The Relationship between Political Philosophy and Politics

In the seventh chapter "Civil Rights Theory", Jinlika mainly discusses the harmony of * * *, and the civil rights theory is a research field that Jinlika is good at (see Qian Yongxiang's introduction in the preface of the book), so he devoted a special chapter to the civil rights theory, which of course provided space for him to give full play to his understanding and knowledge in this respect. Moreover, indeed, this chapter gives a very clear and concise overall description of the progress and problems in the theory of citizenship and its policies in contemporary western political philosophy circles, which is very helpful for us to understand the whole picture of this field, especially for the analysis of various paths for political philosophy circles to cultivate civic morality, which is especially enlightening to the author. At the same time, Jinlika's own writing style is clear and fluent, and the translator's writing style is quite consistent with the original, so readers should be able to feel the pleasure of reading. However, in view of the content of this chapter, I think there are great problems in the introduction and comment on the harmony of * * *.

As Jinlika said, in the field of political philosophy, the central concept in the 1970s was "justice and rights", "the key words in the 1980s became * * * isomorphism and membership" 1, and "civil rights became the jargon of all thinkers in the political field" in the 1990s.2. The theoretical opportunity of this change is caused by * * *' s criticism of liberal democracy and liberalism theory, and * * * is also the most influential conceptual tradition in civil rights theory. Therefore, we could have expected this chapter to introduce the theoretical ideas of * * * and ism in more detail, but this expectation is doomed to be impossible in Jinlika's book. Let's first analyze the related issues according to the discussion ideas in the book.

First of all, Jinlika did not introduce the viewpoint of * * from the way of criticizing liberal democracy and liberalism theory, but on the other hand, he wanted to expound his viewpoint by criticizing the viewpoint of * * *, which is of course understandable. However, there is a strange place in Jinlika's introduction, that is, he calls the moderate view of * * * harmony freedom. Jinlika said, "There are two distinct kinds of * * * and ism. One is the classical view, which emphasizes the intrinsic value of political participation; The other is a liberal view that emphasizes the instrumental value of political participation. " This statement is indeed carried out in the following narrative, but it inevitably makes careful readers wonder: since it is a liberal view, how can it be classified as a subordinate category of * * * and socialist views? Isn't liberalism a theoretical vision different from the standpoint of * * *, but a subordinate category under the harmony of * * *? Of course, that's not what Jinlika meant. Jinlika just wants to say that the moderate view of * * * harmony is consistent with liberalism, so it is no different from liberalism. However, if there is really no difference, isn't it a bit unreasonable for these scholars to claim that they are * * * and don't want to be called liberalism? Moreover, if there is no difference, it seems that there is no need to think that these views belong to the category of * * * and socialism, so let's call them liberalism.

Secondly, in the field of democratic theory, Kinlika clearly described the transition from "voting-centered" democratic theory to "dialogue-centered" democratic theory in the early 1990s. This turning point is the emergence of 4 (deliberative democracy 4). In addition to overcoming the shortcomings of voting-centered democracy, Jinlika also talked about two basic tasks that need to be faced when discussing democracy carefully. One is to respond to the reality that there are multiple moral and cultural values (or "good ideas" and "good lifestyle ideas") in modern pluralistic society; Second, even if pluralism is not considered, deliberative politics is needed by a civilized political form or a liberal democratic politics. Jinlika clearly realized the difference between these two levels. He said, "Contemporary debates focus on those qualities: they refer to the qualities related to modern pluralistic liberal democracy, and these qualities are also related to the basic principles of a liberal regime and the political role of citizens in this regime." However, in the further discussion, the difference between the two is blurred, and the problems existing in dealing with multiple values are basically discussed, but the second level is not specifically answered. Theoretically speaking, the issue of pluralistic values seems to be a more intractable and urgent issue in contemporary times. If this problem can be solved, it will undoubtedly show the great value of prudent democracy theory. But for the latter level, it is also a basic problem that * * * and socialism think needs to be answered, and it is a more basic problem. Jinlika basically avoids the * * * and socialist questioning methods.

Next, Jinlika specially introduced the classical viewpoint of * * * harmony, which he called "Aristotle's * * * harmony". This view holds that "political participation has intrinsic value" because "active civic life is actually our highest way of life". "According to this view, political life is superior to purely private family happiness, neighbor friendship and career pursuit, so it should be impossible to engage in politics and make people extremely incomplete and underdeveloped." 6. As the most influential so-called "Aristotle and Doctrine" in the discourse of reviving citizens' morality, Jinlika introduced his views in less than one and a half pages, and then launched six or seven pages of criticism. The introduction and criticism here, although not completely unreasonable, are really too rough and unbelievable. The completely unreasonable viewpoint criticized by Jinlika is expounded in Aristotle's Theory of * * * which has great influence in the field of political philosophy. If the viewpoint of * * * harmony is really like Jinlika's introduction and comments, then people really don't need to take * * * harmony too seriously. Jinlika has successfully made readers feel more confident and can directly send away * * * harmony. At this point, Jinlika is also quite successful.

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From the point of view introduced by Jinlika above, the weights of several expressions are completely different. Most people think that "political participation has intrinsic value" and "active civic life is the highest way of life" is reasonable, which makes people feel a bit exaggerated. "Being unable to engage in politics makes people extremely incomplete and underdeveloped", which makes people feel ridiculous. Jinlika mixed these completely different viewpoints and described them indiscriminately as "Aristotle-style harmony". In fact, it is an extreme and simplified treatment of * * * harmony, which inevitably means that either Jinlika misunderstood the concept of * * * harmony, or Jinlika was not prepared to introduce and comment on * * * harmony clearly and carefully.

Even when explaining the instrumental value of political participation in the name of liberalism, it inevitably touches on the theme of * * * and ism. But it is here that we can find the confusion in Jinlika's argument. It is flexible to say that political participation has instrumental value, but Jinlika's explanation is actually very clear. The instrumental value of his political participation means that "liberal citizens should admit that they have the obligation to create where the judicial system does not exist and defend it where the judicial system is threatened". The former, of course, has nothing to do with citizens who have already lived in a free and democratic country, while the latter obviously believes that it is necessary to actively undertake political obligations only if the regime is threatened. In order to escape the obligation of ordinary citizens to participate in political life in daily life, Jinlika actually retreated to this position. Doesn't he think he has gone too far? However, at the beginning, he also expressed his appreciation for the democratic theory and said: "This obviously puts higher demands on citizens under the democratic system. Under the democratic system, citizens should not only actively and arbitrarily participate in the criticism of authority, but also pursue mutual understanding through consultation, rather than pursuing personal interests exclusively through bargaining or threats. If no citizen has these virtues, liberal democracy cannot realize its promise, and it may indeed be subject to undemocratic and illiberal forces. " Here, whether citizens need to participate in politics to prevent political decline, or whether citizens need to stand up and defend when politics is threatened, are completely two different logics, and the two logics have different requirements for citizens' obligations. Here, Jinlika seems to ignore this difference. Therefore, in the requirements of citizens' political morality, Jinlika first talked about negative civic obligations, but when she recognized the shortcomings of negative civic obligations, she turned to talk about civic etiquette in large numbers. Political participation itself is really unnecessary.

What can be further distinguished here is probably the concept of "obligation" adopted by Jinlika. Indeed, if active participation in political life is regarded as an obligation that citizens must fulfill, people will inevitably worry about the oppressive consequences of too many obligations. However, political activities still have multiple dimensions, and different dimensions require different levels of participation. For people with low participation, it can be said that some basic forms of participation will not bring too much burden to citizens. For example, compulsory voting in parliamentary or presidential elections, otherwise certain economic penalties will be given, which has been implemented in some countries such as Australia. More active participation requires more time and more cost, which is not suitable as a compulsory obligation, but it is still certain that it should be encouraged. The word "obligation" correspondingly requires that if it is violated, it will be punished, which is one of the ways to promote some behavior. We don't use the term obligation, but use "honor" to encourage a certain public spirit, so as to distinguish some citizens who can better reflect the civic spirit from some more negative citizens, and it will not bring the oppressive consequences that Jinlika is worried about.

An important issue in discussing democratic theory carefully is the diversity of moral and cultural values in modern society. If the ancient city of * * * and China are highly homogeneous, and therefore * * * enjoys basically homogeneous moral and cultural values, then there will inevitably be pluralism in modern society, which is not necessarily regarded as a defect, but as the expansion of people's free space. However, unlike the ancient Republic, in a pluralistic society, the natural collective autonomy in the city-state is questioned. If people have different beliefs about basic moral and cultural values, how can citizens collectively control political power?

For * * * and socialists, the diversification of modern society is an acceptable and necessary prerequisite. Surprisingly, although some famous representatives of * * * harmony, such as Arendt and Bock, did not find that they rejected the diversity of modern society, Habermas took Frank Michelmann as an example to show that * * * harmony rejected the diversity of modern society and demanded to return to a highly homogeneous * * * isomorphism. 10 Many people who are skeptical about * * * and ism follow this criticism. Although Habermas said in his article that it is based on Frank Michelmann's distinction between liberalism and democracy, it implies that whether democracy can accept another position on this issue has been ignored, and his own discussion is based on a polarized interpretation framework. However, Habermas' model of procedural democracy can not only be accommodated by * * and socialism, but also many scholars, including M Fisk, insist that Habermas' model of procedural democracy is 1 1, which embodies the position of * * and socialism. In fact, it is almost incomprehensible to imagine that contemporary pacifists reject the pluralism of modern society. What is certain, however, is that the harmony of * * * inherently emphasizes the value of * * *, and accordingly limits the individual claims that liberalism particularly emphasizes, which naturally conflicts with pluralism in modern society. But conflicts are inherent in social life, so conflicts can be mediated, not just rejected. In fact, we see that many pacifists are thinking on the premise of diversified social values.

If we return to the perspective of deliberative politics, we can see another difference, that is, the difference between the purpose of prudent discussion and the means of prudent discussion. In the case of diversified values of modern moral culture, people have great differences about what kind of life style is a good life. These differences have been generally considered to be theoretically impossible to eliminate in the contemporary context, but these values will conflict in public life. Therefore, it is a task that needs to be discussed carefully to adjust the requirements of different moral and cultural values in different situations. On the other hand, there is no great controversy about the purpose to be achieved, or people have * * * knowledge on the issue of a better life, or although they have different views on what a better life is, they clearly understand the interests of * * * on a public issue, but there is still controversy about how to realize this public interest. There is a problem here. Everyone's information is different. It should be said that the most important and frequent problem in political life is the second kind of problem 12, but from a purely theoretical point of view, theorists mainly deal with the first kind of problem. It is precisely because the second question constitutes the basic experience in life that citizens need to participate. Although it is not aimed at a specific citizen, on the whole, if not enough citizens undertake this obligation, the informal public sphere will inevitably decline. On the other hand, those who don't undertake this civic responsibility are actually hitchhikers in socialist politics, although a healthy regime can accommodate quite a few hitchhikers. If * * * is worried about the decline of the public sector, but is committed to promoting the revival of the public sector and encouraging citizens to participate cautiously, then liberals believe that this should be left to individuals to choose freely. Liberalism can be roughly divided into three attitudes on this issue. The first is that liberal democracy is the most suitable politics for human nature. This kind of regime may be difficult to establish, but it can automatically maintain and survive after it is established. The second view is that there needs to be a system of mutual restriction besides human nature, so that the restriction of power can be successfully realized and politics can operate on its own. This view was particularly popular in the19th century. (Kant's point of view), the third point of view also realizes that the system itself is not enough and must be supported by citizens and society, but it is considered to be a social and private matter divorced from politics. 13

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Jinlika said, "Aristotle-style pacifists believe that people stay away from political participation because they find that politics cannot meet people's wishes." 14. Then Jinlika confidently explained that the reason why we modern people are obsessed with private life is that compared with ancient Greece, the private life and social life in modern society are more abundant. This statement is certainly insightful, and Arendt's explanation in The Human Condition provides an impressive description of this contrast. In fact, for * * * harmony, it has always been thought that people's basic tendency is more willing to at least be more likely to sink into private life, which is also the special meaning that * * * harmony's "corruption" is equivalent to different modern times. (The corruption of ordinary citizens means that citizens use public power to seek benefits for individuals or small groups, which is consistent with contemporary usage, but the word corruption in contemporary times is mainly used to refer to public officials, and is rarely used to refer to civil acts) * * * Harmony is worried that citizens are generally addicted to private life in their daily political life, leading to the hollowing out of public space or public sphere.

The division between private sphere and public sphere really represents the different meanings of liberalism and harmony. It should be necessary to briefly explain the relationship between private life and political life. First, * * * harmony does not belittle the value of private life in general, and active citizens advocated by * * * harmony do not necessarily take political life as the center of their whole life activities. In a person's life, most people naturally take personal life and social life as the center of their lives. For individuals, they stay away from politics and do not actively participate in political life all their lives, but seek meaning in religious life or artistic life. Second, in the field of political life, that is, the public sphere, the value of private life is bound to have little political value. For example, although Arendt believes that the production activities represented by art provide support for the stable world of human culture, production is still a non-political activity. Therefore, for the political field, political life, that is, citizens' active participation in the public sphere, is very important. Third, from the political field, it will be a very serious thing for citizens to generally retreat into private life space. In fact, the "symptom of citizen's privatization" mentioned by Jinlika is worried about "hollowing out the public sphere", or "privatization of the public sphere" in the terminology of * * *. Therefore, it is not a problem of individual citizens, but a political problem of the whole body, and ultimately it is undoubtedly a personal problem of every citizen.

To say that liberalism refuses to admit the value of isomorphism of * * * may not be fully accepted by liberalism. On the one hand, liberalism believes that the value of any isomorphism should be based on personal choice. It is unacceptable for liberalism in theory not to give individuals a critical examination of whether the value of this isomorphism is worthy of belief (although

Kim Gryka believes that the difference between liberalism and * * * harmony may be empirical, not theoretical, in order to maintain the same value. Although the difference in expression is far greater than this view, the doctrine of * * * calls for political action, the reconstruction of the public sector and even the role of national policies in maintaining the value of * * *, while liberalism at least does not deny that the value of * * * needs to be maintained, but resolutely refuses to maintain it through political action, and even more resolutely cannot agree that such a role can be played by national actions. It should also be pointed out that there are significant differences between liberalism and pacifism in their understanding of politics. * * * Pacifism tends to regard the behavior of citizens and associations in the field of public affairs as political behavior, while liberalism regards the behavior of big countries or countries as political behavior. In the view of liberalism, the behavior in civil society is more the result of independent choice than political behavior. So, where are the differences between the two sides? (Not completely opposed to national policy intervention to maintain the unity of * * *, but there are some vigilance, and liberalism is firmly and completely opposed. This difference is obvious, but whether this difference is enough to be the fundamental difference between the two cannot be asserted. Taylor made a clearer analysis of this. Liberalism regards civil society as the ideal standard of political collective autonomy without state interference, while * * * harmony regards the decision and implementation of state policies as the standard of civil collective autonomy. 16

At least, it is clear that * * * harmony itself is a movement to maintain the constant value of * * *, which represents efforts to promote social ties, and liberalism is undoubtedly unwilling to play this role. Although liberals also believe that the same value needs to be maintained, it is impossible to assume this responsibility because of their own liberal position.

Jinlika follows Rawls' distinction between two kinds of * * * and * *. Rawls claims that his revised liberal interpretation is compatible with the instrumentalists, who also put the value of political life on the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens who pursue different purposes, which is different from the so-called citizens' * * * and * *, that is, the Aristotelian * * and * * mentioned by Jinlika.

The dichotomy between instrumental value and intrinsic value of political life may not be suitable for explaining the real difference between * * * and liberalism in locating the political significance of citizens' political participation. This distinction also fails to understand the profound understanding of the political significance of * * * and the anxiety about contemporary liberal politics. We can completely accept that political life has both intrinsic value and instrumental value for citizens, and political life is not just a "necessary evil". * * * In what ways and systems does pacifism improve and correct the defects of modern society and contemporary liberal politics? It is not a definite answer, but what contemporary pacifist thinkers have done is precisely the theoretical efforts in this respect.

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