1 Do you understand "knowledge"?

Knowledge is usually categorized into three kinds,

→ Familiar knowledge: knowledge of an object (knowing what it is), e.g., I know my friend very well.

→ Knowledge of competence: knowledge about technology (knowing how to do it), e.g. I know how to drive a car.

→ Propositional knowledge: knowledge about descriptions (knowledge of why), propositional knowledge involves descriptions, reasoning, that is, we have to know why, or from where we got this knowledge. For example, I know that there are 56 ethnic groups in China.

As we mentioned, the traditional philosophical definition of knowledge is that it consists of three components: truth, belief, and confirmation. So what exactly is "truth"? Or what is the relationship between truth and knowledge? We may think that truth is objective, truth is about the external world, and truth is our belief. The concept of truth we are talking about here is mainly related to our knowledge. In other words, it is because of the truth that is determined by the way in which knowledge is acquired. Different philosophers have different definitions, so let's take a look at the three main theories of truth that have existed throughout history.

1. The basic idea: Truth is the conformity between our knowledge and the external world.

2. Representatives:

Plato: A true sentence states that a fact is as it is, and a false sentence states something that is not a fact, which is not as it is. --The Wise Men

Aristotle: "To say that it is not" or "to say that it is not" is false; "to say that it is is "To say that it is not is not" or "to say that it is not is not" is false; "to say that it is is is not" or "to say that it is not is not" is true. Therefore, to say that something is or is not, or is true or is false. --Metaphysics

3. The Three Elements

Here we find that conformism is not so simple a concept as we have been told, "A thing conforms to our understanding of the thing, and so our understanding becomes truth. " From this, it can be found that in fact, conformism gives us three important ingredients, namely the three elements of conformism :

First, propositions, which are used to describe facts.

Second, the facts.

Third, the conformity relation between the proposition and the fact. It is the most important element in determining whether a proposition is a truth or not.

(1) Propositions

It follows that to determine what truth is, we must first be concerned with what a "proposition" is. A proposition, as the bearer of truth, makes the notion of truth subject to the basic elements of a proposition. What are these elements? It is that the proposition itself must be constituted in a way that conforms to the requirements of the rule. At this point we realize that when we attribute the concept of truth to propositions, we have, in fact, found the ground of truth, that is, truth belongs to propositions, not to facts. Facts have no truth or falsehood to speak of; propositions are true or false only if they exist or not.

Facts are what propositions talk about, and propositions are the ideas and meanings of sentences. In other words, the fact is true because of what the sentence is about, not because the fact itself is true or false, which makes the proposition true or false.

So, in Aristotle's definition, he is considering "yes and no (existence and non-existence)" as belonging to facts, and "truth and falsehood" as belonging to propositions.

Therefore, propositions are the bearers of truth and falsehood. You can't say "this fact is true", you can only say "your statement is true".

(2) Facts

Facts are everything that happens. However, in the past, we have thought that facts are not to be regarded as the basis for determining what is true, but rather that the existence of things in themselves is the basis for what is true. This led us to think that "the world is made up of things and not of facts."

The contemporary philosopher Wittgenstein, on the other hand, made it clear that "the world is the sum of facts, not the sum of things." This idea has, arguably, changed the way philosophers understand the world. (Expanded reading: Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the work that changed the direction of Western philosophy.)

Why is the world made up of facts, not things. It is because, facts are expressed in propositions, while things are expressed in names. Names, standing alone, are meaningless. The existence of the thing itself needs to exist in the fact, the meaning of the name it exists in the proposition. Thus the world is not made up of things, but of facts.

(3) Conformity

Conformity between facts and propositions, we need to think:

① Is there a one-to-one correspondence between facts and propositions?

When we talk about "the computer is on top of the desk", are we really describing the facts in terms of this proposition? Is there really a so-called one-to-one correspondence?

② How do propositions in language correspond to facts in the world?

The propositional system and the factual system are two completely different conceptual systems. When we describe facts in terms of propositions, one of the big spacings we have in between is that "our propositions do not grasp objects in an objectified way." What is meant by an objectifying way is to grasp things in a one-to-one way. Rather, we grasp things in a conceptual way. (For example, the example of "computer" is not a concrete object, but a class name.)

In this way, we find that the question "How does the existence of an object enter into our concepts? How do the two correspond, the propositional system and the factual system?" And so on, we can't explain.

So contemporary philosophers have found that we can only deal with this problem in the simplest possible way, which is to stop thinking about what the factual system is, and to reduce the factual system to the propositional system. Consequently, the theory of conformity becomes "conformity between propositions and propositions" rather than "conformity between propositions and facts". For we have found that there is no system of facts independent of propositions. Thus, Tarski, a contemporary philosopher of language, gave a formula to summarize the theory of conformity:

(S) The statement S is true in the language L if and only if S.

Example, the statement "Snow is true" is true if and only if snow is white.

1. The basic idea

If a proposition is true, it should be consistent with other propositions, or with other propositions in the same system. Coherence or consistency shows the relation of the whole to the parts: all relations are inherent in the nature of things themselves.

If the theory of conformity emphasizes the relation between facts and propositions, the theory of coherence excludes facts altogether, and makes propositions a self-contained system. If a proposition is true, it simply means that it is true in the context of the language system in which it is found. If this is the case, then there is no truth under the sun? For everything that exists, we can understand it precisely because it is self-contained within our system, otherwise it is self-contradictory or defective. For a self-contradictory or defective proposition, it cannot be understood. Thus, for knowledge to be truth, it must be self-justifiable. But does self-justification mean truth?

2. Representatives

Hegel, "All that is real is reasonable, and all that is reasonable is real."

Only that which meets the requirements of reason is realistic. What does it mean to conform to the requirements of reason? For Hegel, it is also the existence that conforms to the history of the development of the absolute spirit itself. Hegel, as one of the greatest fusionists, proposed "the holism of truth" :

In a nutshell, all truth exists in its own system, because the system makes our truth possible.

1. The basic idea

A belief is true when it is actually useful or appropriate.

2. Representatives

(1) This view is derived from pragmatism, in particular from William James: "Truth is expedient in our manner of behavior, in almost any form, and ultimately and in the whole process."

The utility of truth depends on it being useful, or rather, it being expedient. Is what is useful true?

(2) Richard Rorty: It is difficult to distinguish between a belief being corroborated and that belief being true. Truth is something we're better off believing, or guaranteed conclusiveness.

As long as we can give, some kind of assertion about what we believe to be true, we can accept it as true.

Rorty got this idea from Dewey.

3. Opposing Characters

Russell: With practical validity as the criterion of truth, we will never know whether our beliefs are true.

The reason is that all beliefs fulfill a relative pragmatic requirement. A pragmatic view of truth leads to relativism. Relativism happens to be another of the most discussed enemies of the theory of knowledge, making it impossible for us to have certain knowledge. And the very notion of truth is said to enable us to comply with the ultimate requirement, that of determinate knowledge. If all truth is only in accordance with what is there to be used for judgment, then such a view of truth is, in effect, the same as no truth at all.

The second element in the definition of knowledge is belief. What is the relationship between knowledge and belief? It was mentioned earlier that knowing that something is true is equivalent to us believing that it is true. Is this really the case? In the history of philosophy, some philosophers have offered a different view.

Plato and Descartes, for one, argued that knowledge is not equivalent to believing. Believing that something is true is not the same as saying that we have gained knowledge about it.

Pollock and Griffiths argued that knowledge is not required to believe. We know something without actually needing to believe it to be true. If this is the case, doesn't this mean that our knowledge is not required to be backed up by belief? Isn't that the opposite of the traditional definition of knowledge?

The question then is:

What is the relationship between the phrases "I know something to be true" and "I believe something to be true"?

The phrase "I believe something to be true" contains belief. But does belief really determine knowledge? Philosophers have given various accounts.

Confirmation, meeting or conforming to an acceptable standard or doing the right thing. In other words, you can state with a high degree of certainty that the thing is true.

What kind of corroboration guarantees this? For example, empirically verifiable (previous example: it's raining outside, and we can corroborate whether this statement is true by observation). But when we are saying that it's raining outside, (1) is it merely satisfying to ensure that the statement is true by corroboration from outside? Or, (2) do we use corroboration to give a knowledge when we say it is true? These are two different levels of meaning:(1) We are assured that the statement is true by outside evidence. Using evidence to confirm our beliefs as true. --This is the scientific mindset; facts and verification are involved here. (2) We pursue the evidence out there in order to obtain the search for truth. Assuming as true, come looking for evidence. --This is the philosophical way of thinking; inferences are given here.

Philosophy relies on inferences, not on facts. Science needs facts, it needs verification. Philosophy needs arguments and reasoning. Argumentation and reasoning, there is much more to it than mere belief or corroboration.

Is corroboration simple? Confirmation is simple compared to verification. For corroboration of knowledge means meeting acceptable standards of knowledge and having a positive cognitive state. For example, we can give any criterion for determining whether the existence of the external world is true, but there is no way to satisfy the possibility that what will happen in the future will happen (you have no way to satisfy the reasons and justifications for the possibility that what will happen in the future will happen). That's why Hume said, "Must the sun rise tomorrow?" Must there be a close connection between what may happen in the future and what happened in the past? If so, how is it established? Not by experience, of course, but by argument.

So, we will find that for the examination of traditional definitions of knowledge, truth, belief, and corroboration, all three of these will be difficult.

Hence, skepticism, agnosticism, relativism, and so on, have emerged in the history of philosophy.

Can we know anything at all? It is difficult to give a definite answer to this question even today.

Ancient Greek philosopher Plato:

(1) Metaphor of the Cave: We are like prisoners by nature, locked in a cave, and all we see is a reflection on the wall.

(2) Theory of Ideas: There are two ways in which we human beings can acquire knowledge, one is the sensory way and the other is the rational way. But the senses can only provide opinions, only reason can form concepts. The world of ideas is the real form of our knowledge, so knowledge as a form of existence of ideas, it is not acquired through acquired, it should be acquired innately, so knowledge must be innate. Therefore knowledge does not come by learning but by recollection.

From this we find that there can be different types of knowledge as to how it is constituted.

1. Epistemological categories

→ Examine whether knowledge is innate or acquired?

Innate: not subject to empirical verification; for example, the addition rule "2+2=4".

Acquired: requiring empirical verification; for example, all swans are white.

2. Semantic categories

→ In terms of the form of the sentence, is it analytic or synthesized?

Analytic: all mothers are women; man is a rational animal.

Synthesized: I am going to die.

3. Metaphysical categories

→ Are propositions phenomenal or nature-based?

Phenomenal: exactly how some phenomenon seen constitutes knowledge is itself indeterminate; e.g., the stick is bent in the water, I saw a man.

Qualitative; knowledge of the nature of things; e.g., all objects are in motion, the sky is blue.

Thus, when we are discussing knowledge or propositions of knowledge, we must be very clear in what category we are using such propositions.

References:

[1] (US) John? Pollock, (US) Joe? Kratz. Contemporary Theory of Knowledge[M]. Chen Zhen, Translation. Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2008, Chapter 1.

[2] (US) Louis P. Boyman. Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge: What Can We Know? (2nd ed.) [M]. Hong Hunding, Translation. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2008, Chapter 1.

[3] Online course: Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge: What Can We Know?

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