What is the distribution uniform implemented in China at this stage? Why should we implement such a unified distribution?

China's current distribution system is based on distribution according to work, and various distribution systems coexist. At the beginning of reform and opening up, this distribution model was adopted to meet the needs of developing productive forces, because the level of productive forces in China was extremely backward at that time, and it was necessary to introduce advanced production technology and capital to make up for the shortage. It promotes the full utilization of resources and the liberation of productive forces. The current distribution system is unreasonable and has the following defects: the basic system defect of initial distribution (1) The income distribution effect of property right system From the different levels of income distribution, the property right system should belong to the category of initial distribution, or the basic system of initial income distribution. Property right is about property rights. The "property right" discussed in modern economics includes not only the "ownership" in the usual legal sense (that is, the right to possess property according to law), but also the right to possess, use, dispose of and distribute income, as well as the rights of creditor's rights, intellectual property rights and all transactions. Income distribution is nothing more than the distribution of property rights income, so from a broader perspective, the income distribution system is also a part of the property rights system. From Marx's economic theory to western economics, from classical economics to modern economics, the property right system is regarded as the most basic economic system, which fully affirms its decisive role in other economic systems, including the distribution system. The basic functions of property right system, such as incentive function, constraint function and resource allocation function, will bring corresponding income distribution effect. As the starting point of China's economic system reform, the rural contract responsibility system, the reform of the production and operation mode of state-owned enterprises with the separation of ownership and management rights, and the development of various economic forms are all changes in the property rights system. The impact of this property right system reform on income distribution is: the distribution mode has changed to distribution according to work as the main body and multiple distribution modes coexist; Significant changes have taken place in the structure of income sources. The proportion of net operating income and property income in the income source structure of urban households has increased, and the proportion of wage income and property income in the income source structure of farmers has increased. The defects of the current property right system and its influence on income distribution-the incomplete property right and the dislocation of the main body cause the incomplete distribution system and the confusion of distribution behavior. Incomplete property rights and subject dislocation will directly affect the incentive function of property rights and the efficiency of property rights system. This is outstanding in the traditional state-owned economy. As the owner of state-owned assets, workers are empty and therefore incomplete. He can neither bind users by hand voting nor transfer ownership by foot voting, so the profitability of assets is not available or incomplete for workers. As the operator of the state-owned economy, on the one hand, it can exercise the ownership of state-owned assets instead of others (such as "insider control"), forming a "dislocation" of the subject of property rights; On the other hand, his income cannot be completely linked to his business performance, that is, his management right is incomplete (asymmetric rights, responsibilities and interests), which is manifested in unclear property rights. The reform of the property right system of state-owned enterprises has continued to this day, and the problems of "absence of owners" and "separation of government from enterprises" have not really been solved. In the enterprises that have established the corporate system, the corporate governance structure of effective checks and balances among the shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the managers has not really taken shape. Collective economy, especially township collective enterprises, also has a serious problem of "fuzzy property rights". The defect of enterprise property right system has become the main obstacle to the reform of enterprise distribution system. Some common distribution methods and means in modern enterprise system, such as annual salary system, option incentive and equity incentive, are intermittent. Or in the case that the enterprise property right system is not complete and there is no effective supervision and restriction system, the distribution model tilted towards a few operators, such as operator equity incentive, is hastily implemented, resulting in the loss of state-owned assets. In the aspect of rural land property right system, at present, farmers only have the right to use or operate contracted land, but have no disposal rights such as transfer, mortgage, shareholding and corresponding income rights. Rural land has not really become a factor of production that can be circulated and traded in the market. This land property right system is not conducive to the rational allocation and use of land, but also encourages the power and money transactions and graft in the process of land grant by the government, so that a few people enrich themselves, but farmers cannot benefit from it. -"Distribution according to work" and "distribution according to factor contribution" and their combination have not really broken the problem. First, the factor market is imperfect, which leads to the impossibility of realizing factor property rights. Under the condition of market economy? Distribution according to the contribution of production factors? Is the basic requirement of property right system, which can optimize resource allocation in theory? It can also achieve fairness in income distribution. But? Its preconditions are full competition in the market, symmetrical information, clear property rights of factors and full flow of production factors. At present, China's factor market is still in the initial stage of construction and does not have the basic conditions for a mature market. The transaction and flow of factor property rights are often hindered by administrative forces, especially the state-owned assets property rights trading platform has not been set up, which makes the contributions of various factors not fully realized according to the fair market value, and the property rights interests are distorted. Second, the realization form and mechanism of "combining distribution according to work and distribution according to factors" have not been broken. Among the factors of production, besides capital, land and labor, the key is how technology and management participate in the distribution process through "technology capitalization" and "management capitalization", and it is necessary to explore effective concrete forms and ways to achieve them. Third, the protection system for workers in Lao Quan is lacking, and the value of labor force is seriously deprived. Like other factors of production, the labor force should have its own value, and its owner's rights and labor property rights should also be safeguarded. However, at present, China's total labor supply exceeds demand and capital supply is insufficient, so the labor force is naturally at a disadvantage in the factor market. Especially in the low-end labor market, the labor remuneration of unskilled and unskilled laborers, mainly rural migrant workers, is pushed down to the limit, and they lack basic social security and are deprived of capital for a long time. -A single state-owned investment system is an important reason why the administrative monopoly in infrastructure is difficult to break. Investment is the realization and extension of property rights. At present, China's infrastructure investment is mainly government financial investment, and the space and channels for private capital investment have not yet been opened. The single subject of state-owned investment is the main reason why most of our administrative monopoly is concentrated in the field of infrastructure construction. Monopoly operation will inevitably produce monopoly profits, which is not conducive to improving investment efficiency and asset operation efficiency, and is also not conducive to the establishment of a fair distribution system. The change of single state-owned investment system in infrastructure field depends on the fundamental change of state-owned property right system. (2) Wage system In addition to the wage system of non-public units, China still implements the wage system headed by the government in state-owned units, especially government institutions. Because the staff size of state-owned units is still huge, their wage levels and rules still have a noticeable impact on social income distribution. The current wage system is formed through constant adjustment and reform in the transition from planned system to market economy system, and it still inevitably has the color of traditional system, which is still far from the wage system under the market economy system, which is manifested in the rigidity within the system, anomie outside the system, and the coexistence of insufficient incentives and weak constraints. The concrete manifestations are: low wage level, rigid wage growth mechanism and lack of institutional guarantee, which leads to the expansion of extra-wage income and encourages the abnormal income of employees in state-owned units; The salary structure is unreasonable, and the ratio of post performance salary to annual salary is too low, which can not reflect the reasonable salary difference and lacks the incentive and restraint function; The wage management of state-owned enterprises still has a strong administrative color, and the problems of improper intervention and poor restraint coexist; The labor market lacks an effective supervision and management system for the minimum wage and wage payment management of non-state-owned employers, which makes a large number of enterprises infringe on the rights and interests of employees in reality. System defects related to redistribution 1. The coverage of the social security system (1) is insufficient, and the beneficiaries are mainly employees of formal units in cities and towns, while the informal sector, non-mainstream groups and rural residents basically have no or only partial social security; (2) The system is not unified, and there is a dual-track system of social security. In addition to the division between urban and rural areas, there are still institutional differences between enterprises and institutions in cities and towns; (3) There is no system guarantee, the social security law has not been promulgated, there is no mandatory constraint on the payment and collection of social security funds, and the determination and implementation of standards are subjective and arbitrary. 2. Tax system (1) The taxpayer's tax burden is unfair, and the tax policy is not perfect. There are problems of unfair tax burden between urban and rural residents, between high and low income groups and between different economic types; (2) The tax treatment is quite different, and the expense deduction is unreasonable; (3) The tax system is imperfect, and there is a lack of tax settings related to property and its income; (4) The means of collection and management are backward? The level of collection and management is difficult to improve. 3. The fiscal transfer payment system (1) has unclear policy orientation and weak adjustment function; (2) The objectives of the intergovernmental financial management system, including the transfer payment system, are unclear; (3) The scope of government affairs and financial power at all levels is vague; (4) There are many forms of transfer payment and decentralized management. 4. The system of "three distributions" Private charities and public welfare undertakings are important components of income redistribution and social welfare construction in mature market economy countries. At present, there is still a lack of social mechanism to encourage and support non-governmental forces to enter charity and public welfare undertakings in China. Institutional defects related to non-income distribution 1. Employment and labor market system (1) The "ternary" labor market and employment system and policy divided by urban and rural areas, state-owned and non-state-owned, formal and informal employees; (2) Administrative division of high-end and low-end labor markets; (3) An employment service system focusing on helping laid-off workers of state-owned enterprises find jobs again. 2. The public education system (1) lacks financial input, charges the public unreasonably, and public education loses its public welfare; (2) Unreasonable investment and structure of financial funds hinder the development of basic education and vocational and technical education; (3) Differentiated education policies aggravate the inequality of citizens' basic rights and the polarization between the rich and the poor in society. Based on the analysis of the above-mentioned related systems, the main defects of China's current income distribution system are: urban-rural duality, administrative dominance, disorder and lack of public welfare. The direct reason comes from the fuzziness of institutional objectives, the incompleteness of institutional framework and the "double track" of institutional path. In addition to productivity factors, the institutional root lies in the property right system and government management system in the transitional period under the immature market-oriented system. The absence and offside of government functions run through all related institutional problems.