Liu Chuanzhi recalled today that he was? Make a gradual summary? But from the beginning, he wanted to do something big. The real difficulty is that Lenovo, which has gone through the long planned economy system in China, wants to follow the market rules and must build a corporate culture that breaks through the tradition. Liu Chuanzhi, who has always respected common sense, boils down his core to two points: seeking truth and honesty. Externally, enterprises should be honest, internally, they should avoid it? Do things against your will, say empty words, cliches, cliches? .

Later, I wrote "Why Lenovo? When the author Chen first entered Lenovo, it happened that there was an industry fair in Beijing Exhibition Hall. Chen, the public relations manager, comes back every day to report how many big orders he has signed. Liu Chuanzhi thinks this figure is too big to be possible. The next day, he personally went to check and found that most of the so-called lists signed by Chen were just intentions. Later, Liu severely criticized Chen at the company meeting. The other party was surprised: Why is it a good thing in other enterprises and a bad thing in Lenovo?

That's it? Anti-traditional wisdom? Thanks to our efforts, Lenovo has developed rapidly. When Harvard Business School wrote Lenovo into its business case after that day, they thought it was due to Liu's unique core competitiveness, but Liu didn't agree with it. He likes to compare shaping an enterprise to building a house: the roof is the core competitiveness of the enterprise, the fence is the management ability, and the foundation is the institutional culture. Compared with the mature business environment in the west, China needs to establish some basic concepts of corporate governance from scratch, which is Lenovo's greatest achievement.

How does Lenovo compare with foreign companies? There is a gap on the roof, but there is not much difference at the bottom, even better than them. Liu Chuanzhi believes. I had a deep experience as a salesman in a foreign company in my early years. For example, in sales, if someone takes advantage of this opportunity to embezzle, Lenovo will seize the other party very decisively. It is precisely because of Liu's deliberate shaping of corporate culture that there is no obvious gang division within Lenovo, which has also become the key for China team headed by Yang to give up the management right after acquiring IBM's PC business.

During Lenovo Group's integration of Hong Kong Lenovo's 1997, Liu made a relatively complete review of his corporate philosophy. There are two levels, one is the mechanism system, and the other is the management concept. The latter is made up of? Form a team, make a strategy and lead the team? Three elements: building a team is the foundation of the foundation, and the key is that enterprises cannot be divided into gangs; The strategy must be suitable for implementation, and the leading team is a solid corporate culture. ? Whether it is correct or not, you must have a set of ideas, without which it is difficult to develop. ?

If the management concept reflects Liu Chuanzhi's strategy, then the success of Lenovo's restructuring depends more on the wit of its leaders? Liu himself called it? Compromise? .

Lenovo's reorganization plan began in the late 1980s at 1993, but it was not until1993 that a formal request was made to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. What is required is not a one-step equity, but a dividend right, which only requires 35%. After obtaining the permission, until 1999, Lenovo saw that the government paid more and more attention to the restructuring of Zhongguancun enterprises, and once again proposed that it hoped to convert the dividend right into equity. It was not until two years later that I finally had the opportunity to buy. Ten years, right? Make a big turn? The best embodiment of thinking.

One of the episodes is that Lenovo was not the only company that proposed restructuring at that time. The Central High-level Foundation sent audit companies to various enterprises for three months, and finally only Lenovo was allowed to reform. ? This proves that we are indeed a clean enterprise. ?

After the evaluation by the audit unit designated by the state, according to the net assets, after 30% discount, the 35% equity is worth more than 300 million. The cost of buying equity is the dividend accumulated in seven years: the dividend right is useless because the tax problem has not been solved, so we can only write down the profit first, which is just enough.

? This matter needs a lot of patience and thorough examination. Although many enterprises have not done well today, we have taken a step, which at least shows that this matter can be done well. ? Liu Chuanzhi said.

200 1 Before the split of Lenovo Group, Lenovo Investment was established and Zhu Linan was in charge. The venture capital company started from $35 million, and by the end of 2003, its capital and shares had increased to $654.38 billion. Among them, Joyo.com's investment has gained a good return.

Since the end of 2002, Ke Rong Land and Tianjin Shunchi Group have jointly established Tianjin Shunchi Ke Rong Land Co., Ltd. to develop Tianjin Ruijing residential area, which has achieved good returns. Legend Holdings has a great appetite for real estate, with a total investment of 2 billion yuan in 2003.

I bought 2 million square meters of land and completed the layout in Beijing, Wuhan, Changsha and Chongqing. Chen, who was quite low-key, has been in charge of Lenovo for ten years.

In 2003, Lenovo established the Investment Department, which was later renamed Hony Capital. At the end of that year, Legend Holdings bought the non-performing assets package of BOC Hong Kong worth about HK$ 700 million at a price of RMB 65.438+0 billion. In mid-2004, Legend Holdings also participated in the investment process of Goldman Sachs in China, and participated in the establishment of Gaohua Securities by a well-known domestic investment banker. Like before? Lenovo rumbled? The background is very different. The investor in charge of Hony Capital is Zhao Linghuan, an airborne soldier.

With regard to the long-term attack of Legend Holdings in recent years, even Lenovo is not surprised. A joke is: Liu Chuanzhi transformed Lenovo's original canteen into? Golden white collar restaurant? Then, with its gross profit margin of 30%, it became the project with the highest investment income of the group at that time.

Is this Liu Chuanzhi unwilling to be lonely, or is it meaningful?

One answer given by Liu is that his biggest regret in the past 20 years is that he has not trained enough talents. Now, as the president of Legend Holdings, each of the following subsidiaries has full responsibility, and he can devote more time to the exploration and cultivation of talents.

When Liu made up his mind to make Legend Holdings bigger, he felt that Yang Nanxia's high-tech field was still quite risky, so Liu firmly supported Yang's idea.

? When I need to take risks, I have to own another business as a shareholder representative, that is, a more stable and traditional business. ? Liu Chuanzhi said.

But in the future, he will always explain these two questions to the outside world: Is it too risky to buy IBM's PC business? Why strongly support Yang?

In the eyes of many media and analysts, these two decisions took too much risk. Especially Yang, who has been controversial in recent years, seems to be obsessed with Liu. Soldiers? A misunderstanding of the idea.

Liu Chuanzhi thought that the outside comments were too casual. His consideration at that time was simple: when I was there, all the conditions were better. I thought it would continue to get better. I didn't expect Yang and others to catch up with the IT industry and go downhill. If I really do it, I may not do it as well as him. After all, my energy is not as good as theirs. ?

What is little known to the outside world so far is that this is not the first time that Liu Chuanzhi has faced strong doubts from others about Yang. The difference between the two times is that the last time Yang's prestige was low, Lenovo encountered greater challenges, and Liu was under greater pressure. Acquisition is a question of greater success, and at that time it was a question of survival. I didn't know much about Yang at that time. ?

That was at 1994. Due to the strong attack of overseas brands in the previous year, Lenovo failed to achieve its scheduled goal. In order to cross the rubicon, Yang, the former general manager of CAD department, was activated by firewire.

Young and vigorous, Yang soon worked out a series of positive reform measures: streamlining the ranks, concentrating on the distribution system and improving the incentive mechanism? However, he inadvertently touched the interests of other departments within Lenovo: Yang asked to redesign the cost settlement method for the parts he took over so that the PC department could go into battle lightly. This proposal violated Lenovo's previous sales law and met with a lot of opposition within the company. A vice president even said to Liu Chuanzhi: With too much support from Yang, the old rules were disrupted.

Afterwards, Liu Chuanzhi admitted that there was great pressure at that time: the old rules had been disrupted. What if the new one is not established? Fortunately, after firmly supporting Yang, Lenovo ushered in a good result: by 2000, Lenovo's market share rose to 25%, becoming the leader in the domestic market, while the sum of the market shares of Compaq, IBM and Hewlett-Packard decreased from 2 1% to 10%. ? This is also of great benefit to China's informatization, otherwise the price of PC will be extremely high. ?

Although the previous achievements once brought high prestige to Yang, in the past three years, there have been endless doubts about his lack of strategic vision and his failure to enhance Lenovo's competitiveness in the low tide of the industry. Liu Chuanzhi has never considered replacing Yang?

? There really isn't. Liu's straightforward answer? Good leaders are hard to find. ? In his view, Yang's progress is commendable: Yang always puts the interests of enterprises first, is self-motivated and has a good learning ability. What impressed Liu most was that Yang, who didn't know how to compromise with the outside world, became more flexible. For example, on the question of whether the new Lenovo should set up a dual headquarters in China and the United States, Yang gave more consideration to appeasing American employees and promised to set up a single headquarters in the United States.

But just recognizing it doesn't mean that he will let Yang continue to try to make mistakes. A Lenovo executive said in an interview with this magazine that since August 2003, Lenovo's comments on the past? A three-year plan? Reflect and plan for the next three years. The initial reflection remained at the tactical level, but under the leadership of Liu Chuanzhi, the reflection gradually deepened and rose to the strategic level.

On the tactical level, Liu Chuanzhi admits that one of the problems formed by Lenovo in recent years is that the planning office responsible for implementation is not strong enough compared with when he was in power. When I was in charge, I always had a strong planning office in my hand. If this person is incompetent, I will replace him until he is strong enough. ?

But the more serious problem is that diversification leads to Yang's energy being too scattered, so that when the market environment changes, it is difficult for Yang to make the most appropriate response.

At that time, the network revived, the future of IT services was confused, the mobile phone industry quickly entered the era of low profit, and Lenovo's core business PC was strongly impacted by Dell computers. Lenovo's helplessness can be imagined: when the whole market is sneering at Lenovo's inability to persist in making profits on the Internet, what Lenovo lacks is not persistence, but limited energy? If you had bet on the Internet at that time, Lenovo's rout in the PC market might have been more serious.

Even for Liu Chuanzhi, who is used to the world, this is still a big lesson: the business division system directly shows Lenovo's lack of strength at the executive level. If the subsidiary system with more decentralized power is adopted, it may be further out of control because of the lack of personnel capacity in various departments. ? Welch is a mystery to me. How did he achieve such a large-scale diversification under the business division system? Liu Chuanzhi's confusion has not been answered.