What is the logic of Olson's collective action? Urgently beg

Since the late 1950s and early 1960s, a new branch of modern economics, public choice theory, has flourished, which studies non-market decision-making issues that traditional economics does not care about. The reason why traditional economics does not study such problems is that such decisions and actions are determined by non-market factors, so it goes beyond the traditional assumptions about behavior in economics. But the expansion and progress of modern economics just prove that non-market problems do not mean that they cannot be studied by economic methods. On the contrary, the theory of public * * * selection has been firmly attached to the most basic behavior assumption of "economic man" since its birth, which holds that besides those who participate in private economic activities, participants in public * * * activities are also subject to this, and they all tend to maximize their behavior, so-called public * * * interests without actors do not exist. At present, the theory of public choice is not only an independent portal in economics, but also permeates all aspects of social, economic and political life. Many foreign scholars also use it to analyze the formation, evolution and transformation from planned economy to market economy, which has aroused more and more enthusiastic attention in China academic circles. The Logic of Collective Action written by Professor Olson is the basis of public choice theory.

Chapter 1 gives a logical theoretical explanation of some aspects of group and organizational behavior. The second chapter discusses the significance of analyzing groups of different sizes, and draws the conclusion that in many cases, small groups are more efficient and energetic. The third chapter examines the significance of the argument in support of trade unions, and draws the following conclusions: in most cases, some form of compulsory membership system is very important to trade unions. The fourth chapter investigates Marx's social class theory and analyzes the state theory put forward by other economists with the method proposed in this paper. The fifth chapter analyzes the "group theory" used by many political scientists according to the logic expounded in this study, and proves that the usual understanding of this theory is logically contradictory. In the last chapter, a new pressure group theory is proposed, which is consistent with the logical relationship outlined in chapter 1. This theory shows that the membership system and strength of big pressure groups are not the result of lobbying and dredging activities, but the by-products of other activities.