What is the system of deductive logic called?

Formal logic (formal logic) is the study of deductive reasoning and its laws of science, including the study of the logical nature of the word and proposition form, the study of the structure of thought and the study of the inevitable introduction, which provides a test of valid reasoning and non-valid reasoning standards. It summarizes the lessons of human thinking, to maintain the certainty of thinking as the core, with a series of rules, methods to help people correctly think about the problem and express their thoughts, is a necessary tool for people to understand the world and transform the world, is the development of human understanding to a certain stage of the emergence of thinking methods. Kant first used this term.

Research Methods of Formal Logic The relationship between the premises and the conclusion in the reasoning studied by formal logic is determined by the logical form of the propositions that serve as the premises and the conclusion, while the logical nature of the logical form of the propositions (referred to as the form of the propositions) is determined by the logical constants. To clarify the nature of logical constants and systematically reveal the laws of reasoning, it is necessary to carry out the study of meta-logic by establishing logical algorithms. The method of studying meta-logic is the formal axiomatic method.

The rules of formal logic The law of identity, the law of contradiction, the law of exclusion and the law of sufficiency of reason. These four laws require certainty, absence of contradiction, consistency and argumentation in thinking.

Defects and Transcendence of Formal Logic

Human thought consists of its content and form. The attempt of formal logic to understand the whole picture of thinking by grasping the form of thinking without considering the content of thinking is obviously impossible. This attempt has met with criticism from both East and West.

The East is the famous school of the Warring States period, represented by Huishi, Gongsunlong, Huan Tuan, and Wei Mou, who greatly complicated the content of logic by replacing its content with limiting scenarios or by adding factors such as space and time, motion (stasis), observers, and categories, i.e., using limiting scenarios and complicating scenarios to make the formal logic of the time bankrupt. The principle is that there is always a certain carrying capacity of the form, and if the content exceeds the limit of the form, then the original form collapses, and a new form adapted to the new content follows. But the philosophical naivety that led them to build on the ruins of formal logic was sophistry-they metamorphosed from would-be discoverers to pure destroyers. In the West, on the other hand, there was Hegel, who shifted the center of gravity of the study of logic to the content of logic, thus establishing dialectical logic.

Instead of building logic on the basis of content, as Hegel did, the masters were satisfied by manipulating content to bring down formal logic. They took pleasure in debating and were happy when they confused their opponents. Thus, they could not avoid the temptation of sophistry. Hegel, on the other hand, proceeds to build a new logic at the same time as he criticizes formal logic. In addition, as far as the object of criticism is concerned, the formal logic in China at that time was not yet highly developed, and its claims were fragmented, which led to the fact that what the famous writers could give after criticizing it was an isolated sophistic proposition. On the other hand, the formal logic criticized by Hegel is systematic, and if the criticism is to be successful, it is necessary to find an equally systematic logic to replace it, rather than playing with a few propositions. Naturally, Hegel's dialectical logic was and is still flawed. For example, the Absolute Spirit only negates itself twice - why not a third time? In addition, by over-criticizing formal logic, dialectical logic stays on a purely discursive level. These problems left over from idealistic dialectics have finally been solved here in materialistic dialectics.

[edit]II. Development

Formal logic has gone through more than 2,000 years of history, before the mid-19th century, formal logic is mainly traditional logic, and after the mid-19th century the development of modern formal logic, usually called mathematical logic, also known as symbolic logic.

Traditional Logic

Traditional logic usually categorizes propositions into straightforward propositions, elective propositions, and hypothetical propositions, and examines the forms of these propositions and the forms of reasoning. Traditional logic also includes theories about the laws of logic, such as the laws of contradiction and the law of exclusion, and theories about lexical items.

The founder of formal logic in Europe was Aristotle in ancient Greece. Aristotle's established the first logical system, that is, the theory of trinitarianism. His masterpieces on formal logic are Metaphysics and Theory of Instruments. Following Aristotle, the Megara-Stoa school of logic revealed some important properties of propositional conjunctions, discovered several forms and laws of reasoning related to propositional conjunctions, and developed deductive logic. Another ancient Greek philosopher, Epicurus, on the other hand, believed that induction was the only scientific method. Some medieval logicians, developed and enriched formal logic. In modern times, Bacon and John Müller further developed the inductive method.

In China, the emergence of formal logic was basically contemporaneous with Europe. The schools of thought represented were the Mohists and the Nominalists, in addition to Xunzi of Confucianism. It is interesting to note that the Mohists studied logic in order to find the principles of logic, while the Named School established a system of sophistry. The Mozi school's understanding of logic is centered in the Mojing, which has a systematic discussion of logic. For example, it distinguishes between sufficient conditions and necessary conditions, and proposes that "the big reason (sufficient conditions), what is necessary is inevitable, what is not must not be" and "the small reason (necessary conditions), what is not necessary is not, what is not must not be". On the other hand, Huishi, a member of the Famous School, put forward the sophistry principle of "contractual dissimilarity" with the aim of canceling the boundary of concepts. Contrary to Huishi, Gongsunlong, who is also a member of the School of Names, put forward the sophistry principle of "Li Jianbai", which holds that any independent concept has and can only have a single attribute. The famous masters put forward many sophistic propositions, such as "a white horse is not a horse", "a chicken has three legs", "an orphaned calf has no mother", "a chain has no clasps "

This is the first time I've ever seen a white dog with a black face, and I've never seen a white dog with a black face.

Obviously, this kind of "backward" research method is unique to China, it can establish its sophistry system just shows that the level of logical development is very low, there are a lot of loopholes - so the famous one can take advantage of. However, this move of the famous masters also made these loopholes fully exposed, providing a stepping stone for the research of future generations - if we want to develop logic, we have to overcome the sophistic propositions of the famous masters. In addition, there are rational elements in the sophomoric propositions of the famous masters - some of them do hit the nail on the head of formal logic, which implies that there are other logics besides formal logic. Finally, some of the propositions of the famous writers may contain reasonable insights about nature and about human cognitive processes. For example, the proposition that "the center of the world is the north of Yan and the south of Yue" must be based on the premise that "the earth is round" if it is to be valid. At that time, the sky is round and the place is dominated by the "Gaitian theory", the famous artist can have such a realization is not easy. Another proposition is that "the bird has never moved", which, if interpreted correctly, would mean that the master realized that our intuitive conception of "motion" was based on the realization that we would have generalized the understanding of stillness twice. It was not easy to make these judgments at the time, but it is unfortunate that these realizations came in the form of sophistry.

Since then, the development of formal logic in China has basically come to a standstill.

In ancient India, in the fourth century B.C., the Shenglun and Zhenglun schools pioneered the science of Ingenuity, which was perfected by Chenna in the sixth century and called New Ingenuity. Innomics, or formal logic.

Mathematical logic It is the modern formal logic. It is called mathematical logic because, on the one hand, it is due to the extensive use of an artificial symbolic language in research, and developed to use a formalized axiomatic method, and also applied certain mathematical tools and specific results; on the other hand, it is due to the fact that the development of modern formal logic is driven by the basic research of mathematics, especially by the in-depth study of the logical laws of mathematical proofs and the basic research of mathematics raised in the logical problems. Mathematical logic is also called symbolic logic because it uses an artificial symbolic language. The founder of mathematical logic was G.W. Leibniz. Leibniz put forward the idea of establishing a "universal symbolic language", reasoning and arithmetic, and mechanization of thought. Although Leibniz himself did not achieve his goals, the development of mathematical logic has gradually (not yet fully) realized Leibniz's ideals, with G. Frege establishing the first system of first-order logic in his book The Language of Concepts, published in 1879, and G. Cantor founding set theory in the 1870s. The establishment of set theory, and in particular the first system of first-order logic, marked a modern stage in the development of formal logic.

[edit]III. Misinterpretation and Re-understanding of Formal Logic

In the 1930s and 1940s, the Soviet Union had criticized formal logic as metaphysics and took dialectics as the only scientific logic. To speak of dialectics one must criticize formal logic. Under this influence, some people in China at that time also "pronounced" the "death sentence" of formal logic. However, before 1949, this trend of rejecting formal logic was not a mainstream thought in China, and between 1949 and 1950, it became the mainstream thought in China.

It was only after the publication of Stalin's Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics in 1950 that formal logic was "vindicated" in China. However, the "vindication" was not complete, as in the Soviet Union, formal logic still carries the hat of "elementary logic", while "higher logic" naturally does not belong to dialectics or dialectical logic. Denying and belittling formal logic not only hindered the development of logical science, but also caused the evil consequences of the prevalence of sophistry. Hegel commented with great contempt on Leibniz's conception of mathematical logic. Mathematical logic, which sprang up only after the emergence of Marxism (the first system of mathematical logic was proposed by Ferege in 1879), was regarded in the early 1950s as a pseudo-science serving the monopoly bourgeoisie in the age of imperialism.

It was only in the 1961s that the Soviet logic textbooks of the 1950s and 1960s began to break out of some of their boxes, clearing them of all the common-sense errors that the Soviet textbooks had spread.

[edit]IV. Relationship between formal logic and other logics

Logic beyond formal logic

Logic, an abstraction of the thinking process. The purpose of studying logic is to figure out at the level of thinking the reasons for the conclusions reached. From the point of view of this research task, any thinking process that has the effect of drawing conclusions is a logical process. Accordingly, human logic should be divided into three main categories, namely, plain logic, instrumental logic (including nominal logic, formal logic, representational logic) and dialectical logic.

Formal and Plain Logic

In contrast to plain logic, formal logic is flawed in its inability to explain some of the events of life and the origin of logic that does not correspond to formal logic itself. A concrete example is the linguistic construction "Even ...... (noun A) I don't think ...... (adjective Z), so ...... (noun B) would still be ...... (adjective Z)?" Formal logic is just not explainable. Plain logic, on the other hand, can be explained by the major premise "A is more Z than B", the minor premise "A is not Z", and the conclusion "B is less Z". The reason for this is that formal logic does not recognize that sentences expressing contrasts can be treated as triadic propositions, which makes it unable to explain the process of "contrast" in plain logic. In addition, "fictitious", "immersion", "substitution", "coloring" in plain logic, "reverse interpretation", "near-interpretation", and "analogy" are logical processes that seem incomprehensible to formal logic, but they exist in life. Falsely, for example, if we assume that there is a rope that is uniform in appearance, then this rope can be used to extract an object of infinite mass. Here, according to the viewpoint of formal logic, the logical process is completely meaningless, since the presuppositions deviate from the objective facts. But it is a variety of hypothetical scenarios that influence human action. Physical limits are hypothetical, such as absolute zero. It is impossible to reach, but just because it is impossible to reach does not negate the significance of absolute zero.

Baptism, for example, is the idea that "the closer you are to a person, the blacker you are to the person who is close to the ink," and although we all know that there is something wrong with that, we can't avoid falling into that trap when we think about things. Let's say that students with good grades must be good at everything - even though everyone knows that this is problematic, how many classes can avoid this cliché when evaluating the top three students? If formal logic is absolute, then this situation is a non-starter. Alternatives are, for example, "What is good for me is good for someone else" or, conversely, "What works for someone else will work for me". Then there are the negative forms of the two expressions - which are based on the premise that "I and others are irreplaceable", and are nothing more than the reverse use of substitution. In fact, whether it is good or not, whether it is useful or not, we have to try to know, so can we say that the simple logic of substitution is not useful? Can we say that the simple logic of substitution is not useful? Because "substitution" plays the role of motivation, for example, when I conclude that "what I think is good, others also think is good", I will use words and deeds to motivate others to use that thing. Formal logic can't recognize the value of substitution at all, because it seems to formal logic to be something of a stolen concept, something of an empty gesture.

Assigning color, for example, to a musician, a would-be painter, and a sculptor, seeing the same artistic event, would be perceived by them as different conceptual objects, melody, color, and space, respectively. This is actually the three types of artists in their own attributes to "paint" the same event after the conclusion that they give the objective world with their own identified "color". Analyzing the problem with formal logic is itself a process of coloring, but it is clearly not perceived as such.

Reverse interpretation, i.e., explaining the events that happened first by the events that happened later in the chronological order. We say that Wang Jingwei was a conspirator because he followed and defended Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the early days and became a traitor in the later days. To say that he was a conspirator requires a reverse interpretation - using the fact that he later became a traitor to explain his earlier "good behavior". From the point of view of the consistency of formal logic, Wang Jingwei's transformation from a "good man" to a "bad man" is completely inexplicable.

Near explanation, for example, we walk into a room and see a man sitting in front of a table with a bottle of water on the table. We automatically assume that the owner of the bottle of water is that person, on the grounds of proximity. This is the proximity interpretation caused by physical proximity. There are also proximate explanations due to relational proximity, i.e., if a junior high school student is not good at arithmetic, the junior high school teacher may assume that there is something wrong with the teaching method of the student's elementary school teacher. The reason is that "the student was taught by that (elementary) school teacher" and the two are related. Finally, there are close explanations arising from similarities. This includes physical similarities and conceptual similarities. Physical similarity, for example, if you know the properties of the metal sodium, you can make a guess about the properties of the metal potassium on the grounds that they belong to the same main group. Conceptual similarity, for example, what is the difference between "simple dialectics", "idealistic dialectics" and "materialistic dialectics"? For someone who has not specialized in these terms, the explanation is to give a definition by using one of the terms of the class he knows best, together with the meaning of the adjective of the object to be explained. Formal logic naturally cannot recognize near-interpretation, because it belongs to the category of blind guesses and nonsense. But the existence of the above phenomenon proves the relativity of formal logic.

Analogy, i.e., making analogies, is a common logic used in life, as well as a general method of argumentation in plain philosophy. It is naturally flawed - a tomato and an apple are not the same thing, so how can they be "compared"? This is totally unacceptable from the point of view of formal logic. But it is a common logical phenomenon.

There should be other logical processes in plain logic. Naturally, plain logic has the limitation that it can explain anything, and therefore cannot be excluded. In other words, in plain logic, there is no such concept as "false logic". This is clearly incorrect.

Plain logic is a spontaneous, unsystematic logical process. Spontaneous in the sense that often we use plain logic without even realizing it. Unsystematic, in the sense that specific processes of plain logic can stand alone. I can analyze one problem by reverse interpretation, and another by comparison, without considering whether the two problems are related or not, and whether the "difference in treatment" is justified or not. Plain logic underpins most of our daily lives, and it is clear that this logic is constantly making mistakes. This is where instrumental logic comes in.

Formal Logic and Instrumental Logic

Instrumental logic is the logic of conscious systems. It is clear that its task is to sort out, correct, and guide thinking, and its purpose is clear. Then there is the fact that the principles of instrumental logic cannot stand alone; there is one principle, and the others are its corollary. The reason why it is a tool is that it is mechanical and stereotypical, and both sides in various forms of antagonistic situations can use it to justify themselves - it does not have a value in itself, but can only reflect the value orientation of its users.

The answer to the question of whether instrumental logic can fully solve the problems posed by plain logic is clearly negative. The reason is that instrumental logic denies or disregards plain logic, that is to say, it denies plain logic too much. This over-negation leads to the fact that instrumental logic cannot thoroughly clean up the errors in plain logic, and cannot screen out the correct components in plain logic. Secondly, instrumental logic itself is composed of three contradictory subcategories, i.e. nominal logic, formal logic and representational logic. This leads to the fact that instrumental logic cannot sort out plain logic with a unified standard. According to the degree of systematization, plain logic is basic and instrumental logic is relatively advanced. Plain logic and instrumental logic constitute a contradiction. There is no need to mention the aspect of struggle between them, but the aspect of connection is that all three of them, i.e., naming, reasoning, and representational processing, can find their corresponding behaviors in plain logic. In plain logic, naming is to call out the name of "XX" and say what it is about, reasoning is to "guess", and representational processing is to fantasize. These specifics are very general in plain logic, but in the next stage of logic, they are self-contained.

Let's start here with some introductory remarks about nominal logic.

According to the view of serial versus parallel forms of cognition, nominal logic is transformational logic. It realizes the conversion between serial thinking (e.g., linguistic processing) and parallel thinking (e.g., representational processing)-expanding the conclusions of serial thinking and pointing out the conclusions of parallel thinking. It carries out the function of direct identification of objects, the function of conceptualizing the subconsciously dimly perceived or extra-conceptual realities to the level of consciousness, and provides the strict material (exact starting point) for formal and representational logic, while at the same time reprocessing the conclusions of the formal and representational logic, and starting to name them again.

The logic of nominalization requires that the resulting name or property be consistent with the corresponding premise and the category of the object of nominalization - formally, against the violation of the one-to-one correspondence between concepts and categories, and the violation of a single form of subordination between concepts within the same premise; and content-wise, against the over- or under-naming of the conceptual category and the category of the object of nominalization, which results in the over- or under-naming of the conceptual category and the category of the object of nominalization. In terms of content, it is against the significant inconsistency between the conceptual category and the object category caused by over-naming or under-naming. Specifically, for example, the real banana is called "banana" and "pineapple", the conceptual "tomato" corresponds to the real tomato and cantaloupe, the conceptual "chalk" corresponds to the real tomato and cantaloupe, and the conceptual "chalk" corresponds to the real tomato and cantaloupe. The concept "chalk" corresponds to both the chalk itself and the real substance, and a black horse is called a "horse" while a white horse is not a "horse" and other sophistries are opposed by nominal logic.

The logic of nominalization operates by naming and describing things that belong to certain categories. To name is to name the category itself as an indivisible element (elemental naming). Describing, is to treat the category itself as a descriptive frontier to describe the attributes that the category itself has (attribute description). The process of element naming involves the problem of naming precision. For example, if a person sees a beech tree, it is enough to say "there is a tree". But a botanist can tell which beech tree belongs to which genus. The naming of elements should be done in such a way that the names of the elements are consistent with the requirements of accuracy. Attribute description, on the other hand, involves the issue of the prerequisite category of description (note that it is the prerequisite category of description, not the object category of description). Since the attributes of a category are inexhaustible, there is a need to limit the act of description itself. For example, if you are asked to talk about yourself, it may not be easy to say, because there are too many things that can be said, and once said, if the conditions allow it is possible to talk about the moment of the end of life. So we have to limit the "say" itself, let's say, asked you to talk about yourself in the "XX aspect".

Having given a property or a name to something in nominal logic, all it can do is convert between the property and the name. This conversion is the induction and deduction of nominal logic - the conversion from name to attribute is deduction; the conversion from attribute to name is induction.

In short, in the logic of naming a thing described as a point (element naming) or a number of lines (attribute description), if you want to "point" or "a line" to continue processing, we need to use formal logic, if you want to a number of lines of the surface of the whole. If you want to work on the whole of a surface composed of several lines, you need representational logic. This is the reason why nominal logic is the starting point of the other two types of logic. The reason why it is "strict" is that representational logic and formal logic do not consciously consider the nature of their starting point in the same way that nominal logic does. That is to say, these two types of logic follow their senses with regard to their starting point and take whatever they feel is right as their starting point. For example, Feuerbach, who thinks that man is a purely natural creature, but also thinks that man has supernatural values and habits - his designation of "man" is confusing. Thus, in his anthropomorphic mechanical materialism, he recognized both the first nature of matter and the creation of history and society by human consciousness, and proposed a God who has only the attribute of "love". He has not done a good job of naming things, and then he uses formal logic to stab him in the back, forming his mechanical materialism. Formal logic is afraid of contradictions, but one of the philosophies that formal logic has spawned - mechanical materialism - is full of things that cannot be justified.

Here is another brief comment on representational and formal logic. Representational logic is parallel logic, which requires one to grasp and manipulate multiple properties at the same time. A person using this logic would say that he has a picture in his head, or that he carries, turns, or modifies an "object" in his head. Artistic creation, drawing tasks, spatial tasks, and epiphanic learning processes are all inseparable from representational logic. Formal logic is serial logic, its essence is linear derivation, and its task is fundamentally the deep processing of a property. Each item of its logic can only consist of a single element, or at least one without contradiction.

Next, we can see how formal logic differs from nominal and representational logic. In contrast to nominal logic, which is directly motivated by the rules and requirements of logic, nominal logic is directly motivated by "discovery". In terms of linguistic function, nominal logic provides the cogs of language, and formal logic sets them in motion. The advantage of formal logic is its movement, i.e., formal logic is a continuous process of derivation, whereas nominal logic can only perform one transformation. The disadvantage of formal logic is that because it can only process a single property, this makes using it to grasp complex things inevitably bring about the loss of the properties of things, resulting in things that were originally complete becoming fragmented, things that were originally connected becoming isolated, and even contradicting themselves at the level of consciousness. Formal logic makes nominal logic valuable, but does not consciously standardize its logical starting point according to the requirements of nominal logic. As a result of the lack of rigor in the starting point, this can produce fallacies that are perfectly consistent with the rules of formal logic.

Formal logic moves forward in steps compared to nominal logic, which relies heavily on epiphanies (somehow it all comes to mind at once, and it feels like it should be that way). Formal logic is verbal, auditory logic. Representational logic, on the other hand, is pictorial, visual logic. Linguistically, representational logic is not easy to express (you need to use nominal logic to translate representations into language), but formal logic does not have this problem. Formal logic has the advantage of being able to work in depth with the parts of things, and the disadvantage of not being able to grasp both the parts and the whole in one logical process. As a result, when formal logic carries out inductive activities, it is often guilty of generalizing or using the general to infer the particular.

The process of deduction in formal logic is a process of constant change of categories. It may change to the side that contradicts its starting point, its original whole, without realizing it - because it denies contradiction, it contradicts itself without realizing it. However, such an error is inevitable due to the laxity of the starting point and the lack of grasp of the whole. It needs to be re-emphasized that formal logic can give rise to philosophy as well. In addition to mechanical materialism, there is objective idealism as well as theology that are products of formal logic. Naturally, formal logic also produces Western natural science. This formal logic approach to natural science is called logical positivism. The form of formal logic that has completely failed is cumbersome philosophy. It is interesting to note that the children of the same mother are all contradictory to each other and to themselves. But the mother denies the contradictions by all means - which fulfills the idea of material dialectics: if you want to hide the contradictions, then the contradictions that are "hidden" will be manifested in other ways in a more bizarre form.

It is easy to see that if we recognize only formal logic, then plain logic, nominal logic, and epistemic logic will be illegal. But formal logic by itself cannot fulfill the task of these other logics, that is, formal logic is not the most general logic. Plus, formal logic cannot unify other logics either, which means that formal logic is not the most abstract logic. Therefore, the most abstract and general logic comes on the scene, i.e., dialectical logic.

Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic

The three principles of dialectical logic are unity of opposites, negation of negation, and reciprocal change of qualities. In addition, dialectical logic has five dimensions, namely, the cause dimension (internal and external causes, root cause - primary cause - secondary cause), the primary and secondary dimensions (primary and secondary contradictions, primary and secondary aspects), the general - special, relative - absolute, whole -local. The three principles and five dimensions are centrally embodied in the "contradiction" point of view and analysis method. In terms of methodology, dialectical logic requires a comprehensive, developmental, connected and contradictory view of the problem, requires specific analysis of specific problems, and requires a clear discussion of the premise of the problem category. The assertion that there are definite truths under definite categories.

Dialectical logic is not to encapsulate contradictions; it is itself based on contradictions - this is the essential difference between dialectical logic and sub-coherent logic. Rather than defending a whitewashed out logical system without contradictions that is about to collapse, dialectical logic examines the contradictions themselves as content. What formal logic does correctly, in the view of dialectical logic, that is either a discourse on quantitative change, or a discourse on a contradiction in a state of reprieve, or a discourse on generality. This kind of discourse makes sense in itself, but if formal logic is going to carry its methods across all fields, it is not the right thing to do to exaggerate formal logic because it is incompatible and incapable of reconciling contradictions between other logics that are subordinate to dialectical logic.

In addition to its characteristic analytic method, dialectical logic is the meta-logic of other logics - it regulates and manipulates plain and instrumental logic. In fact, dialectical logic constitutes an ambivalent relationship with non-dialectical logic, including instrumental logic and plain logic. In plain logic, we can see the ideas of "connection", "opposition", etc. In instrumental logic, we can see the ideas of "connection" and "opposition". In instrumental logic, we can see the viewpoint of the whole, the viewpoint of categories, and the viewpoint of localization. These perspectives are finally united in dialectical logic, and can each do their own thing.

Dialectical logic does not do away with its subordinate logic. As far as the logic itself is concerned, it was originally created on the basis of the existence of contradictions in the subordinate logic. This fulfills one of the ideas of dialectical logic itself, which is that the contradictions themselves drive their own development. Because of the existence of contradictions in its subordinate logic, it can and is bound to emerge. So if the elimination of sub-logic would be tantamount to the elimination of contradiction between sub-logics, then dialectical logic would also lose its logical origin. But to say that the emergence of dialectical logic has had no effect on infra-logic is clearly another error. If before the emergence of dialectical logic, the lower logics were in a mess, then after the emergence of dialectical logic, the relations between the lower logics became explainable and controllable.

For specific individuals, however, the acceptance of the five logics in particular (plain, nominal, formal, representational, and dialectical) varies due to innate and acquired influences. Therefore, if a person who is good at using non-dialectical logic encounters a problem, he or she may want to try using dialectical logic to moderate it. If the lower logic can solve the problem, then use the lower logic to solve it, if not, use the higher logic to solve it. Sometimes the lower logic is able to give a proper answer with a small number of brain cells compared to the huge workload of thinking in dialectical logic.