The Incomprehensiveness of Virtue Ethics

The foregoing argument makes an impressive case for two general points: (a) that a proper theory of ethics must provide an understanding of moral character; and (b) that modern moral philosophies have failed on this point. Not only have they ignored the topic, but their ignoring has sometimes led them to insist on doctrines that distort the understanding of the nature of moral character. Assuming we accept these conclusions, where do we go from here?

One way forward would be to develop a theory that combines the best features of the proper behavioral progression with insights gained from the virtue progression - we could try to refine utilitarianism, Kantianism, for example, by adding a better account of moral character to these theories. Then our general theory would contain an account of virtue, but that account only as a complement to a theory of justified behavior. This sounds sensible, and there are, obviously, many arguments in favor of such a project if it were to be successfully implemented.

But some virtue theorists have suggested that we should move in a different direction. They have argued that virtue ethics should be treated as a theory that chooses between itself and other kinds of theories-as an independent ethical theory that is complete in itself. Is this a viable view of what we might call radical virtue ethics?

Meritability and behavior. As we have already seen, theories that emphasize proper conduct seem incomplete because they ignore the question of character. Virtue theory remedies this by making character its center of attention. As a result, however, virtue theory risks being incomplete in the opposite way. Moral questions are often questions about what we ought to do. According to virtue theory, it is not obvious how we should go about deciding what we do.

The answer to this question relies on the spirit in which the theory of virtue is formulated. If virtue theory is proposed only as a supplement to a theory of justified behavior, then some resources in the general theory will come into play when the question is to evaluate behavior, and ( for example) some version of utilitarianism or Kantianism will be recommended. On the other hand,

If the theory of virtue is presented as an independent theory, intended to be comprehensive in its own right, some more dramatic steps will be taken. Either the theory would have had to be discarded along with the idea of justified behavior, or it would have had to give some account of the idea of self-generated virtue.

While this may seem like a pretty crazy idea at first, some philosophers have argued that we should get rid of concepts like morally justified behavior. Anscombe says it would be a huge step forward if we stopped using these ideas. She says we still might evaluate behavior as better or worse, but we do so in other terms. Instead of saying that an act is morally wrong, we simply say that it is insincere or unjust - in terms that arise from the vocabulary of virtues. According to her, in order to explain why an act is rejected, we don't have to say anything else, just that.

But for radical virtue theorists, discarding ideas like moral justification is indeed unnecessary. These ideas will be maintained by giving them a new interpretation within the framework of virtue [U9]. This could be accomplished in the following ways: first, it could be argued that acts are evaluated as justified or unjustified in a familiar way by reference to the reasons for or against an act - we should perform those acts that are beneficial to people and for which there is the best justification. The reasons cited, however, will all be those associated with virtue. Thus, the reasons in favor of doing the act will be honesty, generosity, justice, and so on, while the reasons against doing it will be dishonesty, stinginess, injustice, and so on. This analysis can be summarized by saying that it is our duty to act characteristically - in other words, the proper thing to do is the thing that a person of character would do.

The problem of incompleteness. We have depicted the way radical virtue theorists understand what we ought to do. Is this understanding sufficient? The principle problem with this theory is the problem of incompleteness.

To clear up this problem, think about a typical virtue, such as honesty. Suppose a person is tempted to lie, perhaps because lying can yield some benefit in a given situation. According to the radical virtue ethics progression, he shouldn't lie because it would be dishonest to do so. This sounds plausible enough. But what does honesty mean? Are not honest people those who follow the norm of not lying? It's hard to understand what honesty is if it's not a character that follows such a norm.

But inevitably we will ask: Why is such a norm important? Why should people not lie, especially when there is something to be won from it? In short, we need an answer that goes beyond simple observations such as that doing so would contradict the possession of a particular character trait; we need an explanation of why it is better to have that trait than to have the opposite. The answer might be that the policy of truth-telling is on the whole self-serving, or that it advances the general welfare, or that it is needed by people who have to live together and are therefore dependent on each other. The first explanation looks suspiciously like ethical egoism, the second is utilitarianism, and the third is reminiscent of contractarian ways of thinking. In any case, engaging in any bit of interpretation seems to take us outside the boundaries of a theory of virtue that does not complement other theories.

And it's hard to figure out how a theory of virtue not supplemented by other theories would deal with situations of moral conflict. Suppose I had just gotten a haircut (in 1992 I had an auburn fish in the same shape as my current hair) and asked you what you thought of it, thus placing you in a position of responsibility. You could also tell me the truth, or you could say I look okay. Honesty and goodwill are virtues, so there are arguments for or against each choice. But you have to choose one or the other - either you tell the truth and are unkind, or you don't tell the truth and are kind. Which should you do? The exhortation to behave virtuously as such cannot in itself provide much help. It just leaves you confused as to which virtue takes precedence. To resolve such conflicts, it seems we need some more basic guidance, guidance that goes beyond those that radical virtue theory can offer.

Is there a virtue that goes with every morally sufficient reason for doing something? Finally, the question of incompleteness points to more general theoretical difficulties with the radical ethical progression. As we have seen, according to this advance, the reasons for or against doing an act must be tied to one or more virtues. Thus, radical virtue ethics endorses the idea that for any sufficient reason that might be given for approving the performance of an act, there is a virtue that goes with it, which is the character that accepts and acts on that reason. But this does not seem to be true.

Suppose you're a legislator who has to decide how to allocate medical research funds - there's not enough money to do everything, and you have to decide whether to put resources into Eids research, or fighting cancer, or some other worthwhile program. And suppose you decide that in this case it's better to do what most people will benefit from. Does a virtue exist that matches the character of the person doing it? If so, maybe it should be called acting like a utilitarian. Or to return to the example of moral conflict, is there a virtue tied to principles that can be invoked to resolve conflicts between virtues? If there is, perhaps it is the virtue of wisdom-it is, say, the ability to figure out and do what is best overall. But that buries the contest, and if we only propose such a virtue in order to make all moral decisions made fit into what we think is a preferable framework, then while we have saved radical virtue ethics, we have done so at the expense of abandoning its key ideas.

For these reasons, it seems best to think of virtue theory as part of a total ethical theory, rather than as a total theory in its own right. The total theory would include an account of all considerations, both of the making of practical decisions and of their deeper rationality.