The experience of a military work

The Military Thought and Modern Value of Sun Tzu's Art of War

Sun Tzu's Art of War, known as the "Crown of Martial Arts," was published in Wu in 512 B.C., and is the world's oldest recognized work of military theory. Its author, Sun Tzu, known as Wu (武) and Changqing (長卿), was a native of Le'an (present-day Huimin County, Shandong Province) in the State of Qi, and was honored as the originator of the science of war.

Sun Tzu's ideal strategic pursuit is "to subdue the enemy without fighting."

Although The Art of War is a book on military strategy, its highest pursuit is not war, not the pursuit of victory in war. It says, "A hundred victories in a hundred battles is not a good thing." Then, what is its ideal strategic pursuit? It says, "To subdue the enemy without fighting" is "the best of the good".

Throughout The Art of War, we see that, to a large extent, it mainly talks about two words: one is "all" and the other is "break". "Full" is to win without fighting, and "broken" is to win by fighting. The first is "total victory" and the second is "broken victory".

The method of realizing "total victory" is to "fight to win" and to "fight to win"; the method of realizing "broken victory" is to "win without fighting" and to "break". The way to achieve "total victory" is to "attack the army from above" and "attack the city from below".

To "cut down the strategy" is to "thwart the enemy's strategic attempts", that is to say, to expose and destroy the enemy's strategic attempts before they are put into practice, so as to bring them to a premature end and make them bankrupt. This is one of the most labor-saving, trouble-free, and brilliant methods of struggle.

During the Spring and Autumn Period in which Sun Tzu lived, this method of "cutting down the strategy" was indeed possible. The best example of this strategy is the story of Mozi's rescue of the Song dynasty, which was contemporary with Sun Tzu.

The Chu state's Kung Fu Bon invented and made a ladder for attacking the city, which was to be used by the Chu army to attack the state of Song. The state of Chu was strong and the state of Song was weak. Mozi was an advocate of "non-attack" and always opposed to unjust wars. When he heard that Chu wanted to invade Song, he rushed to Chu to dissuade the king of Chu and Gong输般 from invading Song, but the king of Chu and Gong输般, relying on the possession of a new type of siege ladder, were not moved by Mozi's lobbying. Mozi and Gongbobo then performed a "combat simulation" of Chu attacking and defending Song in front of the king of Chu, using a sash as a city and a piece of wood as a weapon for attacking and defending the city. As a result, the king of Chu gave up his plan to invade the Song Dynasty.

The "伐交" means to thwart the enemy's strategic attempts through diplomacy. Though it is also a way to win without fighting, it is a bit more lacking than the "伐谋" because diplomacy is more laborious and troublesome. In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods, diplomacy was very frequent, especially in the Warring States Period, where the combination of vertical and horizontal ties greatly affected the country's safety and security.

The core of Sun Tzu's idea of good war is to win a big victory at a small cost

Sun Tzu's concept of victory and defeat, in addition to the "total victory", is the "broken victory". The "whole" is political problem solving, and the "broken" is war problem solving. The "total" is a bloodless war, while the "broken" is a bloody politics. Although Sun Tzu's ideal strategic pursuit is "total victory", 70% to 80% of his thirteen essays are devoted to the method of "broken victory". After all, the use of war is the main content of Sun Tzu's The Art of War.

The quest for victory at a small cost is Sun Tzu's quest for victory in battle. Sun Tzu's most fundamental guiding principle in the use of war is the pursuit of the word "good". The "total victory" is the pursuit of "goodness of goodness", and the "broken victory" is the pursuit of "goodness of war", that is, he emphasized again and again that "The good of war", as he repeatedly emphasized.

Sun Tzu's idea of "good war" is still a continuation of the idea of "total victory" in the process of combat. He said, "The victory of the good fighter has no name of wisdom and no merit of courage." Why is it that those who fight well win battles but have no reputation for wisdom and no achievements of valor?

Because in Sun Tzu's view, the real good warrior he won the battle, never the kind of killing a thousand people, self-loss of eight hundred of the bloodbath, the battle to the death, but "victory in the easy to win" --- to fight the enemy, "victory in the easy to fight". The enemy of the fight, "victory has been defeated" - the fight is already in a position of defeat of the enemy.

For an army to win a war, it depends on the king to be wise, the general to be capable, the soldiers to be brave, the equipment to be good, the people to be supportive, the security to be sufficient, the liaison to be smooth, and so on and so forth, all of which Sun Tzu has discussed to varying degrees of incisiveness. Here, I would like to elaborate only briefly on the three pillars of Sun Tzu's tactical thinking.

From the perspective of combat command, Sun Tzu's Art of War is also a y creative art of war, from which we can find that Sun Tzu's imagination is very special, thinking is very extraordinary, good at turning the ordinary into a miraculous, in order to four or two to dial up a thousand pounds. In military science, he created a series of conceptual categories, of which the three categories of "situation", "reality" and "odd and positive" constitute the three pillars of Sun Tzu's tactical thinking.

We know that "situation" refers to the accumulation of military power, "odd and positive" refers to the use of military power, and "virtual and real" refers to the target of military power. These three are complementary and interrelated.

An army consists of an army morale and strength, weapons constitute a military force, which is the "situation"; correctly command this army and flexible to make it change tactics, which is the "odd and positive"; according to the enemy's situation and our situation, skillfully choose the best direction of the army, which is the The best direction for the army to fight, this is the virtual reality.

In fact, throughout the ages, Chinese and Western strategic guides, whether it is Sun Tzu in China or Clausewitz in the West, all know strategy and power, the difference is only in the understanding and use of power is different.

Sun Tzu used water as an analogy for "potential", "the speed of the water, to the drifting stone, potential". This water potential is a kind of impact force, not explosive force. Explosive force is like fire power, fierce punch, victory or defeat immediately see. Impact is like water power, continuous attack, so that the enemy does not have a chance to breathe, no time to fight back, no room to change tactics.

In the use of force, Sun Tzu attaches great importance to the odd and the positive, and attaches great importance to the way of combat, advocating that "skill can make things happen" and using skill rather than brute force. The reason why Sun Tzu discusses the different methods of warfare of "ten surroundings and five attacks" is to pay attention to the choice of strategy, and strive for the best strategy, prepare for the middle strategy, and avoid the next strategy. Mastered the law of things in motion is the best strategy, butting the bull, to solve the problem, is the best strategy. Butcher with the skillful strength, less effort and receive more work. Hit the snake to hit seven inches, do not hit the snake whole body, this is Sun Tzu's thinking. This thinking is reflected in the use of military force, it is required to half the effort, the four two to dial a thousand pounds, very much like the principle of taijiquan, still soft, still wisdom, still strategy.

Sun Tzu said, "to the positive, to the odd win". Literally, is the use of positive troops when the enemy, with odd troops to win. In fact, it has another layer of meaning, is to use the normal method of layout, with the odd method to win the enemy. This is the general rule of using the normal method of arranging troops and formations. However, the skill of applying it depends on one's heart. If there is no such article, the war will become a robot against the enemy. It is because of this article, there is the human factor, the human factor is the decisive factor in winning or losing the war.

From the combat point of view, "situation", "odd and positive", "real and virtual" these three, the most strenuous, the most competitive is "real and virtual". ". Because the "real and virtual" issue is to ultimately realize the "unpreparedness, surprise", the enemy is unprepared for the virtual, the enemy does not mean is also virtual. The enemy's unpreparedness is false, and the enemy's lack of intention is also false. Both unpreparedness and lack of intention refer to the enemy's joints.

Sun Bin's guided battle of Guiling between Qi and Wei successfully embodied these principles.

Pang Juan led the Wei army from the capital city of Daliang (present day Kaifeng) northward to attack the Zhao capital city of Handan, and Zhao asked Qi for help. According to the usual thinking, the Qi army that saved Zhao took advantage of the fact that the Wei army was tired and frustrated, and joined hands with the Zhao army to attack the Wei army inside and outside the city of Handan. But Sun Bin rejected this usual thinking and thought that this method is just like persuading a brawl and taking part in the brawl himself, it's a stupid method. He advocated attacking Daliang where defense is empty, forcing Pang Juan to withdraw from Handan and return to save himself, and then take the opportunity to ambush the Wei army on their way back, catching him off guard. The battle went exactly as Sun Bin expected and won the victory.

Sun Bin's method of "surrounding Wei to save Zhao" is to utilize Sun Tzu's principle of "attacking and saving", which Sun Bin graphically called "criticizing and attacking", "吭"。 "吭 "是咽喉，"批吭 "is to strike the enemy's throat, striking the enemy's vital and weak points. For the battle of Guiling between Qi and Wei guided by Sun Bin, Mao Zedong highly evaluated and wrote this criticism: "Attacking Wei to save Zhao, because of the defeat of Wei's soldiers, a master of the ages."

"Make Wen Qi Wu" is the main line of Sun Tzu's military ideology

If "all" and "break" is a main line running through Sun Tzu's combat ideology. "Wen" and "Wu" is the main line of Sun Tzu's military thinking. "To order by the written word, and to unite with the military" is another huge thinking framework put forward by Sun Tzu. The two hands of the civil and military include the use of grace and authority, the letter of rewards and punishments, the love of pawns and good prisoners, strict requirements, and so on, many of the rule of law.

The main body of commanding the battle is the general, the main body of managing the army is also the general, and the Art of War of Sun Tzu discusses in detail the status, role and requirements of the general in ruling the army. Therefore, in this sense, the Art of War is another work of generalship or command science.

Toward the end of the Spring and Autumn Period, generalship as a new thing had just sprouted, and Sun Tzu saw it keenly and gave it a high appraisal. He made a series of insightful and extremely instructive remarks on various aspects of the status and role of generals, their selection and appointment, and their character and cultivation.

Sun Tzu believed that an excellent general should have the political character of "not seeking fame, not avoiding crime, only the people are protected, and the interests of the Lord", and have the general's standards of "wisdom, faith, benevolence, courage, and strictness", as well as the ability to practice " quietness, righteousness, and governance". The moral and talent cultivation of "quiet to be quiet, righteous to be ruled", and the love of soldiers of "treating pawns like babies, treating pawns like love children". Sun Tzu's requirements on generals and commanders are not only the most important words for the Spring and Autumn Period, when the war pattern changed significantly, but also the scientific truth for the later generations of military rule.

Plain military dialectics is the soul of Sun Tzu's Art of War

Sun Tzu's Art of War's great achievement in military science is inseparable from its plain military dialectics. Sun Tzu paid great attention to analyzing the various contradictions between the enemy and us and their contradictory movements, so as to know the enemy and know oneself, and to explore the objective laws of war from the practical point of view, so as to formulate the correct operational policies and methods.

The Art of War is invaluable in that it recognizes both the objective conditions for victory in war and the importance of the human factor in winning or losing a war. In the Art of War, "form" is the substance of movement, and "potential" is the movement of the substance. According to Sun Tzu, everything in war is in motion rather than static. "Degree, measure, number, weighing, victory", "five things", "seven plans", "ten surroundings and five attacks", "leisure, labor, satiety and hunger" and so on are the material forces of war, through which the strength and weakness of attack and defense are manifested, and they are the objective basis for deciding the victory of war. Sun Tzu saw that they are not static, can be through the subjective efforts of people to promote its transformation. He said: "Chaos is born in the rule, timidity is born in courage, weakness is born in the strong", "the enemy can labor, satiety can hunger, security can move". In short, as long as you know the enemy and know yourself, tactical correctness, "victory can be also", the weak army can defeat the strong army, fewer soldiers can defeat more soldiers. He said, for example, if the enemy is ten times more than me, the way to defeat the enemy is to "form people and I am invisible, then I specialize in and the enemy is divided. I specialize in one, the enemy is divided into ten, is to ten attack its one, then I am many and the enemy is few. Can fight against the few with the many, then I am with the war, about it." It means that through tactical masking and force feinting the enemy is induced to disperse his forces while I concentrate mine. In this way, although in the overall view, that is, strategically I am one against ten, but locally, tactically I am ten against one, is to win by many against few, is to win by strong against weak, is to win by superiority against inferiority. If you do this in every battle, you will be able to win every battle, and then the rest of the battles will be broken down one by one, and finally you will win the overall victory.

Luring the enemy and misleading the enemy is the method of defeating the enemy with fewer victories, and hitting the enemy's key points and avoiding the realities is also the method of defeating the enemy with fewer victories. Sun Tzu said, "Listen to what they love first." It means that the enemy is aggressive and has a large army, how to deal with it? Sun Tzu believed that by taking the lead in attacking its vital parts one could turn passivity into initiative.

The study of the philosophical implications of Sun Tzu's Art of War, in addition to its simple military dialectic, but also to explore the characteristics of its way of thinking. This feature is also an important symbol that distinguishes traditional Chinese military science from Western military science.

We know that the theoretical basis of Western military science is logical thinking, and Western military terminology is characterized by the decomposition and synthesis of conceptual elements. Compared with traditional Chinese military science, Western military thought is characterized by a biased microcosmic thinking that emphasizes specific operations and lacks a long-term and macrocosmic strategic awareness, which is its obvious flaw. The theoretical foundation of traditional Chinese military science is based on the dialectic as the main body, empirical, non-formal logic type of thinking. This way of thinking certainly has its weaknesses, but compared with formal logic, it focuses on the overall, dynamic grasp of things, focusing on the universal connection, dynamic transformation and cyclic development of things, and compared with formal logic, it is more suitable for reflecting and mastering empirical knowledge from the perspective of the main body to reflect and master the reality of contradictions and movements, and it has a far-sighted and far-sighted sense of the overall situation and consciousness. This is the soul of traditional Chinese military science represented by Sun Tzu's Art of War, the strengths of traditional Chinese military science, and the rich cultural heritage left to us by traditional Chinese military science, which must be inherited and carried forward.

Two

Sun Tzu's The Art of War was well received after its introduction. Accompanied by the maturation of Chinese feudal society and Chinese feudal culture, the Northern Song Dynasty established the seven books of war headed by "The Art of War" as the classics of Chinese military science, which further consolidated the lofty position of "The Art of War" in the history of military scholarship until the Ming and Qing dynasties, without wavering.

The modern transformation of traditional Chinese military science represented by the Art of War

The Art of War was really tested and challenged after Chinese history entered the modern era. In the words of Li Hongzhang, modern China has encountered "a situation that has not been seen in thousands of years", "a strong enemy that has not been seen in thousands of years". In the face of the impact of modern military technology and modern warfare style, including "Sun Tzu's Art of War", including the traditional system of Chinese military science and Western military science had a serious collision. After the Opium War, Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan and others y realized the reality of "inferiority of technology" and put forward the strategic proposition of "learning from the barbarians to control the barbarians". The repeated defeats in modern anti-aggression wars reveal a succinct logic of inferiority, and further logic is that the Chinese must accept the modern system of military science. The contemporary value of traditional military science thus began to be questioned. Chen Longchang, a military scientist, pinpointed: "China's talk of war without worrying about a hundred, but the Sun Tzu" thirteen, Chi's "Jixing Xinshu" passes to this day, known as the practical. But Sun Zi theory is more mysterious and subtle, not on the wisdom can not understand; Chi book from the former Ming, although Zeng Wenzheng Gong tasted for the push, it can be taken, to be but the practice of the last idea, in addition to seeking the so-called compromise of the military, will be through the old and the key to the defense and the opportunity to full of the right person, not much to see." Xu Jianyin also came to this conclusion: "the ancient military book, half more talk, not practical, Chi's "new book", although a little of the facts, but the language is not detailed, difficult to take the law."

In this context, China's traditional military science system began its modern transformation, the introduction of a large number of Western military theoretical works. Works reflecting modern Western military theory and military academic thought, such as The Science of Strategy, A Textbook of Battle Methods, The Science of Tactics, The Science of Military Systems, and The Science of Weapons, basically replaced the Seven Books of the Martial Arts.

Successful transformation requires "Westernization" rather than "Westernization", and successful "Westernization" should be based on the actual situation of the country, and on critical inheritance of the national military science. Successful "Westernization" should be based on the actual situation in one's own country and on the critical inheritance of the military science of one's own country. As Mr. Lu Xun said, "The outside is not behind the world's trend of thought, but the inside is still not lost the inherent bloodline, to take the present and restore the past, and set up a new school." It is in this context, some military scientists realized the great potential value of traditional Chinese military science.

The famous military scientist Jiang Baili began from the perspective of modern military science, began to "Sun Tzu's Art of War" for the annotation work, and opened up the traditional military science research "new annotation of the wind". After entering the Republic of China, the value of traditional military science represented by Sun Tzu's Art of War was further recognized by the people. The Republic of China military scientists believe that the characteristics of traditional Chinese military science are mainly in the following aspects: traditional Chinese military science is "application-oriented, instructing a number of principles or methods to teach the application of the ultimate"; Western military science is "to explore the science of military science and even the art of military science is the main application is applicable to the general theory of understanding". Western military science is "mainly concerned with the investigation of military science and even military art, and its application is applicable to the general theory of understanding. Chinese traditional military science is "to grasp the essence of the facts immediately by intuition", "to seek the application of the wonderful, but not the form of reasoning"; Western military science is "to the reasoning of the reasoning to achieve the conclusion of the organization Western military science is "reasoning to reach a logical conclusion". Chinese traditional military science by the influence of Confucianism, the scope of its discussion is not only about strategy and tactics, at the same time for politics, economics, diplomacy and other important aspects of "national politics", "are very clear instructions in the two times of peace and war guidelines".

This is the reason why the Chinese book of war has been immortalized for ages. Compared with the Western military writings, which "only have the value of being a military code", the Chinese book of war "has its own value of being a great experience in ruling the country and leveling the world". China's national nature is peace-loving, Chinese military science, also "everywhere flowing with the idea of peace". This is extremely different from "the military science of the Great Powers with aggression", which is also the traditional Chinese military science "so the main reason for the splendor". Chinese traditional military science is to "not war but yielding troops, the good of the good also" for the use of the highest principle of military, is the king's military science; and Western military science to "direct annihilation of the enemy" annihilationism for the use of the highest principle of military, is the hegemony of the military science. The traditional Chinese military science emphasizes the principle of "the upper military strategy, the second to cut down the traffic, the second to cut down the army, and the second to attack the city"; the Western military science stays at the level of "the second to cut down the army, and the second to attack the city", which is not sound.

These understandings basically grasp the characteristics of traditional Chinese military science and its value. Critically inheriting the excellent heritage of traditional Chinese military science, critically absorbing the essence of modern Western military theory, in the exchange and integration of Chinese and Western military science, the establishment of a modern military science system with Chinese characteristics, has become the military scientists *** knowledge.

However, the Republic of China military scientists to establish China's independent new military system of vision, to a large extent, just stay in the theoretical conception of this level. In terms of class attributes, most of the Republican military scientists were bourgeois ideologues. The congenital deficiencies of the Chinese bourgeoisie made it impossible for them to get rid of their heavy dependence on the West, whether politically, economically, culturally or militarily, and the same was true of military theories. This also determined that the bourgeois military scientists were incapable of establishing a new, independent system of military science. The task of establishing a new system of military science historically fell to the proletariat. Mao Zedong's Military Thought, a scientific system with unique Chinese characteristics, is not only a product of the combination of Marxist-Leninist military theory and the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution, but also a product of the critical inheritance and development of the traditional Chinese military culture by the proletarian military scientists represented by Mao Zedong. The essence of traditional Chinese military culture has been comprehensively inherited and developed in this new system.

Sun Tzu's "Art of War", the idea of "total victory" of "strategy" and "communication" was rediscovered in the 20th century

After entering the 20th century, the two world wars, unprecedented in the history of mankind, were followed by a series of wars and a series of wars. The two unprecedented world wars in human history, especially after the emergence of nuclear weapons, exposed the flaws of Western military thinking. Taking the opportunity of the Westerners' reflection on the military theories since Clausewitz, the value of traditional Chinese military science, once again, manifested itself. The First World War caused British military scientist Liddell Hart to feel a strong sense of disillusionment with Western military theories since the Napoleonic Wars, and he was convinced that "the main reason for the unproductive mass killings that occurred during the war was due to the fact that the guides of the war were fixated on the erroneous military dogma, i.e., the Clausewitzian interpretation of the Napoleonic Wars ". Shortly after the end of World War I, Liddell Hart published an article calling for a "re-examination" of the "rather widely prevalent views on the purpose of war inherited from Clausewitz." It was in the process of liquidating modern Western military theory that Liddell Hart discovered the importance of Sun Tzu's The Art of War as a source of inspiration for strategic thinking and values, which led him to propose the "indirect route strategy".

Liddell Hart was the first, but not the last, to reflect on modern Western military theory. After World War II, the West, led by the United States, was plunged into successive defeats in the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and the problems of Western military theory were further exposed. In particular, the failure of the Vietnam War gave the West a great touch. In the Vietnam War, the Americans fought in strict accordance with Western military theory, yet in the war, which lasted 11 years, the United States won almost every battle, yet lost the entire war. This not only baffled the U.S. military's battlefield commanders, but also forced even the war's top decision makers to reflect on what went wrong with a war that seemed to deserve to be won anyhow. Against this background, more Westerners looked to Sun Tzu's The Art of War, hoping to gain insights from the ancient wisdom of the East. The result was that many came to the conclusion that the Western world had failed precisely because it had gone against the lessons of Sun Tzu. In "A Soldier's Report," Westmoreland, the commander of the U.S. Army's invasion force in Vietnam, quoted Sun Tzu's famous saying, "There is no such thing as a soldier who has been in the army long enough for his country to benefit." He said, "Going into Vietnam was the biggest mistake our country has ever made. Former President Richard Nixon also said in The Real War, "As the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said 2,500 years ago, 'There has never been a case in which a country benefits from a prolonged war. Therefore, an army is more valuable in victory than in duration. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam echoed Sun Tzu's words." Another famous American strategic thinker, Collins, also pointed out in his book Grand Strategy, "Sun Tzu said, 'The upper armies are more strategic than the upper armies.' ...... The United States ignored this wise advice of Sun Tzu and foolishly went into battle. We overestimated our own side's capabilities and underestimated the enemy's capabilities. Our zealous use of armed force quickly resulted in a goal that does not play a decisive role: military victory on the battlefield."

In the late 1970s, when the Western strategic system was facing a serious "crisis of collapse," the Americans thought of Sun Tzu again and, inspired by his strategy of "total victory," formulated what they called the "Sun Tzu's Nuclear War" ("孙子的核战"). "Sun Tzu's nuclear strategy". The operational command theory of the U.S. military also draws a lot of things from "The Art of War", so much so that the Australian military writer Mohan Marley Jr. predicted when he looked forward to the development of military theory in the 21st century: "Just as the wars of the 19th century were influenced by the ideas of Yomini and Clausewitz in the 20th century, the wars of the 21st century will probably be influenced by the strategic ideas of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart. strategic thinking."

Unlike modern Chinese, who were forced to accept Western military theories, modern Westerners, represented by Liddell Hart, came to introduce traditional Chinese military science on their own initiative. If for modern China, the result of Western learning was the disintegration of a traditional system of military science, this is not the case for modern Westerners. The modern western military theory is already a mature system, the westernization of Chinese traditional military science did not form a comprehensive impact on the western military theory system, on the contrary, it is more manifested as a revision of the western military theory system represented by Clausewitz. It is precisely for this reason that the Western military theory's absorption of traditional Chinese military science was not at a low level from the beginning, but drew on the way of thinking contained in traditional Chinese military science.

The humanistic spirit of Sun Tzu's The Art of War, which advocates prudent war preparation and peace, deserves to be vigorously promoted in contemporary international relations

The greatness of traditional Chinese military science lies not only in the fact that it reveals and creates monumental general rules of combat, but also in the fact that it holds up the banners of righteousness and prudence in war, and opposes militarism. The opening chapter of Sun Tzu's The Art of War states that war is a major national event and must be handled with care. Subsequently, it constantly emphasizes that, for the threat of the enemy, we must always be prepared, "not rely on its not come, rely on me to wait for it; not rely on its not attack, rely on me to have unattackable," cautioning the monarch and generals, treating the war to be "non-profitable not use, not use, not a crisis not war! "The military fierce war crisis," the Lord can not be angry and the division, will not be huffing and puffing to the war.

The Chinese nation is a peace-loving people, China's military culture and China's Confucian culture, the same as its fundamental spirit is the culture of harmony, and never advocate the pro-peace, good neighbor, active defense. Yanzi Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn Annals of Yanzi) is representative: "Do not invade the land of a great nation, do not consume the people of a small nation, so the vassals all want to be honored; do not rob people with armor, do not intimidate people with the strength of the crowd, so the world all want to be strong." (The fifth of the Third Internal Questions) In the view of war, the military school believes that "since ancient times, it is not a good war", Confucianism advocates benevolence and righteousness to secure the world, Mohism advocates "non-attack", and Taoism pursues the establishment of an ideal society, which is "even though there are armors and armies, there is nothing to display". "The main idea is the same.

Traditional Chinese military science emphasizes that war must be subject to the laws of social morality and justice, and cannot be used merely to advance one's own interests. The use of military violence must be subject to the constraints of human morality and not become unrestrained. Military science should not lead to the self-destruction of mankind; on the contrary, military science must have a deep sense of humanity; only in this way can military science point out the right direction for human military behavior, and military science become a science rich in rationality that is beneficial to the progress of mankind. In today's era of globalization, this spirit of humanitarianism and pacifism in traditional Chinese military science is especially worth exalting in modern international life.

Opening the new face of the study of the Art of War

I have pointed out in my article "Facing New Challenges, Opening New Horizons" that in the face of the new military revolution, the study of the Art of War can not be left out of the world's trend, but should have new concepts and theoretical ideas, new research perspectives and new research methods. In short, the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War must come to a big change.

First of all, it is the transfer of the research fulcrum.

Since the 11th century A.D., the Northern Song Dynasty, "Sun Tzu's Art of War" as a classic, listed as the first of the martial arts scriptures, over the past thousand years, collating its version, annotating its chapters and verses, recognizing its ability to interpret its system of writings, a large number of works have emerged. For a long time, this research tradition of annotating and exegeting has been the fulcrum of the study of The Art of War. While this tradition of research should be continued, the interpretive work on The Art of War is basically finished today. It is an unavoidable historical issue for research to shift to a new fulcrum. In order to seek a new fulcrum, we must explore the deeper cultural implications of The Art of War through the excavation of its ontological spirit. For example, we should explore the strategic tactics and geostrategic issues of multi-polar struggle in today's world through the ideas of "cutting down on strategy" and "cutting down on communication", as well as exploring the issue of building a harmonious world. Only in this way can the study of "The Art of War" be more consciously close to the answer and application of real social problems.

The second is the extension of the research field.

To develop the study of The Art of War, it is necessary not to leave the tradition, but also to go out of the tradition. Not away from the tradition, is to require that we must put "Sun Tzu's Art of War" in the Chinese military traditional culture for comprehensive research. Specifically, Sun Tzu's "Art of War" and the Chinese classical military culture, such as the successive military books, Confucianism, Mozambique, Taoism and law linked to the study, clear "before Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu will not be left behind; Sun Tzu after Sun Tzu can not be left behind the Sun Tzu" inheritance trajectory, and from the essence of the essence of the development of the great.

Out of the tradition, that is, we are required to use the knowledge and means of modern people, with a new perspective, to explore the "Art of War" in the military field and non-military areas of research and application. Research is to solve theoretical problems, application is to solve practical problems, and the two are complementary. Without solving theoretical problems, practical application is also fragmented.

The third is the transformation of research methods.

To make a breakthrough in the methodology of Sun Tzu's Art of War, not only do we need to change the means of research, such as computer retrieval, Internet communication, etc., but we also need to make a breakthrough at the philosophical level, and at the core of which is the problem of innovation. To solve this problem well, it is necessary to place the study of The Art of War in the context of the comparison of Chinese and Western military culture. The modern value of The Art of War can only be truly realized by comparing, integrating and competing with the so-called strong culture of the West.

The fourth is the incremental position of the academic level.

The vitality of the study of "The Art of War" is determined by its academic status, and the key to measuring its academic status is the level of academic level.

It is well known that in the face of a series of new problems raised by the new military revolution, it is impossible and unnecessary for the study of The Art of War to cope with each and every one of them. The Art of War is by no means a panacea for all ills. We can seek useful insights from it, but it cannot provide us with ready-made answers. That kind of discursive and simple analogical research and application method is superficial and undesirable. To improve the academic level, it is necessary to start from the system of Sun Tzu's Art of War, especially from the system of categories of Sun Tzu's Art of War, to link with a series of new topics of war proposed by the new military revolution, and to explore the theoretical essence of Sun Tzu's Art of War from the macro-whole, so as to achieve the purpose of "applying the past to the present". Photo of the silk book "The Art of War"